Transitions Online_Around the Bloc-Separate Commemorations for Victims of Jasenovac Concentration Camp
Croatia has also been the target of spying allegations made by Slovenia in the wake of failed border agreement in the Adriatic Sea.
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Croatia has also been the target of spying allegations made by Slovenia in the wake of failed border agreement in the Adriatic Sea.
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In the military conflict between the ‘two’ Spains – the military one and the democratic one – more than a million people died. The Spanish Civil War deeply polarized the world public. While the military junta drew support from the German Nazism and the Italian Fascism, the democratic world public actively supported defence of the Spanish Republic. In the period 1936-1938 about 40,000 volunteers from 54 states arrived to Spain, including more than 1,900 ‘Yugoslavs’. The most comprehensive insight into the given problems is offered in the collection of papers “Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Spanish Civil War” which can be found today in the Archives of Serbia and Montenegro in Belgrade. Although on the grounds of the Second Yugoslavia there were relatively many published studies on the theme of the Yugoslav volunteers in Spain (diaries, records, memoirs, autobiographies, pictures, etc.), we cannot overlook the conclusion that this important theme of the new world history has never been the subject of a thorough research work and scientific approach by any institution or an individual in the former Yugoslav republics who deal with the contemporary history. Everything, more or less, with some rare exceptions, remained at the level of collecting the memories of the participants in the Spanish Civil War. This study is focused on the structural analysis of the Yugoslav volunteers (age, profession, gender, political affiliation, nationality, etc.) and gives a new name list. Compared with 1971 (1664 persons) the same list was extended to 1912 persons of the ‘Yugoslav’ origin. It is based on the new international research who included among the ‘Yugoslav’ Spaniards the volunteers who were overlooked before, from the following categories: 1. economic emigrants from the ‘Yugoslav’ countries before the First World War and between the two world wars; 2. political emigrants from Yugoslavia between the two world wars and after the Second World War; 3. the Slovenians and the Croats from the Julian border area (Venezia Giulia) annexed by the Fascist Italy after the First World War; 4. the Slovenians from the regions of Koruška and Staerska which were given to the Republic of Austria; 5. the Croats from the territory of the Croatian coast annexed by the Fascist Italy after the First World War; 6. the ‘Yugoslav’ Macedonians from Bulgaria and Greece.
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The successes of Germany and the USSR in the war of 1941-1945 were significantly influenced, among the other things, by one neglected factor: sudden change in the disposition of the population towards the German troops. Factor of the disposition of the population influenced not only the change in the military luck, but also the activity of the militant collaborationism. According to the calculations of the contemporary historians “general number of the USSR citizens and emigrants, who spent at least some time in service with Wehrmacht troops, SS, police or paramilitary units, amounted to approximately 1,200,000 men (including up to 700 thousand Slovenes, up to 300 thousand representatives of the Baltic people, up to 200 thousand representatives of Tataro-Turkistan, Caucasian and other smaller nations)” with the maximum number at one time of 800-900 thousands. Numerous units were formed by nations which were “annexed” to the USSR on the eve of the war: the 14th division “Galicia”, 15th and 19th Letonian SS division “Galicia”, 15th and 19th Letonian division SS, 20th Estonian division. Western Belarusia and Lithuania did not have independent SS divisions but therefore they gave more police battalions which were used in suppressing the partisan movement in the northwestern parts of Russia, in the eastern Ukraine and Byelorussia. As early as in November 1941, Hitler ordered formation of four national legions – Turkistan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian-Magometan. They formed later on many police and military regiments and the 162nd Turkistan division of Wehrmacht. The Russians formed, besides many small units, the Kozak cavalier corps which was used for anti-partisan operation in the area of Yugoslavia. The culmination of the policy of using Russian collaborators of the occupiers was reached within the so-called “Lokot region”. As late as in 1945, the division ROA of General Vlasov was formed. After 1991, historiographic fate of the Soviet collaborators varied from rehabilitation to the continuation of the Soviet historiographic traditions.
