Adam Olech, Semantyczna teoria poznania
Review of: Adam Olech, "Semantyczna teoria poznania"; Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo AJD, 2014, 292 s., plus errata by: Grzegorz Trela
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Review of: Adam Olech, "Semantyczna teoria poznania"; Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo AJD, 2014, 292 s., plus errata by: Grzegorz Trela
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The aim of this work is to express standpoint about concept of the truth as it was taken and supported by Thomas Aquinas. He was convinced that truth is spread all over the world and that the primarly task of the human thought is to seek and gather the truth. His originality is in its entirety. He does not repeat some old ideas. Thomas is a realist in a special sense who resolves all the difficulties and problems that carry the question of reality with faith in reality. Things are more realistic than they are shown to us. We have to discover them. They are unrealistic if they are just in the row of the possibilities, and not in the reality. They are still incomplete and they are waiting for their further development. Thomas loved God more than his mind, and yet he loved the mind more than any other philosopher. He was an apostle of the mind, a teacher of truth and a renewer of intellectuality not only for 13th century but also for our time. Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is a philosophy of faith and truth which is known, and at the same time a philosophy of natural reason. According to the methodological principle, suspicion is necessarily the starting point for unbiased scientific and theological research, and the aim of this research is to remove suspicion. But it is necessarily to be on clear with the suspicion on its own and to know what we can resonably doubt. Because the one who doubts in all, doubts also in validation of his own doubt. God's being is the first and the most perfect, and his truth is the first and highest. The truth for Thomas, by his definition, which remained stigmatized for the whole scholastic period defined as an adequate, is an adequate state of rei et intellectus. Thinking further about the truth, Thomas answers on question: is there only one truth where everything is true? It is emphasized again that the truth, all truths, expressed about things in comparation with human mind do not affect on the existence of the thing in their essence because there is a truth about these things in comparation with god's mind that is inseparable from them. That is why everything is true, thanks to one truth and that is the truth of the God's mind. On that truth, which comes from God's mind into ours, we judge everything. It is not changeable and cannot be aqcuired with the human sense. Everything that is sensational owns something similar to false, so that can be recognized, but there is nothing false in the true. Something is considered for truth when truth exist in mind and when it is not a reality. If the truth of things is observed in the right way towards the human mind, it can be changed either into a lie or to another truth.When compared with things, the statement is considered true if it is in accordance with them. From this comparison comes out variability of the truth, and the first truth remains unchanged. When one thing changes because of it's decay, which is important to the thing, it will change truth of the thing. The mind, while realizes the truth thinks of its own act, realizes its relation to things, co-forms with things, in fact, the mind realizes even the truth of the mind, it thinks about itself. So, in comparation with God's mind one thing cannot be false. In comparison with the human mind, a disharmony of thing with the mind sometimes happens, and that disharmony is always caused from thing itself.
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The purely introspective philosophy, based on reasoning and that from centuries has analysed the mental activity of man needs the scientific research of brain, the only real method of objective investigation of the mental processes. I called this association ‘neurophilosophy’. In this paper, the cerebral processes involved in the knowledge of truth are described: he phenomenal analysis, the epistemic one, processes as thinking, judgement and consciousness.
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Historijski razvoj interesovanja za Adomovo djelo, gotovo zaboravljeno u Njemačkoj nekoliko godina poslije smrti autora Negativne dijalektike, svjedoči pouzdano o važnosti te filozofije — po suštini protivnoj »integraciji« a osuđenoj na »izolovanost« — od oduševljenog ali površnog pristajanja koje je najprije doživjela.
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Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s understanding of the reality of the modern man, and a critical attitude towards the same shows a tendency which brings to the attention the consistency of destructive tendencies of the 20th century, but also finds the causes of such destructiveness much earlier, first in ideas that were viewed by the Enlightenment. The ideas of the Enlightenment, mind, freedom and equality, losing their original goal of human nature, have created a new cultural-historical epoch, based on the enslavement of man and nature, but also dehumanizing ideologies such as National Socialism and Fascism. The key question that Adorno and Horkheimer ask is the question of how the world has ever come to the present condition, if the Enlightenment and tendencies that it brings promised a better world for man. How did it come to the situation that progress in civilization at the same time also means a return to barbarism? The aim of this paper is certainly not only to display the questions and dilemmas that Adorno and Horkheimer set, but also to draw attention to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s solutions of the crisis, which are based on the critical examination of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment ideas.
