Responsibility for Bad Beliefs and Moral Relativism
Responsibility for Bad Beliefs and Moral Relativism

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I argue in defense of responsibility for bad beliefs from the perspective ofethics of belief and cognitive science, providing a classification of bad beliefs into three types.I also present arguments in support of the regulative value of truth. Metaethical moral relativ-ism alters the understanding of the basic tenets of the ethics of beliefs and also undermines theidea of truth as a fundamental epistemic good. There are potential epistemic pitfalls associatedwith moral relativism, including its use to support bad beliefs, where truth becomes relative tothe benefit of a group or those in power, thus undermining the very concept of truth. AlthoughClifford’s classic principle is overly demanding, moral responsibility should be required for theway beliefs are acquired, since epistemically ill-formed beliefs tend to become morally and ep-istemically bad under unfavorable social conditions.

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