Dwie osoby w jednej głowie? O pewnej (wątpliwej) interpretacji ontologicznej komisurotomii
Two Persons in One Head? On Some (Doubtful) Ontological Interpretation of Commissurotomy

Summary/Abstract: Commisurotomy has attracted the interest of scientists and philosophers concerned, for example, with the question of personal identity. Some have drawn very far-reaching ontological conclusions from experiments on commissurotomics, e.g., that commissurotomy causes a doubling of the conscious mind (Gazzaniga 2018) or that it reveals the fact that also healthy people are not really one, but two persons (Puccetti). Alternatively, that the “doubling of the self” applies at least to commissurotomics with bilateralization of the verbal system (Gazzaniga, LeDoux). In this article I try to show that these interpretations are not warranted, referring, among other things, to the phenomenological argument, the distinction between the experiential and narrative self, and the analogy with various agnosias.

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