Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness
Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness
Author(s): Jean-François Rougé, Borislav ChopovSubject(s): Economy, Economic policy, Fiscal Politics / Budgeting
Published by: Oikos institut-Istraživački centar Bijeljina
Keywords: tax optimization; harmful competition; aggressive tax planning; transfer pricing; tax havens; lobbying; subventions; fiscal incentives; flat tax;
Summary/Abstract: Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game (Colonomos, 2005) based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.
Journal: ECONOMICS-INNOVATIVE AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH JOURNAL
- Issue Year: 4/2016
- Issue No: 2
- Page Range: 75-93
- Page Count: 19
- Language: English