NAČELO MILOSRĐA
THE PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY

Summary/Abstract: The focus of this paper is the oft-referred to principle of charity, as formulated by one of the most influential American philosophers of the 20th century, Donald Davidson. The application of this principle, according to Davidson, is what crucially differentiates the social sciences from the so-called natural sciences, and with this in mind, this paper adumbrates the broader implications for epistemology and methodology. In the analysis of this principle, we have focused more narrowly on its semantic subspecies, that is to say, the form that the principle acquired in Davidson’s theory of language, not in his “unified theory of action.” The numerous and differing formulations of the principle sometimes complicate the discussion, so we have sought to identify a common denominator, the common inner conceptual tendencies that characterize Davidson’s vision of this principle. The discussion evolves on the basis of specific semi-problematic situations, which are set forth at the very outset in order, wholly in the spirit of contemporary analytic philosophy, to facilitate an adequate analysis of the proper application of the principle of charity. These semi-problematic situations are taken into consideration to a significant extent through the lens of their scientifically defensible and relevant descriptions. It was redundant, in so doing, to emphasize that the principle of charity goes far beyond the narrow concept of the dry logical or methodological, purely “verbal” and “superficial” or “non-philosophical” analysis as suggested by widespread prejudices in regard to analytical philosophy. The discussion is further comprehensively dedicated to three particular features: a) the reasons for approaching the principle of charity on a communicational basis, contrary to Davidson, rather than semantically à la Davidson; b) the reasons why the formulation of the principle must necessarily remain fluid and fuzzy; c) the critically unsustainable aspects of Davidson’s distinctive philosophy of the language of charity, and the defence of those aspects which his critics, such as McGinn, have wrongly or “uncharitably” interpreted.

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