МЕРЕЊЕ НЕЗАВИСНОСТИ СУДСТВА DE IURE У РЕПУБЛИЦИ СРБИЈИ НАКОН УСТАВНИХ ПРОМЕНА 2022. ГОДИНЕ
MEASURING INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY DE IURE IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF 2022

Summary/Abstract: More than a decade ago, the author published the co-authored article containing the case study of de iure independence of judges in the Republic of Serbia, as well as of the changes de constitutione and de lege ferenda that could be performed. The authors had applied the methodical framework developed by Melton and Ginsburg, using six key indicators of de iure independence of judges (statement of judicial independence, judicial tenure, selection procedure, removal procedure, limited removal conditions, and salary insulation). Using the same methodological matrix as in the previous article, the author tends to determine what has been done and what changes took place in the Republic of Serbia after the constitutional changes of 2022 and new judiciary laws. Contrary to some assessments in the literature that the novelties of 2022 were just a small or almost no step forward on the path to the rule of law strengthening, the author finds that quite a lot was done and that the weakest points of the previous normative framework (mentioned in the earlier article) are mostly eliminated. All the more, by measuring the same parameters which are determining de iure judicial independence, it is founded that the tendency to achieve “thick” rule of law has been exaggerated. Insisting upon a “romanticised picture” of the independent judiciary was particularly visible in some solutions, particularly those relating to the election of judges. Owing to this quantitative analysis the author finds that the constitutional changes in the Republic of Serbia of 2022 have opened a way to the opposite exaggeration, namely to something that could be labelled in theory as juristocracy/courtocracy.

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