Understanding 'Representation-Eschewing' Approaches: An 'Ancient' View
Understanding 'Representation-Eschewing' Approaches: An 'Ancient' View

Summary/Abstract: The paper argues that the fundamental claim of approaches to cognition that are 'representation-eschewing,' such as the enactive one, must have been more intuitively plausible in some cultures where the self is not understood in terms of an inner entity that can feel alienated or separated from the world. Taking cues from ancient literature, the paper demonstrates that even a simple act of perception is understood differently in some ancient cultures. It was more like an activity spread across eyes and objects and not simply an internal event receiving input from the world. This involves understanding oneself as continuous with the rest of existence. Accordingly, there was hardly any need to posit discrete representations inside that stand for objects outside. This suggests that approaches to cognition that are representation-eschewing may appear intuitively implausible in our culture because of certain inveterate but culturally constructed ways of understanding oneself as separate from the world.

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