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Serbian military thought in the 19th century was influenced by many factors, and most of all the experience from the wars waged against Turkey in 1876 and 1877, and against Bulgaria in 1885, as well as the European military theories, above all the German, then the French and the Austro-Hungarian. Speaking about a phenomenon which in the 19th century was not yet articulated, it may be said that doctrine existed only in Germany and France. As for the other European militaries, including the Serbian, it cannot be said that they had a defined, consolidated doctrine. Regarding the general knowledge, they took most from the Germans, and that was what they considered useful and usable. Among the Serbian military theoreticians, a prevailing position that the art of war integrates both the science and the skills, and that one cannot exist without the other. Officially, the art of war was not divided to the strategy and the tactics, because they were considered to have narrow links and to interweave. However, such division was applied in the theory of the art of war for the purposes of easier studying. Not before the very end of the 19th century, the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia had ready war plans in case of war with potential adversaries, Turkey or Bulgaria. The war plans developed in 1898 represent a basic document for preparation, organization, use and provision of the military in a possible war with Bulgaria and Turkey, and they can be considered a document of strategic significance made operational at the operational and tactical levels. Then, some basic positions of the Serbian military war doctrine were outlined, and under the influence of the German military doctrine, the attack was given priority to the defence.
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Prikaz/The review of: - Душан Батаковић, Дечанско питање, Београд 2007, 354; - Душан Батаковић, Косово и Метохија у српско-арбанашким односима, Београд 2007, 393; - Душан Батаковић, Косово и Метохија-историја и идеологија, Београд 2007, 469;
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Prikaz/The review of: Дмитар Тасић, Рат после рата. Војска Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца на Косову и Метохији и у Македонији 1918-1920, Београд, 2008, 501,
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Prikaz/The review of: Исидор Ђуковић, Аустроугарски заробљеници у Србији 1914–1915, Београд, 2008, 221,
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49. међународни конгрес војних историчара „Am Rande Europas? Der Balkan – Raum und bevölkerung als Wirkungsfelder militärischer gewalt”, Потсдам, 15-17. септембар 2008. године / 49th International Congress of Military History „Am Rande Europas? Der Balkan – Raum und bevölkerung als Wirkungsfelder militärischer gewalt”, Potsdam, September 15–17 2008,
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Међународна научна конференција “Kosovo case and the Multinational Peace Forces”, 11–15. maj 2009, Софија, Бугарска / International Conference “Kosovo Case and the Multinational Peace Forces”, May 11–15th , 2009, Sofia, Bulgaria
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Међународни научни скуп „Косово и Метохија у цивилизацијским токовима“, Косовска Митровица, 8–11. октобар 2009. године / International Conference, Kosovo and Metohija as a part of European Civilization, Kosovska Mitrovica, October 8-11th, 2009
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From the summer 1941, two resistant movements have been organized in Eastern Bosnia. One was indigenous that has merged with partisan or chetnik movement of Colonel Draža Mihailović and the other was partisan movement organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Their front remained unified relatively longer than elsewhere. Process of differentiation has been slown due to the characteristics of this area as a part of ustashi Indenpendent State of Croatia. A wish for basic survival has been stronger among the insurgents than politics. In relatively short period of time greater number of insurgents have been changing their sides. In October 1941, a joint Partisan – Chetnik Headquarters have been established and during following two months uprisal has reached its peak. This area has been a part of joint liberated area of Western Serbia, and Eastern Bosnia. When the chetnik – partisan conflict has started in Western Serbia, Eastern Bosnia has remained out of it for some time, and operational cooperation beetwen two movements has continued all the way to the begging of January following year. The differences between two movements have culminated during German offensive in Eastern Bosnia in the period of January – February and afterwards started irreconcilable conflict. In their effort to draw the insurgents to their cause, partisan leadership has organized volunteer detachments from the former members of chetnik movement. In the circumstances of a new offensive of German, Italian and ustashi (Croat) armed forces – the Operation „Trio“, during April 1942 in volunteer and some partisan units chetnik coups have occurred. The insurgents than have gone to the side of those chetniks who have been seeking for the modus vivendi with Croat authorities and German and Italian commands. Due to the radical changes in the balance of powers, until the April 1942, fighting insurgency movement in Eastern Bosnia has been defeated.
