RELEVANŢĂ, HOLISM ŞI PROBLEMA „DEZACORDULUI PROFUND” ÎN ARGUMENTAREA DELIBERATIVĂ PUBLICĂ
RELEVANCE, HOLISM, AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT IN DELIBERATIVE ARGUMENTATION

Summary/Abstract: The crucial problem, in informal logic, of what Fogelin (1985) and his commentators - Lugg (1986), DavsonGalle (1992), Adams (2005), Friemann (2005), Turner&Right (2005) - call „Deep Disagreement‛ is that of the inferential (as assertions) rather than epistemological status of the so-called „framework propositions‛. It will be argued that a holisticinferentialist approach to assertions - one that defines assertions in terms of the inferential articulation of their conceptual content -, and a coherentist understanding of the notion of relevance in argumentation may contribute to avoiding many central problems confronting Informal Logic in treating cases of disagreement in public deliberative argumentation.

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