REALNOST, FUNDAMENTALNOST, UTEMELJIVANJE (I SRODNI POJMOVI)
REALITY, FUNDAMENTALITY, GROUNDING (AND COGNATE NOTIONS)

Summary/Abstract: The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls “the pure logic of ground” by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico-explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an “essentially contested concept”, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.

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