“Бях в три страни, които и трите се казват България”. Географско-пътеписни съчинения за България и българите от XV век

Author(s): Vasil Gyuzelev / Language(s): Bulgarian / Publication Year: 2014

The present anthology comprises translations of 47 works (travel notes and log books, geography accounts, itineraries, portolans, treatises, sermons, novels and a variety of others); they are made up of either detailed or concise reports dealing with the Bulgarian lands and their inhabitants during the fifteenth century. They are the works of authors of various affiliations in terms of ethnicity, religious denomination or nationality (Arab, Bulgarian, Byzantine, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish ones, etc.) They are meant to draw out an image of the state of affairs in the Bulgarian lands, as well as of the general state of the Bulgarians during the century in question, and also supplement and add up to the details listed in the papers and historical records pertinent to the period mentioned being of paramount importance in view to the Bulgarian history. They clearly and unequivocally show that during that period of time, the recollections over the Bulgarians and their nation had as of yet been clear and very much alive not only in the minds of many, but also distinct to almost all of Europe. Meanwhile, the details they feature provide for a clarification of the way of life of the Bulgarian people in the first few decades it had under the sway of a foreign rule, their part partaking not only to their history, but to the ones of the Balkans and Europe. The selected works of the remarkable medieval Bulgarian writers from that century, such as Constantine of Kostenets and Vladislav the Grammarian, stand out from the rest in the anthology. Their geographical and travel notes to a large extent account for the vigour of the Bulgarian national creative zest displayed in the course of a grievous century from the Bulgarian history. Brief notes on the certain authors and their works publications have been added to each and every translation of the particular sources. The written commentary with the particular texts is concise and relates a purposive information. A considerable portion of the texts comprised in the respective anthology has for the first time been brought to the knowledge of the reading party in Bulgaria. In a great measure, it is what would determine their significance as tools for a further scientific research.

“РОДИНА-МАТЬ” В СИМБОЛИЧЕСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ ПЕРОДА “БОЛОТНОЙ РЕВОЮЦИЙ”: ЛЕГИТИМАЦИЯ И ДЕЛЕГИТИМАЦИЯ ВЛАСТИ

Author(s): Oleg Vjacheslavovich Riabov / Language(s): Russian / Issue: 4/2015

The article dwells upon the using of the symbol of the Motherland in the discourse of the Russian protests 2011-2013 (the «Snow Revolution»). The author analyses legitimation and delegitimation of power as forms of the symbolic politics. The first part of the article is devoted to role of the symbol of the Motherland in Russian culture. The next section concentrates on employing the symbol in legitimation of power. In the third part the author demonstrates how the protesters exploit two modes of delegitimation of power with the help of the symbol: the «populist» and the «liberal».

„... ZASTALIŚMY W ZAKRYSTII TURKA W ZAWOJU, Z BRODĄ OGROMNĄ”. ADAM PROSPER BURZYŃSKI OFM (1755-1830) JAKO PREFEKT APOSTOLSKI W EGIPCIE

Author(s): Tomasz Moskal / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 15/2016

Władysław Adam Burzyński OFM (1755-1831), monk, missionary in Egypt, Sandomierz bishop. In the 1791 year began the missionary work in Egypt. During the campaign of Napoleon of Bonaparte, cooperated from fighting at the side of the emperor Gen Stanisław Zajączek. In years 1802- 1808 prefect apostolic, responsible for works missionary. Outstanding priest, made preacher.

„Balkanski“ i „zapadni“ makijavelizam: Z-4 - diplomacija i/ili oružje?

Author(s): Albert Bing / Language(s): Croatian / Issue: 3/2015

The article deals with the genesis and the epilogue of one of the last attempts to resolve the problem of the occupation of Croatia through diplomatic channels on the eve of the military denouement in 1995. The initiative Z-4 (Zagreb four talks) was started in the direct talks between the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith immediately after reaching the Washington Agreement in March 1994 (which cleared the path to closer Croatian-American cooperation and the future Dayton Agreement). Although it had never been achieved – given the new circumstances after the military intervention of Croatia in 1995, in the historical sense the diplomatic initiative Z-4 represents a significant political and diplomatic (inter)phase of an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem of reintegration of the occupied Croatian territory. As one of the basically American initiatives, Z-4 equally shows the controversial background of the US policy towards „the region“, the complex issues of political and military cooperation between Croatia and the US (which in the period from 1994 to 1995 became the backbone of the final outcome of the (post)Yugoslav „crisis“), that is to say, the positions of some of the most important factors in the international community. In the broader context, Z-4 has also been analysed as a historical document that expressed different value features of understanding of the political (re)organisation of Croatia, as well as the complex background of the real political premises of the Croatian and American policy, i.e. the forum of international community.

