ニクソン・ショック後の日ソ関係再考 ── グロムイコ訪日から田中訪ソまで（1971–1973）──
Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Aftermath of the Nixon Shock: From Gromyko’s Visit to Japan to Tanaka’s Visit to the USSR (1971–1973)

Summary/Abstract: The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s, epitomized by Nixon’s announcement of his visit to China in 1971, triggered a strategic reconciliation between Japan and the USSR, which took the form of negotiations on a peace treaty in 1972–1973. The biggest obstacle to these negotiations was the so-called “Northern Territories” issue, the key to which lay in the handling of Kunashir and Iturup, namely the two larger islands. Focusing on the discussions over this issue, this research note seeks to revisit the process and results of Japanese-Soviet efforts to improve mutual relations against a backdrop of transformation in the Cold War. For this purpose, I use the recently declassified documents from the diplomatic archives of Japan, Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. While the Japanese government strove to make use of rapprochement with the USSR as a lever for its diplomacy with China, the Soviet leadership considered it an urgent issue to improve relations with Japan in terms of preventing the formation of an anti-Soviet front by Japan, China, and the U.S. Therefore, the USSR not only sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Tokyo just before Nixon’s visit to Beijing, but also formulated a guideline policy for concluding a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty immediately after the birth of Tanaka Kakuei’s administration. To retard the latter’s approach to China, the USSR began to offer Japan such concessions concerning Kunashir and Iturup as fishing, port calls, grave visits, and joint economic activities, in addition to the promise to return Habomai and Shikotan. As the Tanaka administration rapidly achieved the normalization of relations with China, the USSR gradually hardened its policy toward Japan. Meanwhile, with the military-strategic significance of Kunashir and Iturup reemerging and with the urgency of a compromise with Japan reduced by its rapprochement with the United States and Western Europe, the USSR finally shifted to a tough stance toward Japan and decided to withdraw the abovementioned economic and humanitarian offers. As a result, the Soviet leadership adhered to the position of rejecting any other proposals than the two-island solution during Tanaka’s visit to Moscow in October 1973. The dispute over the sovereignty of the “Northern Territories” was the fundamental cause of the breakdown of talks on a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty from 1972 to 1973. Notwithstanding the proposal for the “return of the two islands” or the transfer of economic and humanitarian rights concerning the other two islands, the USSR was persistent in advocating indisputable sovereignty over Kunashir and Iturup and demanding official recognition from the Japanese side. In contrast, major foreign policymakers in Japan united on the bottom line that the sovereignty of Kunashir and Iturup should not be relinquished outright. Still, the Japanese government had several options for the solution of this issue: the argument of “phased return” premised on the recognition of Japan’s “residual sovereignty,” as well as the method of “parallel consultation” with a view toward continuing deliberation with the Soviets over the ownership of Kunashir and Iturup while negotiating over the issue of safe fishery in the surrounding waters. For the USSR, an only acceptable “parallel consultation” could be a non-political settlement of Kunashir and Iturup without touching the question of sovereignty while discussing terms of returning Habomai and Shikotan. In other words, Japan and the USSR came to an impasse even around the procedural issue of dialogue. These elements of confrontation would remain in the Japanese-Russian relationship after the end of the Cold War.

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