BEYOND SHORT-LIVED RESPONSES TO MALICIOUS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE UN GGE AND OEWG PROCESSES
BEYOND SHORT-LIVED RESPONSES TO MALICIOUS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE UN GGE AND OEWG PROCESSES

Summary/Abstract: Western democracies imposed international sanctions, issued internationally coordinated public attributions, and/or deployed defensive cyberattacks after being hit by major cyber operations. These responses and measures have a role in reducing malicious state-sponsored activity, but their success is only temporary (if any). Bilateral agreements, such as the one between the US and China, are limited in scope, playing only a brief role. Moreover, a cyber arms control treaty could contribute to a more peaceful cyberspace, but it would be remarkably difficult to monitor compliance. Thus, in this study I shall explore the development and role of the two main United Nations processes on the security and usage of cyber technologies by state actors. In parallel, the paper will discuss the major cyber operations that have occurred during these processes, highlighting that progress has been largely obtained after escalations in cyber operations. The United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts and the Open-Ended Working Groups have achieved some limited results, but conclusive success is far from being obtained. State-actors’ behaviour in cyberspace is still an issue that needs to be regulated and normed at an international level, but it will be difficult to achieve a meaningful consensus among several loosely-formed groups of states with very different approaches to these issues. Thus, democratic states need to go beyond sanctions and use cyber diplomacy for the adoption of an international set of rules.

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