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In this article I propose a way of thinking about aesthetic and artistic verdicts that would keep them distinct from one another. The former are reflections of the kinds of things we prefer and take pleasure in; the latter are reflections of other judgments we make about the kinds of achievements that are made in works of art. In part to support this view of verdicts, I also propose a way of keeping distinct the description, the interpretation, and the evaluation of works of art. (And along the way, I worry about whether we offer the same kinds of interpretations of the objects of our aesthetic pleasures, properly considered, that we clearly do offer with respect to works of art.) The thesis I propose—the achievement model—is not original with me. What is original, perhaps, is that it is posed as an alternative to two other views of artistic evaluation, namely the appeal to “ideal critics” and the appeal to one way of understanding our preferences with regard to works of art. I do not attempt to show that each of these alternatives meets with insuperable problems; but I do indicate what I take to be the substantive content of those problems. In the end, in order to flesh out the thesis I propose, I borrow some material from the literature on human well-being concerning how we determine what an achievement is.
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Rola i znaczenie filozofii w kontekście dyskusji między wiarą i rozumem
The article focuses on the role and significance of philosophy in the discourse between faith and reason is the main focus of the article. Two encyclicals: Aeterni Patris by Leo XIII and Fides et Ratio by John Paul II are the basic texts analysed here. Both popes, pointing to the necessity of restoration of philosophical education on every level of its functioning, describe advantages connected with its development. To expose significance and contribution of philosophical teaching, the author considers four principal assumptions of the ‘way of wisdom': experience, wonder, doubt and the lack of suppositions. 'Ihen, he characterises the essence of philosophical theology - in distinction to mythical and political theology - as the road of searching the answer to the question about arche, the question about the essence of the divine (to theion). The last part of the article discusses the attitude of Leo XII and John Paul II to the possible symbiosis between philosophy and theology, their mutual relations as well as relations between faith and reason that enrich both philosophy and theology and enable one to avoid false convictions (doksai).
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This exposition regards to some moments of the theory of will of Duns Scotus as it is presented in Ordinatio II, distinctio 38. According to the Thomist’s teachings, the will is considered an intention of the intellect toward happiness, i.e. toward goodness. In this sense, the will is affectio comodi. The problem of this conception, as Duns Scotus thinks, is related to the question of the freedom of will. Scotus does not accept the idea that the will, on one hand, is freely acting power and at the same time is power, which desires goodness with necessity. That is the reason, Soctus to bring into his philosophical system one additional necessary guarantee for the freedom of will – and that affectio iustitiae, which is precisely the focus of this paper.
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In this study I would like to reflect on those fundamental and common features of minded beings which define them and set them apart from everything else in the world. What are those individually necessary and jointly sufficient basic characteristics by which an actual or possible being can be considered minimally minded or cognitive? Obviously, my aim is not to resolve this big question, but I think we can get closer to a possible answer by considering among others the following few essential traits: embodiment, agency, autonomy, teleology, normativity etc. These characteristics play a fundamental role in understanding what it means for a system to be minded. In the first part of my study I would like to analyse some connections which exist among these concepts and after this brief introduction I would like to highlight and interpret the category of affect. Following these considerations, I will try to argue that affect, like the other key features mentioned, plays an essential role in the constitution of minded beings.
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In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safiye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.
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In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ‘I’, in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ (p. 98). I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ‘Cartesian materialist’ sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word ‘I’ or the concept I) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I ‘as object’ and the use of I ‘as subject’. I don’t argue directly for the ‘two uses’ view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad (Wittgensteinian or ‘Wittgensteinian’) argument for the ‘only one use of I’ view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on ‘corporism’—the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind.
