Finanzielle Daumenschrauben gegen Rechtsstaatssünder: Der Konflikt Ungarns mit der Europäischen Union um das liebe Geld
Financial Thumbscrews on Rule of Law Offenders: Hungary’s Conflict with the European Union over Dear Money

Summary/Abstract: For years the European Union has tried to solve conflicts over the rule of law with the Hungarian government through dialogue-based instruments. The deployment of these has not, however, led to substantial results. Instead, Hungary has become the first “electoral autocracy” in the European Union. Against this backdrop, the European Union has expanded its strategy of financial conditionality to the area of rule of law and EU values. While the so-called rule of law conditionality, established in 2020, is the most prominent instrument of value-related financial conditionality, it is by no means the only one. This article briefly overviews the EU’s expanded ability to put financial pressure on member state governments that dismantle the rule of law. It then examines how the Commission has recently combined several of these instruments to put pressure on the Orbán government. While financial conditionality is the most promising alternative to previously used instruments, it is nevertheless unlikely that it will lead to a fundamental change in the government’s policies.

• Details
• Contents