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Lyubomir Miletich was the main initiator and organizer of the Macedonian Scientific Institute founded in 1923, whose Statute he penned himself.
More...Rola Wielkopolski i Wielkopolan w polityce Kazimierza Wielkiego do roku 1345
In the early years of his reign, Casimir the Great had to cope with the legacy of his father, Władysław the Elbow-high. Władysław the Elbow-high’s final years had seen him struggle with a powerful noble of Wielkopolska – Wincenty Nałęcz of Szamotuły, who had emerged as the victor in this trial. Casimir could not afford to ignore the noble houses of Wielkopolska. The early days of his reign witnessed his attempts to resolve matters with the Teutonic Order and Silesian principalities and to forge an alliance with the House of Wittelsbach. He also had to stand up to Czech pretensions to the Polish crown. To negotiate with the House of Wittelsbach, the king needed the endorsement of the knights of Wielkopolska, which abutted Brandenburg. Mikołaj Doliwa of Biechów and Jarosław Grzymała of Iwno saw to the durability of the Polish-Brandenburg alliance. Notwithstanding the brevity of the pact, the impact of the two knights on mutual relations was so great that the king nominated them both for the then highest official positions (provincial governors) in gratitude for their work.
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Relations between the Roman and the early Chinese Empires have been considerably popular fields of research, however, principally from a trade-oriented point of view. Contextualising Roman-related glass finds unearthed in the People’s Republic of China provides a more complex nexus. Transparent glass vessels carry multiple testimonia of cultural impacts and interactions, leading towards a stereotyped and utopian perception of the Imperium Romanum. This paper focuses on the complexity of such inter-imperial connections through contextualising the most significant Roman-interpreted glass finds in China. Furthermore, by a detailed and critical examination of Roman-related transparent glass vessels, it also aims to highlight problems of earlier identifications and interpretations. In addition, a precise recollection of the existing data not only allows to catalogue these various glass objects, but also helps to insert these glass artefacts into the Roman glass typology system.
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The author analyses the international importance of the Act of 5th November from the point of view of the future of Poland in the post-WWI international deal. The declaration of two emperors represented an “important step towards Poland’s reconstruction” (as Szymon Askenazy, a Polish historian, observed). However, the declaration failed to ultimately internationalize the Polish cause and determined itself the existence of the Polish state. The document was a product of special circumstances resulting from the fact that Germany was running out of human resources indispensable to continue the war. It was also possible because of the abortive attempts at securing peace with Russia on the basis of a territorial status quo. The declaration represented Berlin’s grand-scale political move, connecting with the history of the German political thought with assumptions originated by Bismarck and general Waldersee and revolving around the idea of establishing a small Polish state when it is necessary in the course of a war with Russia. Despite the proclaimed establishment of the Polish state by the governments in Berlin and Vienna, the Western powers (France and Great Britain) were not able to force Russia to acknowledge Poland’s independence. They assigned the government in Petrograd the right to deal with the Polish cause at its discretion i.e. to delineate the Western border of the empire according to its will once the acts of war were over. The historian therefore concludes that it was not before the February Revolution in Russia when actual possibilities opened up for the Western powers to support the Polish cause. In their policies, they did not include willingness to make the world a better place by principles of international justice but rather, they intended to maintain Russia as an allied force in the anti-German coalition at all cost.
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The main subject of this article is the relationship between the Ottoman state and semi-nomadic groups in the Ottoman Danubian frontier zone (serhad) in the late 15th and the first half of the 16th century. Taking the two extremities of the Danubian frontier zone – the provinces of Smederevo in Serbia and Silistre in the northeastern Balkans – as case studies, the article compares the ways in which the Ottoman state dealt with semi-nomadic Vlachs at one end of the frontier zone and Turcoman yürüks (and related groups) at the other. Placing the subject in the broader context of the historical development of the Danubian frontier zone, the author analyzes the Ottoman state’s changing policies toward these two groups. Taking into account the largely different historical legacies and demographic make-ups, the article analyzes the many commonalities (as well as some important differences) in the way the Ottoman government integrated such groups in its administrative structure. It highlights the process in which such semi-nomadic groups, traditionally utilized by the Ottoman state as auxiliary soldiers, were gradually “tamed” by the state in the course of the 16th century, becoming gradually sedentarized and losing their privileged status.