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McKitrick (2003) proposes that an object has a disposition if and only if there are a manifestation, the circumstances of the manifestation, a counterfactual true of the object, and an overtly dispositional locution referring to the disposition. A disposition is extrinsic if and only if an object has it, but a perfect duplicate of the object might not have it. I present an alternative definition that an object has a disposition if and only if a counterfactual is true of the object that, under a certain condition, it would interact with another object in a certain manner. There are three reasons for thinking that my definition is better than her definition. 1. Ockham’s razor favors my definition over McKitrick’s definition. 2. My definition is consistent, while her definition is not, with Lewis’s and her definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. 3. My definition goes well, while her definition does not, with our intuition that an object has a disposition even in a possible world where there is nothing but that object.
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This paper addresses the so-called ‘truthmaker problem’ or ‘grounding problem’ for presentism. In section 1, I set the stage by introducing presentism and the truthmaker problem. In section 2, I consider a proposed solution to it, which I call the ‘laws of nature proposal’ (LNP), recently defended by Markosian (2013). I argue that LNP fails as a solution to the truthmaker problem because it does not meet a constraint that is generally taken as constitutive of it: that the entities doing truthmaker work should be categorical. Then, in section 3, I discuss the prospects of abandoning this ‘categoricity constraint’. The conclusion of this discussion is that the presentist should be allowed to such a move. This, however, is not completely good news for the friends of LNP, since the abandonment of the ‘categoricity constraint’ opens the door to simpler solutions, like what is often called ‘Lucretianism’.
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In this paper, we discuss Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor which is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection of metaphorical meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as the key mechanism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone defend these proposals because the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings, characterized in general by the negation of (i) and (ii), fails to come to grips with neither the power of metaphor nor the explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories. In this paper we show not only how our non-sceptic account of metaphorical meaning as a variety of ad hoc concept eliminates these difficulties but also how it can solve two related difficulties that appear in Lepore and Stone’s account. One of them is that Lepore and Stone’s account involves the possibility of interpreting all metaphorical utterances literally (metaphors only have one meaning, the ordinary meaning) as a criterion of metaphorical identification; the other is that their proposal is not suited for explaining how speakers can agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances.
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Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent’s intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements.
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This paper critically examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwill (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, I argue that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states.
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This paper deals with Watkins's attack on Popper's Theory of Science (PTS). Watkins claims that Popper's theory of verisimilitude (together with his theory of corroboration) introduces justificatiomst and mductivist elements into PTS. The aim of the paper is to show that Watkins"s accusation is false. In PTS there is no good (positive) reason for any conjecture. Similarly, there is no way how any conjecture could be attained by means of induction.
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According to the Quran morality is given to human. So it doesn’t try to define and systematize behaviors with subject to ethic. We can classify morality in the Quran as God’s names and attributes, believers and heresies’ special features and the public morality. Behaviors within the context of good and evil are located inthe Quran by warnings or promoting language. Thus, neither pre-Islamic Arabic communtiy nor non-Muslim societies are all devoid of morality, because the mind and creation are origins of morality. The third source of morality for the believersof God is the Quran. The Quran supports existing human morality in human nature and puts some worship for it.
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In both philosophy and science when searching for correspondence between experience and thinking of reality a principle of evidence is employed. I’m interested in possible correlations of the mentioned principle of evidence with another field of its particular validity – a phenomenon of religious experience of ascetics in early Christianity and contemporary successors of tradition. A phenomenologist who invites to return to “the things themselves”, seeks eidetic vision, non-mediated experience and its adequate expression should recognize reality itself as an evident imperative in wasteland. A thirst for evidence which accompanies the Desert Fathers is slaked in a qualitatively different way than in science or philosophy. Here evidence as an attribute and principle of experience and true knowledge is obtained as a Gift of transcendence, although existential decision is a necessary condition in order to accept it. Such experience of the hermits being in the proximity of that which is unconditionally real is witnessed by the pearls of Desert wisdom – apophthegms.
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According to John Broome, akrasia consists in a failure to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do, and such akrasia is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is certain of a maximally detailed proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, it could be perfectly rational not to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do. This paper seeks to remedy this problem, by proposing an anti-akrasia principle that covers cases of uncertainty (as well as cases of such complete certainty). It is argued that this principle is in effect the fundamental principle of practical rationality.
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