Ľudská prirodzenosť a norma
Human Nature and the Norm

A Metaethical View on the Theory of Natural Law according to Thomas Aquinas

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the paper is to examine metaethical aspects of the theory of natural law in Thomas Aquinas. The theses of the paper is that Aquinas does not reduce the meaning of the term ‘good’ to something natural and does not derive value judgements from the factual. In the first part, the main arguments are presented in favour of irreducibility of the meaning of ‘the good’. In the second part, the main argument is introduced in favour of a dichotomy between fact and values (the difference between factuals and value judgments). In the third part, the understanding of the concept of good is introduced. Subsequently, the concept of the natural law is presented in which the idea of human nature is also present. In the fifth part, the relationship between human nature and practical reason is explained in the constitution of moral norms. In the penultimate part, the understanding of human affectivity/emotionality and rationality is introduced with regard to the problém of determining the source of moral good or evil. Finally, the article concludes that Aquinas Concept of Natural Law is an example of moderate cognitivism and naturalism. Aquinas does not commit the naturalist fallacy, because human nature is working as a data provider for a practical reason, wich is the creator of moral norms.

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