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Because of the legacy of 1956 the hardest country to engage behind the iron curtain was Hungary. The history of the Hungarian political amnesty, a milestone in the development of the most liberal system in the Soviet bloc is an anatomy of the hurdles of diplomacy in dealing with a closed dictatorship under the sway of a foreign power. The new Soviet-installed government launched massive reprisals against real and alleged participants of the revolution. For the first time the US was able to influence events in a Soviet controlled country through diplomatic efforts exerted in the UN. In 1962 after years of difficult negotiation the leaders in Budapest agreed to amnesty political prisoners in exchange for the removal of the Hungarian Question. The settlement was in the best interest of the Hungarians. The regime’s international position was an embarrassment for Moscow. Hungary was internationally isolated. That the deal was so long in the making showed the difficulty of dealing with a client state supported by a world power. The political committee’s view of world matters was formed by the tenets of communist ideology. This and the knowledge that they would be backed by the Soviet Union through thick and thin allowed the Hungarians to adopt a rigid and uncompromising stance. They exploited domestic weakness to garner support in a conflict that Moscow was ready to settle. Kádár expected American officials to deal with Hungary as a proud independent national entity. Communist functionaries struggled to understand the motivations of American policy. American diplomats found it hard to strike the right tone when dealing with their communist counterparts. Also they did not know about the inner power struggle behind the facade of communist unity. The Kádár regime’s eventual willingness to strike a deal and put an end to domestic terror had to do with his desire to launch the country on a road to economic modernization. This required a gradual and limited opening to the West. One of the pillars of this new policy would be the normalization of relations with the US. Prudently the State Department made it known that this would not happen until political prisoners were freed. In the meantime US goals in Eastern Europe went through drastic change. This was matched by a new approach to the Soviet bloc. The liberation of Eastern Europe and the reunification of the continent were deemed unfeasible. Therefore a more moderate aim of “continental re-association” was adopted. In fact the restoration of the independence of states in Eastern Europe no longer seemed an unequivocally more preferable condition than the Soviet control of middle Europe. Rather than destabilizing them as in the fifties the US became interested in the consolidation of more liberal communist regimes as a prerequisite of western security. In other words as opposed to the doctrine of the 50s western security no longer required the restoration of national independence. Liberation and containment was replaced by the doctrine of bridge building. This aimed at the gradual transformation of communist regimes to more liberal and more autonomous albeit not independent or fully democratic entities within the tolerance limit of the Soviets. By the early seventies the European status quo was “not so bad” for the Americans. The East Europeans’ only hope for liberation would be change within the Soviet Union.
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Using unknown archival sources in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Ukraine, this study focuses on the work of scientist-agronomist, public figure and diplomat Konstantin Matsievich (1873–1942). The study deals with his academic activity in Russia, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, as well as with his participation in the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the late nineteenth - early twentieth century and the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921. We analyze the activity he carried out in Parliament, the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, as head of the Ukrainian People's Republic diplomatic missions in Romania and Bulgaria and as the leader of Ukrainian political emigration in interwar period in Romania. The current paper shows, for the first time in historiography, the role Konstantin Matsievich played in the unification of Ukrainian political emigration in Europe under the auspices of the State Center of the Ukrainian People's Republic.
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This paper examines the foreign policy of the Galician-Volhynian prince Roman Mstislavich. Roman became the main military ally of the Byzantine Empire in the early 13th century. Byzantium was going through a severe political crisis caused by the Serbian and the Bulgarian uprisings and by the crushing raids of the Cumans. According to Niketas Choniates, the nomads’ aggression could have been stopped only thanks to the aid of the Galician prince Roman. The circumstances and the time of Roman’s campaign in Choniates’ account are the same as in the Russian chronicles reporting the steppe campaigns of the Galician-Volhynian prince.
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The research of the last two decades revealed a multi-faceted political and historical continuity between the Hittite Empire and the so-called Neo-Hittite states. This article investigates a hitherto neglected aspect, the literature. Though the investigation must be restricted to the historiography due to the oddities of the tradition of Luwian texts, their motifs and stylistic devices unambigously show that these texts are organic followers of the Hittite historiography (and that they acquired many own characteristic features in the course of time). Although the exact technical details of the transmission between the Hittite Empire and her successors require further investigations, the monumental inscriptions of the Hittite Great Kings and the successor state in Karkamiš must have played a central role in this process.