„Barátok a bajban” A főtitkár és más nemzetközi szereplők diplomáciai tevékenysége az ENSZ szomáliai szerepvállalása idején

Author(s): Dávid Pusztai / Language(s): Hungarian / Issue: 1/2008

THe organisations of the United Nations and other international organisations in the Somalian affairs.

„Ideea rusă” în politica externă a Uniunii Sovietice, 1939-1941, I

Author(s): Ioana Elena Secu / Language(s): Romanian / Issue: 1-2/2016

Since the takeover of the Soviet power in 1925, by adopting an ideology tributary to the Tsarist roots, Stalin succeeded – the signing of the Moscow Pact (August 23, 1939) – to impose his own ‘russocentric’ policy. Through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet-German partnership that followed (1939-1941), Stalin managed to create a replica of the Russian Empire at the western borders of the USSR. The extension of Soviet influence in the territories of eastern Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Southeastern Europe (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) meant ensuring a restricted security sphere at the boundaries of the west of the Soviet Union. We believe that, for Stalin, the security of the Soviet state could be fulfilled only through the international political supremacy, an ideal followed by every russian vojdi (leader). In our study we observe whether and to what extent the role of the Russian idea– manifested by the need for supremacy – was decisive in designing and implementing foreign policy directions by Stalin during the Soviet-German alliance (1939-1941).

„Ideea rusă” în politica externă a Uniunii Sovietice, 1939-1941, II

Author(s): Ioana Elena Secu / Language(s): Romanian / Issue: 3-4/2016

Since the takeover of the Soviet power in 1925, by adopting an ideology tributary to the Tsarist roots, Stalin succeeded – the signing of the Moscow Pact (August 23, 1939) – to impose his own ‘russocentric’ policy. Through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet-German partnership that followed (1939-1941), Stalin managed to create a replica of the Russian Empire at the western borders of the USSR. The extension of Soviet influence in the territories of eastern Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Southeastern Europe (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) meant ensuring a restricted security sphere at the boundaries of the west of the Soviet Union. We believe that, for Stalin, the security of the Soviet state could be fulfilled only through the international political supremacy, an ideal followed by every russian vojdi (leader). In our study we observe whether and to what extent the role of the Russian idea– manifested by the need for supremacy – was decisive in designing and implementing foreign policy directions by Stalin during the Soviet-German alliance (1939-1941).

„Pošteni posrednik”. Jugoslavija između starih i novih spoljnopolitičkih partnerstava sredinom pedesetih godina

Author(s): Vladimir Petrovic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

The contribution is dealing with the specificities of an important stage in the transformation of Yugoslav foreign policy in the 1950s, characterized by the Yugoslav attempt to conceptualize a flexible diplomacy by performing the role of a broker in international affairs. Mediation in resolving crises was a pragmatic manifestation of the Yugoslav doctrine of active peaceful coexistence, as well as an attempt to harmonize various commitments acquired during intensive cooperation with the West, the East and the noncommited countries. The role of Josip Broz Tito in the development of the Middle East crisis 1955–56 is particularly scrutinized. Through his contacts with state offi cials of all sides, he attempted to alleviate the crisis, legitimizing at the same time an awkward Yugoslav position and presenting the country as a useful impartial channel of global communication. This strive towards the role in international relations which Yugoslavia could hardly sustain brought mixed results. The unpredictability of the international brokering was underlining the tension between the goals of such policies and the scarce resources Yugoslavia had, and was largely abandoned in favour of more institutionalized approach to international relations.

„Semper meliora prospiciuntur et utiliora attenduntur.”

