NATO’s Eastern Flank: between Deterrence by Denial and Deterrence by Punishment
NATO’s Eastern Flank: between Deterrence by Denial and Deterrence by Punishment

Summary/Abstract: The military action against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has substantially raised the level of tensions between the Russian Federation and the West, and changed the military dynamics in Eastern Europe. Naturally, the states in the region and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have become much more concerned with identifying effective solutions to strengthen deterrence and defence. In this context, the aim of this article is to analyse whether the logic of deterrence has changed in the case of conventional allied presence on the Eastern flank (Enhanced Forward Presence/eFP and Tailored Forward Presence/tFP). From an official perspective, NATO’s two initiatives fall under the umbrella of deterrence and defence. However, on the one hand, there are researchers/experts who assume that eFP and tFP are manifestations of deterrence by punishment, and on the other hand we can identify another side that supports a logic of deterrence by denial. By applying elements of deterrence theory to the analysis of recent developments on the Eastern flank - the deployment of four additional battle groups in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania; the increase in the number of troops in the existing battle groups – one can see that a deterrence by punishment approach is maintained (the threat of a global-alliance response in the event of an attack). Although there have been significant developments in NATO’s conventional military presence on the eastern flank, the requirements of a strategy by denial are still not being met.

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