DVE VERZIJE EKSTERNALISTIČKOG TUMAČENJA EPISTEMIČKOG OPRAVDANJA
TWO EXTERNALIST ACCOUNTS OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Summary/Abstract: This article deals with two prominent versions of externalist account of epistemic justification, the reliable indication theory and the reliable process theory. According to the reliable indication theory, a belief is justified if it provides a reliable indication of the occurence of the state of affairs which makes it true. The reliable process theory holds that a belief is justified if it has been formed by a reliable cognitive process. The main contentions of this two accounts are analyzed and compared in the light of three more general and fundamental externalist ideas: (1) justification need not be cognitive available to the person whose belief is in question; (2) justification should be connected to the truth of the belief in such a way that it makes the case that one’s epistemically justified belief is likely to be true; and (3) justification of one’s belief depends on the causal history of the belief.

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