EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS OF DISAGREEMENT AND RETRACTION
EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS OF DISAGREEMENT AND RETRACTION

Summary/Abstract: Elke Brendel claims that, regarding several challenges, her nonindexical contextualism fares better than the so-called indexical versions of contextualism supported by prominent epistemic contextualists such as Keith DeRose, Stewart Cohen, etc. Of these challenges, we will consider the problems of disagreement and retraction. I will argue that the indexical nature of DeRose’s account doesn’t necessarily have to relate to personally indicated standards. Instead, I will offer an interpretation that generalizes the idea of conversational context and determines conversationally indicated epistemic standards as the main bearer of the content and the truth condition of knowledge attributions. In some cases, conversationally indicated epistemic standards are collapsing into personally indicated. In other cases, some form of the reconciliation of personally indicated standards produces the final conversationally indicated epistemic standards. This interpretation is motivated by Mion’s contextualist position, but in the first stage, it doesn’t require his notion of objective contexts. When dealing with typical face-to-face disputes, this interpretation of DeRose’s position will successfully account for the challenge of disagreement. Only when we are faced with so-called one-way disputes and the challenge of retraction, we will depart from DeRose, and instead, refer to Mion’s position. I will claim that by adopting his view, we are in a position to better respond to these two challenges, than Brendel with her nonindexical account.

• Details
• Contents