PASTABOS APIE ANALITINIŲ IR SINTETINIŲ TEIGINIŲ PERSKYRĄ
Remarks Concerning the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the paper is to outline in general the defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction in the context of the famous Quine's criticism in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Firstly, it is difficult to understand why Quine does not raise the same objections with regard to logical truths which are dependent on the rules and synonymy of logical particles. Secondly, there is confusion between prescriptive sentences as rules, and descriptive sentences about actual linguistic practices: the validity of rules does not depend on the actual pre-existing usage. Thirdly, explicit definitions (which are a transparent case for Quine) rely crucially on our pre-existing ability to implicitly use the relation of synonymy. Fourthly, it is possible to explain the analyticity in less formal ways than Quine requires (besides, less formal ways are necessary to explain crucial terms in his own article). Fifthly, a defender of the analytic-synthetic distinction need not think that analytic sentences are immune to revision "come what may".

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