Pluralism and Relativism in Ethics Starting from W. K. Frankena
Pluralism and Relativism in Ethics Starting from W. K. Frankena

Summary/Abstract: This article connects pluralism and relativism in ethics through the path of a classicscholar of 20th century moral philosophy: W. K. Frankena. In normative ethics, Frankena de-fends a pluralist perspective, because in his theory of obligation there is a plurality of basic moralprinciples (exactly two) that may conflict with one another and there is no strict order of pri-ority for resolving conflicts between them. His attitude towards ethical relativism is insteadnegative, because in his view all three versions of relativism in the moral sphere (descriptive,metaethical and normative) are questionable. The author explains the reasons for the plausibil-ity of a pluralist model in normative ethics, but on relativism he shows more openness thanFrankena, in particular by defending a moderate version of descriptive and metaethical relativ-ism, for which on certain issues there may be equally justified conflicting moral evaluations.Such a form of relativism, far from constituting a “bogeyman”, simply expresses the idea thatthe correct use of reason does not necessarily lead to a single outcome, but can have a pluralityof outlets (without thereby allowing every outlet).

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