Monoszló nb. Péter erdélyi püspök társadalmi és politikai kapcsolatai

Author(s): Mihai Kovács / Language(s): Hungarian / Issue: 1/2015

Bishop Peter Monoszló’s family had solid political relationships, and himself was a very skillful politician. These facts allowed him to have the status of a magnate. The Transylvanian bishop supported always the strongest candidate for the crown, knowing that a solid central government is a vital interest of his bishopric. Similarly to the other Hungarian bishops of his time, he fought persistently against king Ladislas IV, which he considered to be a pagan. He kept good relationships with Transylvanian voivodes and the local nobility, being in the same time ready to fight anytime for the rights of his bishopric. He had similar relations with his fellow bishops. To consolidate his military power he built two stone fortresses. Thanks to Peter Monoszló’s activity the fortune and prestige of the Transylvanian bishopric grew considerably. That’s why, after his death, voivode Ladislas Kán wanted at any price to have his own man as a bishop. His memory inspired the Transylvanian chapter to elect a magnate bishop decades later. We don’t have too many sources to illustrate bishop Peter’s religious feelings, but we may consider – knowing his activity – that his main interest was in keeping and enlarging his bishopric’s rights and freedoms. His priorities are very well illustrated by the arenga cited in title of an episcopal document.

„W MOCY DUCHA ŚWIĘTEGO. KSIĘGA PAMIĄTKOWA DLA JEGO EKSCELENCJI KSIĘDZA BISKUPA EDWARDA BIAŁOGŁOWSKIEGO Z OKAZJI XXV ROCZNICY ŚWIĘCEŃ BISKUPICH”, RED. P. MIERZWA, M. NABOŻNY, RZESZÓW 2013, S. 496, ISBN 978-83-936516-0-3

Author(s): Waldemar Palecki / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 18-20/2013

„История на завладяването на Константинопол от Мохамед II“ от Леонард Хиоски

Author(s): Aleksandar Nikolov / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 1/2015

„Пражката пролет” – 1968 г. и някои аспекти на нейното отражение в България

Author(s): Vladimir Migev / Language(s): Bulgarian / Publication Year: 0

Important liberalization of the regime in Bulgaria in early 1960s increased the interest of Bulgarian intelligenzia for Czechoslovakia. Bulgarians were particularly impressed by films about „the Czech wonder in the cinema” which showed a new freedom-loving spirit which had already gained ground in Czechoslovakia. With the beginning of the „Prague Spring”(January 1968) the authorities imposed a total informational „blackout” about events in the brotherly Slavic country. Tendentious and „debunking” materials against the „Czechoslovak revisionists” became more frequent during spring and summer. However, the Bulgarian public found ways to get information about the real state of affairs, mainly by listening to Western and Yugoslav radio stations. The days of the „State Security” showed that the majority of Bulgarians, particularly the young and students, reacted positively to the „Prague Spring”. Due to the large influx of unoffi cial information, the government was forced to report, albeit on a limited scale, about the struggle of Czechs and Slovaks against the occupiers after August 21.

„Пражская весна” 1968 г. и позиция руководства Венгрии

Author(s): Aleksandr S. Stikalin / Language(s): Russian / Publication Year: 0

The Hungarian communist leader Janos Kadar who launched limited economic reforms in his country since January 1968 assessed the moderate reform-communists in Czechoslovakia as the potential allies in his desire for certain modernization and rationalization of the socialist economics in Eastern Europe. Realizing the negative attitude in Kremlin to the ideas of Prague reformers, the Hungarian leader attempted to be the mediator between the Soviet and Czechoslovak communist leaderships. He tried to persuade Brezhnev and the members of his team that the reformist plans declared in Czechoslovakia would not threaten the Communist power in the country and therefore the Soviet interests. On the other hand, he called the Czechoslovak colleagues to more discretion and more attention to the interests and anxieties of the USSR. In mid-June when the Czech literary weekly published the article marking the 10-th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy, Kadar corrected his attitude towards the events in neighbor Czechoslovakia. He was sure that the Dubček leadership was losing control over the political processes, and that there was a real danger that the developments in Czechoslovakia would get the form similar to the developments of the Hungarian crisis in 1956. Nevertheless, Kadar tried to influence further both the Czechoslovak and the Soviet colleagues to meet and he pretended still to be the mediator between Moscow and Prague. Even in August, he preferred the peaceful solution of the conflict but did not dare oppose the joint military action implemented on August 21, 1968. His choice was in accordance with the priorities of Kadar’s foreign policy. The Hungarian leader avoided threatening the normal relations with the USSR for he was sure that they were the main guarantee of more independent and fruitful internal policy. The „Prague Spring” revealed the limited possibilities of Kadar’s regime to pursue more active foreign policy without running the risk of undesirable complications with the USSR.

