THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (PRESENT DILEMMAS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES) Cover Image

THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (PRESENT DILEMMAS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES)
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (PRESENT DILEMMAS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES)

Author(s): Igor Milinković
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, ICT Information and Communications Technologies
Published by: Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци
Keywords: artificial intelligence; moral status; dignity; legal personhood;

Summary/Abstract: The rapid development of artificial intelligence systems raises dilemmas regarding their moral and legal status. Can artificial intelligence possess moral status (significance)? And under what conditions? Can one speak of the dignity of artificial intelligence as the basis of its moral status? According to some authors, if there are entities who have the capacities on which the dignity of human beings is based, they would also possess intrinsic dignity. If dignity is not an exclusive feature of human beings, such status could also be recognized by artificial intelligence entities. The first part of the paper deals with the problem of moral status of artificial intelligence and the conditions that must be fulfilled for such a status to be recognized. A precondition for the existence of moral status of artificial intelligence is its ability to make autonomous decisions. This part of the paper considers whether developing autonomous artificial intelligence is justified, or, as some authors suggest, the creation of artificial intelligence agents capable of autonomous action should be avoided. The recognition of the moral status of artificial intelligence would reflect on its legal status. The second part of the paper deals with the question of justifiability of ascribing legal personhood to the artificial intelligence agents. Under what conditions would recognition of legal personhood by the artificial intelligence be justified and should its legal subjectivity be recognized in full scope or only partially (by ascribing to the artificial intelligence agents a “halfway-status”, as some authors suggest)? Current state of the legal regulation of artificial intelligence will be observed as well.