A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth
A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth
Author(s): Joanna Odrowąż-SypniewskaSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: contextualism; nonindexical contextualism; relative truth; relativism
Summary/Abstract: In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think — just as Haack does (see 2011) — that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 19/2011
- Issue No: 4 (76)
- Page Range: 43-53
- Page Count: 11
- Language: English