DPC BOSNIA DAILY: Bosnia Cannot Disintegrate Without Violence
Bosnia Daily: April 6, 2011 – Bosnia Cannot Disintegrate Without Violence
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Bosnia Daily: April 6, 2011 – Bosnia Cannot Disintegrate Without Violence
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Hungary has launched one of Europe’s most comprehensive efforts to address the needs of its ethnic minorities, including unique provisions for self-government. This policy is motivated by the wish to set an example for neighboring countries with large Hungarian minorities, as well as by the need to satisfy the demands of Hungary’s own minorities. One puzzle that remains unresolved is how to assure ethnically based parliamentary representation at the national level. Except for the large Romani minority, all of Hungary’s twelve other recognized minorities are very small and some are geographically dispersed. (The Greek minority, for example, numbers fewer than 1,000.) Another factor is that Hungary’s 386-member parliament is unicameral, so that the addition of even one mandatory place for each of the thirteen recognized minorities could have unpredictable effects on the balance of power in governments that typically are made up of coalitions. There is also the question of how to balance the expectations of a large minority, the Roma, with those of the small minorities.
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The discussions summarized in this report took place on December 1 and 2, 2000, in the Vougliameni suburb of Athens, Greece, at a gathering of senior political leaders from Southeast Europe. The Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) convened the meeting, in an informal and neutral setting, to help these leaders in their mutual search for solutions to the bitter aftermath of ethnic strife and warfare that devastated parts of their region during the 1990s, and to encourage them to exchange ideas about how to prevent continuing interethnic rivalries from breaking out in renewed violence. Behind the prosaic title of the Athens discussions —“Albanians as Majorities and Minorities: A Regional Dialogue”— lie some of the most explosive issues of the day: the future of the status of Kosovo; relations between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo and between Serbs and Albanians in Serbia proper; the survival of the Yugoslav Federation, the territorial integrity of Serbia and Macedonia; and the ebb and flow of influence between Albania and Albanians living outside its borders. The outcomes of these questions will affect the entire region, including even Greece and Italy and, indeed, the international community itself, for decades to come.
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The idea of hosting a meeting among members of the Macedonian governing coalition (the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia [SDSM], the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the opposition and representatives of the international community just six months after the formation of the new government, originated in Lucerne, Switzerland. There, during the third in a series of regional dialogues devoted to the issue of “Albanians and Their Neighbors,” representatives of Macedonia’s new coalition government asked the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) to hold this meeting. Intended in part as an evaluation of the coalition’s progress and as a vehicle for honest and open communication among all parliamentary parties, the meeting could perhaps not have come at a more interesting time in recent Macedonian politics. Just weeks before the meeting – made possible by the generous support and cooperation of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Embassy in Macedonia—former Prime Minister and leader of the largest ethnic Macedonian opposition party, Ljubco Georgievski publicly disavowed the Ohrid Framework Agreement—an internationally brokered truce that in 2001 helped to bring peace to a country on the brink of civil war. (Georgievski was a signatory to the Framework Agreement.) Days later, Arben Xhaferi, leader of the largest Albanian opposition party, threatened to resign, issuing a moratorium on behalf of his party. Also a signatory to the agreement, Xhaferi said his party was taking a “time-out” in opposition to the government’s failure to adequately implement the agreement.
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When, at the request of members of the Macedonian government, the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) agreed more than a year ago to host a roundtable meeting for representatives of the country’s coalition [the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)] and opposition parties, we scarcely anticipated the demand for this type of forum. Indeed, what started as a single meeting (held in Mavrovo, Macedonia on May 10-11, 2003) has since become the “Mavrovo Process.” Launched by PER in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Embassy in Macedonia, the Process is designed to facilitate communication not only between members of the government and the opposition, but also within the coalition itself. These discussions, which are not for public attribution, provide participants a rare opportunity to offer their vision for Macedonia’s future and to candidly assess the government’s performance in implementing the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement—an internationally brokered truce that is credited with ending the country’s bloody albeit brief ethnic conflict. The participants at the May roundtable agreed that all parties should reconvene under PER auspices roughly once every six months, whereas members of the coalition should meet every three months. Two meetings have since taken place. The first, a discussion among the coalition parties, occurred in September; the second meeting, held in December, featured participants from the senior-most levels of the Macedonian government and opposition as well as representatives of the international community. While themes from the September discussion are referenced herein, it is the latter meeting which forms the basis for this report.