„Сербскія новины“ о событиях в Польше в 1791 г.

Author(s): Tamara Stoilova / Language(s): Russian / Issue: 3-4/2014

Serbskіja novini was issued in Vienna in 1791 and was intended for the Serbian readers in the Habsburg monarchy. The newspaper provided valuable information about the political life in the empire and in Europe and also reflected the events in Poland, which the Constitution of May 3, 1791 finally turned into revolutionary. The article examines the published reports from Poland. Most of them referred to the activity of the Polish Diet (deliberative assembly), to the adopted Constitution and the reaction of the Poles and the neighboring monarchies to changes in Warsaw. Albeit incomplete and not always accurately, Serbskіja novini introduced its readers in the events reflecting the zeitgeist

Църковният закон на патриарх Василий в Архивския номоканон (ЦИАИ 1160)

Author(s): Ancho Kaloyanov / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 2/2015

The Arhivski Nomocanon (Church History and Archives Institute 1160) is end of the 14th century copy of the Penitential Nomocanon of the Bulgarian church. Its initial composition originated in 913 from translated and domestic legal documents and later new texts were added, among which we identify Patriarch Vasilii’s Ecclesiastical law. In the Law the total number of rules is 117, united thematically in 9 groups, of which the first two are meaningful: the first is about the hierarchy in the autocephalous Church headed by a Patriarch, the second establishes the priority of the ecclesiastical court over the tsar’s court, sign of the uniat with Rome (1204–1232) at the time of Patriarch Vasilii’s rule.

Църковно-националната борба в Македония от 1870 до 1913 г.

Author(s): Christo Temelski / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 2/2000

The church-national struggle continued almost four decades and ended on February 27, 1870, with the foundation of an independent Bulgarian church hierarchy in the form of a Bulgarian hexarchy by virtue of a decree of the sultan.

Църковнонационални борби в София до отхвърляне властта на Цариградската патриаршия

Author(s): Antoaneta Kirilova / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 1/2018

Based on published and newly discovered unpublished sources, as well as the existing historical research on the topic, the author reconstructs the church-national struggle in Sofia in the years after the end of the Crimean War (1856). The events in Sofia are discussed in the context of the national struggle for an independent Bulgarian church and in comparison with the similar activities in Plovdiv at the same time. Two main moments in the church movement in Sofia attract the attention and form the cores around which the source material is focused: the reaction in the city after the secession from the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 3 April 1860 in the Bulgarian church „St. Stefan“ in Constantinople – two months later Sofia’s Bulgarians also renounced the Patriarchate and reinforced this with relevant changes in the municipal self-government; the dramatic events in Sofia in 1861 when the citizens of Sofia defended their previously stated position on the church issue by refusing to accept the patriarchal bishop – Bulgarian Dorotheos.

ЧЕ ГЕВАРА У ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ 1959. ПРИЛОГ ПОЗНАВАЊУ УСПОСТАВЉАЊА ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКО­КУБАНСКИХ ОДНОСА

Author(s): Milica Pejcinovic / Language(s): Serbian / Issue: 2/2017

One of the greatest idols of the twentieth century, Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, was visiting Yugoslavia in Avgust 1959. It was a significant visit which wasn’t characterised as important in public and in media. On the one hand, it is understandable, because Che Guevara first stepped on the historical stage just a few years before he came to Yugoslavia and he wasn’t as planetary popular as he is nowdays. In those days, he was young and rebellious revolutionary who has just found himself in politics and his time was yet to come. Che Guevara – the right hand of Fidel Castro, a minister, a commandant, a physician, the icon of the 20th, but also of the 21th century. This encounter was important for Yugoslav – Cuban relations, as well as for two historical figures, Tito and Che Guevara, who possessed revolutionary spirit, although originated from different continents and with different ambitions. His visit was important for Guevara, because he wanted to learn everything about revolution and guerrilla warfare. Guevara learned techniques of warfare and hiding in the woods from Yugoslav soldiers, which he applied in Bolivia 1967. This visit was also significant for the better development of Yugoslav Cuban relations.

