Influence Operations, between the Ethical and Critical Facet
Influence Operations, between the Ethical and Critical Facet

Summary/Abstract: The psychological operations (PSYOPS) doctrines of many NATO member states, including Romania, do not allow the use of influence activities on internal audiences. While this is an ethical provision, difficulties arise when formulating an adequate counter-propaganda strategy, as domestic groups that are susceptible to influence are targeted by an effective propaganda conducted by the adversary. The 2014 edition of the NATO doctrine on PSYOPS (psychological operations) was ambiguous with regard to this limitation, while the Romanian doctrine from 2016 kept it, in accordance with the older NATO doctrine from 2007. With this limitation PSYOPS risk being ineffective in countering propaganda, their role being restricted to analysing the effects of the propaganda on the audiences and making recommendations to counter it. Without using influence activities, the recommendations would be, based on the scenario, addressing the public or not (choosing “silence”) with information activities through the responsible structures. Going further, inform and influence activities (IIA) intertwine, which leads to the need for more clarity in the doctrines that regulate their employment. The propaganda of the Russian Federation in Donbas, that victimised the separatists leading to their support for the invasion of Ukraine is a relevant example for situations when PSYOPS should be allowed to target internal audiences. The present paper does not go into detail on the case of Ukraine but problematises on the above-mentioned ethical limitation that has the advantage of giving the adversary advantages on multiple levels.

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