Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica
Review of: Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1995, 141 s.
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Review of: Joseph Bocheński: Nove lezioni di logica simbolica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1995, 141 s.
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The author tries to outline Fregeś semantics for indexical expressions. The task is rather problematic because there seems to be some inconsistency between general principles of Fregeś semantics and requirements posed by him for semantics of indexicals. The main problem arises when we ask which kind of sense ought to be expressed by an indexical expression. Two proposals as possible answers are discussed, one suggested by John Perry, the other by Pavel Tichý. Both proposals are in part right but there are some arguments against their general validity. Then the author sketches another suggestion which preserves the main contributions of the above proposals but nullifies their mistakes.
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The main aspect of the intuitionist ontology of mathematicsis the conception of mathematical objects as products (constructions) of the human mind. This paper argues that so long as the existence of mathematical objects is made dependent on thehuman mind (or even any physically realizable mind), the intuitionist ontology is refutable in that it is inconsistent with our well-confirmed beliefs about what is physically possible. At the same time, it is also argued that the intuitionistś attempt to remove this inconsistency by endowing the mind with various highly idealized features and capacities will erase any significant ontological difference between Intuitionism and Platonism.
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Nezaujatému pozorovateli lze prominout, pokud při pohledu na současnou filosofickou scénu zprvu nabude dojmu, že sleduje lidi, jejichž hovory se míjejí.
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V stati [4] uviedol Peter Sýkora na slovenskú filozofickú scénu jeden zo zaujímavých a diskutovaných problémov teoretickej biológie i filozofie biológie - problém biologického druhu.
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Review of: Pavel Tichý: O čem mluvíme?Vybrané stati k logice a sémantice. Filosofia, Praha 1996, 161 s.
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Though Frege's second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency to render words "meaning" and "význam" as proper translations of German word "Bedeutung", used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects (i. e. wordś referent or denotation). Fregeś basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as wordś content, or wordś sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Fregeś answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Fregeś conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word "meaning" as translation of "Bedeutung" does not cohere with Fregeś possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. "denotation" as much better and clearer translations than the above one.
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The author tries to show that if we indentify properties with their extensions (sets) and accept the assumption that universe of discourse is the same at all world-time couples, we can simplify the Gödel´s ontological proof of the existence of God: the necessary existence of God follows from the first three axioms and Gödel´s definition of God (translated into the language of set theory).
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Mnohí filozofi sú náchylní hovoriť o pojmových schémach. Tieto schémy sú podľa nich spôsobmi organizácie skúsenosti; sú systémami kategórií, ktoré usporadúvajú naše zmyslové dáta; sú hľadiskom, na základe ktorého jednotlivci, národy alebo epochy posudzujú dianie. Je možné, že schémy sú navzájom nepřeložitelné, čo by znamenalo, že presvedčenia, túžby, nádeje a poznatky určitej osoby nemajú nijakú skutočnú analógiu u toho. kto reprezentuje inú schému.
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Je nesporne zaujímavé sledovať, akými mnohorakými metamorfózami prešiel vývoj sémantických teórií prirodzených jazykov od čias zakladateľov modernej sémantiky, predovšetkým Fregeho a Russella.
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The ontological proof of the existence of God from Gödel´s heritage is presented and analysed in regard to the classical ontological proofs, due to Descartes and Spinoza, and their criticism by Leibnitz and Kant. Some recent works are taken into account as well, mainly the criticism of Descartes´proof by R. M. Smullyan, the emendations to Gödel´s proof by C. A. Anderson and the analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions and biases behind the proof (and the modern European science in general) assumed from scholastic, due to P. Vopěnka.
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In the first part of this paper, the author analyzes several unacceptable views of properties of physical objects (particulars) and justifies the familiar explication, according to which properties of physical objects are certain functions defined on the set of all couples w,t, where w is a possible world and t is a moment of time (it is assumed that the universe of discourse is the same at all couples w,t). On the background of the indicated understanding of properties, the author demonstrates that there exist empirical essential properties. An empirical property is understood as a property, the extension of which cannot be identified without applying experience. He distinguishes two kinds of essential properties: (i) purely essential and (ii) partially essential. A purely essential property has the same extension at every world-time couple. The extension of a partially essential properties changes in the logical space, but there exists a non-empty set of objects which is a subset of their extension at every world-time couple. Every partially essential property is empirical. The author pays special attention to the essential properties expressible by means of expressions of the form (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) where P, Q are non-essential empirical properties that are allied through some objects X1, ..., Xn - i.e., the property (λx)(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) belongs to the objects X1, ..., Xn at every world-time couple. In the last part of the paper, the author demonstrates that every empirical property of the type (λx)(x < I) where ”<” denotes the relation of being a part of, and ”I” stands for any physical object, is purely essential. The assumption that the extensions of these properties are changeable, entails unacceptable consequences.
