OVER-DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION IN KANT’S ETHICAL PJILOSOPHY: CASE OF IMPERFECT AND PERFECT DUTIE
OVER-DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION IN KANT’S ETHICAL PJILOSOPHY: CASE OF IMPERFECT AND PERFECT DUTIE

Summary/Abstract: In this contribution we will discuss the demandingness objection with regardto Kant’s ethics. While in the literature there has been an emphasis on this issue with regard toimperfect duties, our main goal is to show Kantian ethics has resources to resort to in the case ofthe demandingness objection in the class of perfect duties. For doing this, first we will discuss theinherent difference between imperfect and perfect duties while the duty of rescuing being a casein-between the two classes of duties through linguistic proof. Furthermore, we consider differentpossible components of a moral theory, introduced by Scheffler, which can lead todemandingness: (i) a required process of decision making, (ii) overridingness and (iii) thestringent content of demands. While we concur with Kantian critics that the stringent content ofKantian ethics may be a source of demandingness, we will show that Kantian ethics has resourcesto respond to demandingness arisen from other components. For this purpose we discuss Kant’snotion of “Vorsatz” (intention), accompanied by the device of Flouting, introduced by Grice inhis Conversational Implicatures.

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