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After the recognition of Israel in 1948, Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with newly created state. In close cooperation between the two countries a number of issues were raised (assets of Yugoslav Jews who had went to Israel, trade, military and cultural cooperation, etc.). Israel strived for buying Yugoslav weapons and Tito’s mediating in the organization of a secret Israeli-Arab meeting, which the Yugoslav side was avoiding by delaying agreement. In an effort to strengthen its international position, in 1954, in the contacts with Yugoslav representatives, Israel requested the opportunity to join the Balkan Pact. Also, Israel needed the Yugoslav support in voting for the resolutions at the United Nations in order to strengthen its position in relation to the Arab countries, so it looked with distrust at the Yugoslav-Arab closer contacts. One of the challenges in the relations between the two countries was the Israeli-Arab war in 1956, which Yugoslavia condemned as an Israeli aggression. Wishing to strengthen and improve relations with Yugoslavia, Israel insisted on Tito’s visit. Late in the fifties and in the early sixties, the establishment of closer links and raising diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level was sought. Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito, looking at their position through the Non-Aligned Movement and relations with Arab countries, looked at Israel with diplomatic measuredness, from a distance, and it seemed that there were no progress. Differences with regard to mutual relations were at their peak during the Israeli-Arab war in 1967, whereupon diplomatic relations were severed.
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Prikaz/The review of: Gobetti, Eric: L’occupazione allegra. Gli Italiani in Jugoslavia (1941–1943), Roma: Carocci editore, 2007, 260,
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X годишња конференција евроатлантске радне групе за студије конфликта (CSWG) “Military and political aspects of armed conflicts”, Варшава, 24–28. мај 2010. године / 10th Annual Conference of the Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group: “Military and Political aspects of Armed Conflicts”, Warsaw, 24 to 28 of May 2010
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In the territory of Western Serbia in late summer and autumn 1941, the stage of the Civil War, whose consequences can be felt even today, was set. The first conflicts began already in the formation of partisan and chetnik detachments. Leaders of two anti-fascist movements were repeatedly trying to negotiate, but the differences between members of the movements, which had emerged in the decades before the war, were too big and the negotiations failed. Serbia found itself in the fight against the occupiers, internally divided. The divisions of the Civil War are so profound that they can be also felt in the literature dealing with these issues in the decades after the World War II. The need for a real picture of events orders return to the sources, so this paper was based on the memoirist literature of direct participants of the events. This literature so far has been used for getting concrete data on commonly asked questions: outbreak of the uprising, negotiations, beginning of the conflict between Chetniks and Partisans ... However, the data testify to the atmosphere which prevailed in those days in Serbia, and which this paper is trying to shed light upon, are neglected.
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The Italian capitulation and retreating from the war were a signal for the Germans and the two movements in Yugoslavia (Partisans and Četniks) to take advantage of the new situation. The Germans wanted to advance towards the Adriatic Coast in order to prevent the Allies from possible landing. The Četniks tried to gain better positions by filling the vacuum created by the Italian capitulation and to get ready for possible allies’ landing. The Partisan movement hoped to expand the liberated territory and augment the movement by drafting new fighters. Both movements (Partisans and Četniks) strived for strengthening their military assets by acquiring Italian weapons. Following Četniks’ advance to the vacuum created by the Italian capitulation, the Partisan movement attacked those areas and took them over, deepening the irreconcilable conflict between them and Četniks. All the events that were taking place reflected efforts to secure better positions in the wake of the expected end of the World War II.
