IMPLIKACJE EKONOMICZNE TAK ZWANYCH ZABÓJCZYCH PRZEJĘĆ Z PERSPEKTYWY ANTYMONOPOLOWEJ
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SO-CALLED KILLER ACQUISITIONS FROM THE ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE

Summary/Abstract: There have been broad and vigorous debates for several years over a relatively recent phenom-enon of so-called killer acquisitions, whereby incumbent large companies (mostly with marketdominance) preempt future competition by acquiring potential competitors (mostly start-ups)equipped with innovative technology. The article explores the economic implications of suchtransactions, and how their repercussions influence the approach of the antitrust authorities tothis phenomenon. First, an initial explanation of the concept and idiosyncrasies of killer acquisi-tions is presented. Then, their effects on innovation and competition are discussed in more depth,considering the actual scale of this phenomenon and its empirical examples. This is followed bya brief description of the difficulties in identifying and assessing killer acquisitions in terms oftheir economic characteristics. The article’s methodology is based on the analysis of economic andlegal literature on the subject matter, and partly on the dogmatic and legal analysis of antitrustregulations and practice. Based on the research findings it is suggested that, despite the concep-tual vagueness of killer acquisitions, as well as their complex economic implications, there seemsto be a growing belief that this is a real and significant problem, which cannot be solved solelywith conventional antitrust tools, not to mention the market’s self-regulation. It does not appearthat searching for an optimal response to the challenges posed by killer acquisitions will lead tothe development of a silver bullet, if only because of the jurisdiction-specific economic and legalbackgrounds.

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