NORMATIVE STATECRAFT: THE EU SANCTIONS POLICY ON RUSSIA’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA
NORMATIVE STATECRAFT: THE EU SANCTIONS POLICY ON RUSSIA’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

Summary/Abstract: The instruments of economic statecraft have been utilized increasingly in the face of geopolitical challenges. The EU’s response to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 was to impose sanctions. This paper analyses the EU as a normative sanctioning power in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 until the start of the Russia-Ukraine War on February 24, 2022. In its Global Strategy, the EU mentioned sanctions as a credible tool in the Union’s foreign policy mix. Following David A. Baldwin’s economic statecraft conceptualisation, this article argues that, in various contingencies, economic statecraft might constitute a credible option, especially if the potential perils of military statecraft in a nuclear world are considered. The EU sanctions after the annexation of Crimea functioned at least for two purposes: first, the EU successfully conveyed its messages to Russia and the wider international community that what Russia committed was not approved. Although this message could be conveyed verbally diplomatically, as done by many international actors, the EU’s message was supported with relatively credible instruments compared to ineffective verbal declarations. Secondly, the EU committed itself through the sanctions on the Ukrainian cause. Thus, this paper argues that although economic statecraft cannot be considered a cure for all the vagaries of geopolitical challenges, it has proved to be an essential part of the policy mix of a containment strategy upon the annexation of Crimea.

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