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Poland’s location and history have often brought up the issue of its borders. During World War II and just after its end the issue became topical again. Interna¬tional diplomacy had to undertake the task of deciding about the futurę of Germany yet another time in the first half of the 20th century. The issue of new borders was integral part of this decision and one of its basie elements. Poland being perforce directly affected by the border decisions wanted to participate actively in the work on the preparation of the possible futurę peace treaty with the western neighbour. Special institutions were established for this purpose. Within the Polish government in exile the Ministry of Congress Work conducted its activity and after the war was over the new Polish authorities formed the Office of Congress Works. Presenting the details of border decisions concerning Poland or Germany which were the result of the war is not the aim of this article. It is aimed at showing the visions of these borders which were developed in these two Polish institutions in two different political realities. Both the Ministry of Congress Work and the Office of Congress Work produced a large number of studies concerning the futurę borders. They were prepared by experts connected with various research institutions as well as columnists, military men and politicians.
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Japan was the only allied power that was not directly threatened by the effects of the Russian defeat in the war. In Tokyo news about the two coups in Petrograd in 1917 (of February and October) were met with a wait-and-see attitude. But, from the spring of 1921 on, both the British and the French wanted to send troops to Russia, initially to support, then to reactivate the collapsing front in Russia. In Siberia (Vladivostok was one of the main reception points of allied supplies) such an action could have been conducted only by the Japanese. The plan, however, fuelled mistrust of Washington that regarded it as a threat to American interests.It was not until after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, recognized as the beginning of German-Bolshevik cooperation that Woodrow Wilson consented to the Japanese action in Siberia. There was one condition, however, that participation of Japan could not exceed that of U.S., Britain and France. Yet, already in the first months of the intervention which began in August 1918, the Japanese forces (70,000 troops) deployed in Siberia were ten times the number of the other allies together.The Japanese ignored the Russian government of Admiral Aleksandr Kolchal (despite the fact that they recognised it). Their hidden aim was to create a buffer pan-Mongol state which would include also the part of Russian Siberia. Those plans were met with strong opposition, especially of the United States, which was skilfully used by the Bolsheviks to their advantage. An expensive expedition drained the Empire’s treasury, and their official aims were totally obscured for average Japanese people (including soldiers). And after the victorious Bolshevik revolution, they also lost their meaning. America insisted that Japan withdraw from Siberia, and all that Japan wanted was to save face, so it demanded compensation for the massacre of several hundred Japanese expatriates in Nikolayevsk in February 1922. Finally, on 25 October the Japanese troops left Vladivostok.
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By the end of 1917, the leader of the Czechoslovak independence movement Tomaš G. Masaryk was keeping a close eye on the organisational development of the Polish corps in Russia. He had numerous talks with Polish politicians on military cooperation. In November 1917 there was in Kiev a Polish-Czechoslovak meeting during which the talks about cooperation were held. The main point of the meeting was the form of contacts between institutions and organisations of the two countries in Russia. A possible joint action of the forming Polish and Czechoslovak military formation was also brought up. During the talks Poland informed the Czechoslovak delegates that at that stage of developments the main demand of the Polish party was – apart from a collective declaration of the Entente states on the creation of the independent Polish state as their war aim – to obtain the approval of the Russian government for the formation of a Polish Army in Russia. After the Bolshevik coup, when the security of the Czechoslovak Corps was increasingly threatened, Masaryk tried to persuade the Polish leaders and General Eugene de Henning Michaelis who at that time was the inspector of the Polish military forces in Ukraine and Romania, to concentrate the Polish troops in the vicinity of the Czechoslovak forces. This was to increase security of the forming Polish corps and the Czechoslovak one. Also most of Czechoslovak commanders and members of the Czech and Slovak POW’s organisations were of the opinion that closer military cooperation was desirable. But, in the face of increasingly frequent conflicts between the Polish and Ukrainian units, and actions of the Polish troops defending the Polish property in Ukraine, Masaryk began to distance himself from closer cooperation with Poles, as he feared that the Czechoslovak troops could be accidentally involved in fights between Poles and Ukrainians or Bolsheviks. His fears prevented him from pursuing closer Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation in Ukraine at the end of 1917.
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The Polish-Soviet War (1919–20) is one of the key events in the process of implementation of the Versailles order in Eastern Europe. Having saved the Versailles deal, the war gave the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an extremely valuable opportunity, for twenty years, to decide about themselves and build their own nation states on the remnants of three empires, which disintegrated in the aftermath of the geopolitical revolution brought by the Great War (1914–18). From the very beginning, the West did not understand the geopolitical significance of the Polish-Soviet War, seen as a local conflict of two countries, triggered by ‘Polish imperialism’.
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