On What Is Personally Appealing on Conceptual Relativism Cover Image

On What Is Personally Appealing on Conceptual Relativism
On What Is Personally Appealing on Conceptual Relativism

Author(s): Daniel Dancák
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Keywords: realism; conceptual relativism; the gap; epistemological status; ontological status; personal appeal

Summary/Abstract: Conceptual relativism is not an attractive position. Surely, it has its ups and downs,but the ups are rarely mentioned. This article has no ambition to provide a resolute groundbreakingargument in favour of the conceptual realism. It only aims to reconstruct the very basis of thegiven position from the defendant’s point of view, while giving a bit of a personal (or existentialif you will) touch to the whole topic.The personal element in question resides in the fact thatthere are incommensurable percepts, experiences, even worlds which all “feel” equally real tothe subjects. This is something to what realism does not seem to be able to do justice withoutdiminishing the ontological status of the “wrong” opinions, beliefs, etc., but this does not seemto go well with how we experience our “imperfect” realities. Conceptual relativists, however, arefree from strictly distinguishing between correct and incorrect views on reality and, thus, theyare able, if nothing else, to retain and appreciate the reality of our subjective worlds.

  • Issue Year: 1/2023
  • Issue No: 9
  • Page Range: 1-15
  • Page Count: 15
  • Language: English
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