The (Ab)use of Soft Law in Shaping EU Competition Law: Undermining the Effectiveness of Leniency Programmes
The (Ab)use of Soft Law in Shaping EU Competition Law: Undermining the Effectiveness of Leniency Programmes
Author(s): Javier Guillen CaramesSubject(s): Economic policy, Law on Economics, EU-Legislation, Commercial Law
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Keywords: EU competition law; leniency programmes; cartels; competition authorities; cooperation; soft law; legal ramifications;
Summary/Abstract: One of the defining features of EU competition provisions is that they are enforceable and applicable by the authorities and courts of the European Union and those of its Member States. The European Commission and national competition authorities participate in the application of EU competition law to differing degrees. Different legal mechanisms are adopted to apply Article 101 TFEU, including leniency programmes aimed at pursuing cartels, considered to be the greatest risk to free competition in the European Union. These programmes are implemented using non-binding mechanisms of soft law, which has generated a number of issues for the European Commission and the administrative competition authorities of the Member States when applying European and national competition laws.
Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (YARS)
- Issue Year: 14/2021
- Issue No: 24
- Page Range: 95-115
- Page Count: 21
- Language: English