ON EFFICIENCY, BARGAINING POWER AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL METHODS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION FOR IN BONIS COMPANIES IN ROMANIA AND ENGLAND
ON EFFICIENCY, BARGAINING POWER AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL METHODS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION FOR IN BONIS COMPANIES IN ROMANIA AND ENGLAND

Summary/Abstract: This study offers a comparative and economic analysis of Romanian and English creditor protection methods concerning in bonis companies. The focus of the analysis is on the rules of alternative or self-help rules as well as an exploration of the theory of appearance (error communis facit ius) and estoppel from a Romanian and English perspective, to determine what is the functionality and efficiency of these methods, including law and economics considerations. Thus, we are conducting both a comparative analysis of a continental and common law system as well as an economic analysis of law. We consider efficiency problems in regard to the underlining market failure of informational asymmetry in creditor protection scenarios. We concluded with the ways in which these alternative creditor protection methods are structured and can help remedy the problems faced in the bargaining process in the creditor-debtor paradigm, offering a new perspective on the dynamics of a form of creditor protection which has not been thoroughly considered

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