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Úvodom autor konštatuje, že si pokladá za povinnosť, pretože filozofia dialektického materializmu znateľne preniká aj k nám, podať analýzu jej noetických základov.
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The problem of the meaning of a reasonable natural language expression is solved. First, traditional ”denotational” approach is criticized. The meaning of a sentence is not its truth value, similarly the meaning of, eg, ”The president of U.S.A.” is not Bill Clinton, etc. Frege met this problem when analyzing the so called propositional attitudes in which ”denotational” approach has lead to the paradox of analysis. His well-known solution consists in splitting the meaning into sense and reference. But this is rejected in the paper as well, for its radical contextualism. In the first attempt, meaning is defined as an intension — mapping from possible worlds and time points — (empirical expressions) or extension (analytical expressions), respectively. The problem of the propositional attitudes is seemingly solved. The proposition that Morning Star = Evening Star is different than that of Morning Star = Morning Star. But, alas, in the case of analytical expressions we get the paradox of omniscience. A fine-grained solution is, therefore, proposed: the meaning is a closed construction denoted by the respective expression. Yet this solution is still not precise enough. Eventually the meaning is a concept which is the equivalence class of quasi-identical constructions indiscernible from the conceptual point of view. Finally, homonymous, synonymous and (analytically and empirically) equivalent expressions are precisely defined. Concluding we state that only synonymous expressions, having exactly the same meaning, ie. representing one and the same concept, can be mutually substituted in propositional attitudes without lea_ding to paradoxes.
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The aim of the paper is to attack some prejudices against contemporary analytical philosophy spread among Slovak philosophers. The author tries to show that 1. the analytical philosophy is philosophy and not logic or logical analysis of language, that 2. this philosophy is not purely analytical and 3. it is not a system of assertions accepted by all analytical philosophers but rather a philosophical movement unified by the conviction that philosophical problems cannot be put and solved properly without knowledge of language and its logic. In authorś opinion the analytical way of doing philosophy is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy. Contemporary analytical philosophy conspicuously resembles the ancient Greek philosophy in the period of its bloom.
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The paper considers one of the most enigmatic problems of Wittgenstein`s Tractatus - the problem of solipsism. The authorś task is to reveal how the discussion of solipsism illuminates Wittgenstein`s metaphysical view in this treatise. Wittgenstein`s method is considered as one through which the status of what cannot be said is demonstrated. Wittgenstein has not embrased solipsism or idealism in the Tractatus, and neither has he rejected metaphysics as a whole. His attack has been directed against dogmatic philosophy and ethics, against the effort to say what cannot be said in true/false propositions. The discussion of solipsism brings into philosophy the importance of metaphysical "I" as a transcendental limit of the world and language. Wittgenstein`s aim in the Tractatus has been twofold: a) to show the nonsensicality of philosophical, ethical, aesthetical propositions (based on truth function theory), b) to emphasize, that the inexpresibility of the higher (in language) is the most important thing in our lives.
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Po prečítaní repliky môjho oponenta sa ina zmocnilo nefalšované pobavenie a priznávam, že takmer som podľahla pokušeniu začať svoju odpoveď výkladom o paralógii ako bežnej metóde nielen na slovenskom politickom trasovisku. N
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Všeobecne prijímané učenia, aby získali súhlas, často používajú mytologické motívy. Tak napr. D. Hilbert neváhal nazvať Cantorovu transfínitnú teóriu množín rajom, z ktorého nás už nikto nemôže vyhnať ([9], 170).
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Touto štúdiou sa chcem vyjadriť k niektorým aspektom diskusie o vývine pojmov, ktorá prebiehala medzi V.Cerníkom a J.Viceníkom (ďalej ako ČcrníkViceník) a P.Cmorejom. Pokúsim sa ukázať východiská každej z diskutujúcich strán, ako aj to, že bázou diskusie je vzťah logickej sémantiky k teórii poznania.
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20. Lambdaoperátor a jednoargumentové lambda-predikáty. V kapitole o predikátoch sme poukázali na rozmanitosť predikátových výrazov prirodzeného jazyka a na možnosť utvoriť predikát z ľubovoľného výroku odstránením niekoľkých výskytov niektorých jeho individuových mien.
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