Чекић Или Наковањ? Немачка После Прве Мароканске Кризе 1905/06

Author(s): Nenad Milenovic / Language(s): Serbian / Issue: 53/2006

The essential problem of Germany’s international position after unification was its disproportionately great strength in comparison with other powers and the fact that this disproportion was constantly increasing. That trend was to continue right up to 1914. Germany was not only stronger than any other European power individually, but it was also capable to single-handedly take on even a coalition of several other powers, as it was to be amply demonstrated in World War I. Immediately after the unification, Bismarck realized the fear that Germany instilled in its neighbours and the potential negative consequences this fear could have for Germany itself. Consequently, he attempted to adapt his foreign policy to these circumstances, making it moderate and cautious, with the goal of preserving the situation created after 1871. However, soon after Bismarck left, the Kaiser’s diplomacy tore down the basic postulates of his foreign policy. As if that was not enough, a policy was launched, designated as Weltpolitik, although no one defined that concept, or connection of that policy with German national interest. Bismarck’s successors did not have clearly defined national interests for Germany to pursue. They thoughtlessly and irrationally reduced the entire foreign policy to a simple an illogical choice between two alternatives. So as not to be an “anvil” in European politics, Germany had to be a “hammer”. An unavoidable consequence of such a policy was the rapid deterioration of relations with other Great Powers. The great speed with which the process of degradation of the international position of Germany was progressing at the beginning of the 20th century was equal to the speed of its military and economic growth. In 1890, just about every experienced European diplomat would have jeered and shaken his head at the thought of an alliance between Britain, France and Russia. In 1906 at Algeciras it could be seen that such an alliance was definitely going to become a reality. It is an irony of history that for the greater part this alliance was not the work of some diplomat from one of the member states, but of the very nation against which it was directed. In his time, Bismarck had been faced with the possibility of an alliance of that kind and he made every attempt to avoid its consequences – the surrounding and isolation of Germany. Now the German politicians were faced with the reality of that alliance, and in 1905, they made the first in a series of attempts to break that encirclement and thus eliminate negative consequence of their restless, erratic, inconsistent and incalculable foreign policy. But to no avail. The last such attempt would lead into World War I.

Червената армия – „армия-освободителка“ или окупатор: поглед от XXI в.

Author(s): Petya Dimitrova / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 5-6/2016

The article is dedicated to some issues related to the memory of one of the most important events of the 20th century – World War II. The author traces the debate on the role of the Red Army in the war as part of the total revision of its history picking up momentum after the collapse of the communist system and the self-dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The analysis of the changes over the past three decades in the views of this greatest clash in the history of mankind, respectively, the role of the Soviet army in it, rests on several basic postulates. The first of them is the view that history is an endless process of self-knowledge and is related to the need of each generation to make sense of the past in terms of the issues and problems of its present, i.e. the rethinking of what happened during the Second World War is not an exclusive priority of the post-communist era. Secondly, this is a process that affects, at one time or another, each of the states participating in the war, not just the countries of Eastern Europe, from the so-called “socialist camp”, which for many years were forced to adhere to the Soviet version about the war. Thirdly, the history of World War II, taken as a collective historical memory, demonstrates clearly the “multivoicedness” of the historical narrative, the principle inability to build an adequate account of the past from a single point of view within an unmistakable history. On the contrary, we are witnessing a kind of “war of memories”, not only between national discourses but also between the “memories” of different groups of society within one country. It is undisputed, however, that the great rewriting of the history of World War II is in the post-communist era and is mainly related to the participation of the USSR in the war. And the great “battle” of the memories here is led between today’s Russia on the one hand and the former members of the “socialist camp” and of the Soviet Union itself, on the other. That is why the debate about World War II and the role of the Red Army is traced in the article through the prism of the development of the historical policy of the participants in the war. The zigzags in the Russian interpretation of the historical events are compared to the new narratives of Poland, Ukraine and the three Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the countries located in a special region of Eastern Europe, designated by the Yale University Professor Timothy Snider as the geographical, moral and political centre of the mass murders in the old continent.