Disputatio on the Distinction between the Human Person and Other Animals: the Human Person as Gardener
Disputatio on the Distinction between the Human Person and Other Animals: the Human Person as Gardener

Summary/Abstract: While the Catholic intellectual tradition upholds the uniqueness of humans, much contemporary scientific research has come to the opposing conclusion that humans are not significantly different from other animals. To engage in robust dialogue around the question of human uniqueness, we utilize Aquinas’s model of disputatio to focus on an attribute of human beings that is unexplored in the literature – namely, the human capacity to garden – and address five scientific and philosophical objections to our position that the capacity to garden makes humans distinct. Engaging with various branches of science, we demonstrate that human capacities and modes of gardening are not only incrementally different, but also fundamentally different in kind, from those of nonhuman creatures. Philosophically, we utilize the power-object model of division and Aristotle’s categorization of knowledge to express the difference in kind between human beings and other animals. These responses allow us to set aside each major objection.

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