Imagining the Ring of Gyges. The Dual Rationality of Thought-Experimenting
Imagining the Ring of Gyges. The Dual Rationality of Thought-Experimenting

Summary/Abstract: In her already classical criticism of thought-experimenting, Kathy Wilkes points to superficialities in the most famous moral-political thought experiments, taking the Ring of Gyges as her central example. Her critics defend the Ring by discussing possible variations in the scenario(s) imagined. I propose here that the debate points to a significant dual structure of thought experiments. Their initial presentation(s) mobilize the immediate, cognitively not very impressive imaginative and refl ective efforts both of the proponent and the listener of the proposal. The further debate, like the one exemplifi ed by Wilkes’s criticisms and some of the answers, appeals to a deeper, more rational variety of imagination and reasoning. I suggest that this duality is typical for moral and political thought experimenting in general, conjecture that it might be extended to the whole area of thought experimenting.

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