KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE
AND THE DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Cover Image

KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY

Author(s): THODORIS DIMITRAKOS
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti
Keywords: Thomas Kuhn; philosophy of history; history of science; scientific rationality; Imre Lakatos;

Summary/Abstract: In the present paper, I provide a reconstruction of Kuhn’s philosophy of history of science based mainly on Kuhn’s criticism of Lakatos. My goal is to examine the compatibility of the Kuhnian philosophy of history with his explicit aspiration to defend scientific rationality. I argue that the Kuhnian philosophy of history is essentially formed by three tenets: (a) contextualism, (b) radical anti-presentism, and (c) naturalism. I conclude that the combination of those three tenets is incompatible with the logical distinguishability between being-justified and being-taken-to-be-justified, which is a prerequisite for the proper defense of scientific rationality.

  • Issue Year: 72/2023
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 19-43
  • Page Count: 24
  • Language: English
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