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General Protogerov and Colonel Drvingov are characters whose activities in the World War I in the Balkans can be viewed from different perspectives. In the political sense, they truly mirrored the evolution of VMRO from 1912 to 1918. By following their efforts – first in organizing Macedonian-Odrin Regiment, then in 11th Macedonian Division, and at the end in eastern Macedonia and the Morava Region, where they always played the key roles, we can see the changes of VMRO itself. From a semi-underground organization it evolved into an important factor of the Bulgarian nationalistic policy. It turned into an organized army with strong territorial links and began functioning as a kind of autonomous authorities within the Bulgarian state. Its power grew so strong that in 1915 the government in Sophia was being worried about potential dangers posed by this organization. However, 1917 was a great turning point: VMRO became the means used by the Bulgarian government to gain control over the internal situation in the Morava Region, Macedonia, Thrace, and, at the end, in Bulgaria itself. In 1918, Protogerov was leading the forces set to quell the rebellion of Bulgarian soldiers against the government in Sophia. In the military sense, it is interesting to follow the process of VMRO institutionalization. Its Komita companies were incorporated into the regular army: first 11th Macedonian Division, and later other units, for example „Mountain Bands“. The fact that these companies joined the Bulgarian Army marked a significant change in the way they were conducting war and made strategic decisions. At the end, the part of these two characters in crimes against and suffering of innocent civilian population should not be forgotten. Their decisions and methods caused death of dozens of thousand people, destruction of property, looting and other misdeeds committed during the World War I in the part of the Kingdom of Serbia under Bulgarian occupation. Unfortunately, due to negligence of historical science, the picture we have about these events has remained vague for almost a century. We hope that this paper has at least partially contributed to shedding light on it.
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Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized and led armed uprisings against the occupier and collaborationists since July 1941. The role of the assassinations, as the way of insurrection, changed due to possibilities and Political Platform of the Communist Party. Until the September 1941, small number of assassinations was done, so the precedence came to the particular actions, in order to provide resistance of the population, overcoming into the mass uprising. The Party leadership was forced to change resistance organizational politics due to repeated arrests, so the assassination strategy intended for occupiers and collaborationists became the only way of the people stand up against the occupation regime. We tend to conclude, the Party failed in its primary cause of disabling and destabilizing the enemy, despite the implementation of the system senior officials assassinations strategy. The essence of failure regards to the enemy armed force, so the retaliation as the answer on the Party actions. The occupant measures resulted with small numbers of attacks on a German soldiers - every attack meant the execution of Communist Movement members. So the result was attacks on members of the Special Police Department of the Administration of the City of Belgrade, as well informed of the organizational structure, membership and implementation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia politics. Agents of the Special Police Department came to the top of the Communist Party enemies list, right after the arrest of 510 communists, during the year 1941. Psychological effect which caused organized assassinations should not be ignored, too. German soldiers, so the system collaborationists could not feel safe on the streets of that time Belgrade, despite the precautions. Most of the planned assassinations failed. The reason of it regards assassinator himself – often imprecise, insufficiently trained, and undisciplined. Considering the fact, that most of them were pupils when the war started, or worked in factories and its first experience, in weapon handling, often was, just before the action, its acts demand respect and this work represents the overview on it.
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After the death of Esad Pasha, the members of the Battalions of Organized Arnauts posed a big problem to the Yugoslav authorities. On one side, there was a practical use of the Battalions in the areas along the border line, while on the other side there were doubts about their ultimate intentions, respect of their strength, suspicions regarding their venality and willingness to side with the enemy. No one could dispute their engagement in the battles in midsummer 1920 near Dva brata, Stebljev, Borovo, Zabzun, participation in actions in Šalja and Peshkopi, or their contribution to operations of intercepting robbers and taking away stolen cattle. But many of them also took part in robberies, murders and smuggling. However, the reason preventing the Yugoslav state from abolishing them was the fear that they could turn against it, so that even at the end of 1921 a decision on disbanding them was not made.
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38. конгрес Међународне комисије за војну историју „Технологија и ратовање“, Софија, Република Бугарска, 25–31. август 2012. године / Congress of International Commission for Military History “Technology and Warfare”, Sofia, Bulgaria, 25–31 August 2012
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