Doświadczenie weredyczne i niepodważalność racji w dysjunktywizmie epistemologicznym Johna McDowella
The Veridical Experience and the Indefeasible Reasons in John McDowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism

Summary/Abstract: McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism is based on the thesis that veridical and nonveridical experiences have a different epistemic status. Some veridical experiences may be a case of the manifestation that x is F ― McDowell believes that in such a case, the subject has an indefeasible reason for believing that x is F takes place. In the critical part of the article, I show that experience understood in this way cannot provide the subject with an indefeasible reason, since the identification of experience as the case of the manifestation that F is x, is a fallible ability. In the last part of the article, I show that we can accept the concept of perceptual justification without the need to accept the idea of the indefeasibility of reasons.

• Details
• Contents