ULUSLARARASI ÖRGÜTLER, KOŞULLULUK VE DEMOKRATİK TEMSİL: YUNANİSTAN’IN IMF DENEYİMİ
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CONDITIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: THE IMF EXPERIENCE OF GREECE

Summary/Abstract: The impact of IMF programs on democracy is frequently debated in the international organizations literature. During a negotiation process, while the IMF has its own negotiation agenda, the public signals its preference to the government. Democracy is unaffected when the two overlap. When they diverge, however, the impact depends on the relative power of the borrowing government vis-à-vis the IMF. This article focuses the impact of IMF programs on domestic representative institutions. The study analyzes an extreme case of the IMF impact, namely Greece between 2010 and 2015, and using findings from the interviews with the former ministers, parliamentary representatives, and Troika officials. The analysis claims that whenever the borrowing government is weak vis-à-vis the IMF and there is a disagreement between the governing party and the IMF, IMF programs curtail the representative function of democratic institutions. This has significant implications for the party systems and the future of democracy in borrowing countries such as the rise of rightwing and left-wing populist parties capitalizing on the violation of “sovereignty” and reduced trust in representative institutions, as demonstrated in Greece between 2010 and 2015.

• Details
• Contents