THE REVISABILITY OF COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY Cover Image

THE REVISABILITY OF COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY
THE REVISABILITY OF COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY

Author(s): Nada Gligorov
Subject(s): Psychology, Philosophy of Science, Neuropsychology
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: Folk Psychology; commonsense; eliminative materialism; revisability; neuroscience;

Summary/Abstract: Various views of the mind/body problem adopt one of the two general strategies towards explaining phenomena: one approach is to take into account the intuitions found in common sense, and the second is to go against those intuitions. The first type of theory attempts to ground views of particular phenomena on our common sense. Eliminative Materialism (EM) is not such an approach. EM urges that commonsense psychology is false and should be replaced by neuroscience. Eliminativism has often been challenged. Some have attacked the premise that commonsense psychology is a theory; others have attacked the claim that it is a false theory, which can be replaced. I plan to countenance the argument that commonsense psychology is an empirical theory that can be replaced, which will, surprisingly, lead me to an argument against eliminativism. My view is that commonsense psychology cannot be eliminated because there are no commonsense theories.

  • Issue Year: 53/2010
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 53-61
  • Page Count: 9
  • Language: English
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