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Relations between Albanians and their neighbors dominate politics in the Balkans and pose a continuing problem for European and Euro- Atlantic stability. More than a decade after the wars in ex-Yugoslavia first erupted, the so-called “Albanian Question” remains unresolved, with interethnic struggles in Kosovo, South Serbia, and Macedonia. The series on Albanians and Their Neighbors, launched by the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) in 2000, is a unique regional undertaking that brings together almost every significant ethnic Albanian political actor from the Balkans with non-Albanian counterparts from Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Greece, and the international community. This is a report of the fourth gathering, which took place in Lucerne, Switzerland in May 2004. (Three earlier meetings took place in Budapest and in Athens in 2000, and in Lucerne in 2002.) These PER meetings provide the venue where many of the most critical high-level discussions and negotiations take place between Albanians and their neighbors—as well as with key players from the international community. Since 2000, PER has also convened regular follow-up roundtables in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro, with the aim of promoting practical measures toward interethnic accord. (Reports on these PER efforts are available at www.per-usa.org.) The May 2004 roundtable was noteworthy for the participants’ newly constructive approach to the question of Kosovo and positive reports on interethnic accommodation in Macedonia and Montenegro. The roundtable also made possible an additional PER effort: a face-to-face meeting in Pristina the following month between Kosovo Albanian and Serb political leaders, their first since the violence in Kosovo in March 2004.
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The first day of this two-day meeting was attended by representatives of the parties making up the governing coalition: the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM), the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Democratic League of Bosnjaks in Macedonia, the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, the Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia, and the United Party of the Roma in Macedonia. They were joined on the second day by their colleagues from the opposition parties, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), and the Liberal Party (LP). The roundtable began with a discussion of what has been achieved by the interethnic governing coalition, and the impact of their accomplishments on the country. The international participants praised Macedonia, which, they said, had become an example for the region in improving interethnic relations. Indeed, they noted, recently some leaders from Kosovo have been examining the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) as one model of what could be accomplished with self-restraint and political will. In their turn, the participants from Macedonia stressed the benefits that they derive from the Mavrovo meetings in clarifying the positions of the respective political partners, anticipating future problems and solutions, and in providing guidelines on how to communicate with the media and the public. The participants agreed that the most urgent current topic is decentralization. While decentralization was on the agenda of each of the previous meetings, said one participant, we managed to avoid sufficient discussion of it. This time, even though decentralization is not the main topic on the agenda, it is where we now need to focus our attention.
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The fourth round of discussions in the Mavrovo process was held in mid-December 2004, at a moment of great challenge for Macedonia. A new government, necessitated by the former prime minister’s resignation on November 15 and his public allegations of corruption against a government member, was confirmed by parliament on the very day the Mavrovo meeting was to convene. Nonetheless, the new prime minister and his government elected to attend the Mavrovo meetings, and use them to foster open and frank discussion among the coalition partners in the government including the parties of the smaller ethnic communities and with opposition parties. In comparison to earlier sessions of the Mavrovo process, these discussions were characterized by a significant increase in the proportion of time and attention devoted by participants to what they described as “constructive criticism” and problem-solving. Although the first session of discussions was abbreviated because of the government’s need to convene its first, organizational meeting following parliamentary confirmation, this round of the Mavrovo process covered a number of important and sensitive issues facing the new leadership team. Participants discussed their understanding of the nature of representation and accountability, from the perspective of both government and opposition. Attention was devoted to the meaning and implications of “equal representation” as a principle embedded in the Ohrid Framework Agreement and as a practical goal of government policy. There was substantial discussion of the relationship between political parties, their leaders, and the government, and its crucial effect on government authority and performance. Discussion turned several times to the importance of improving the performance of the economy for resolving social and political problems, and therefore its importance for the new government. Improving the functioning of the electoral system was the focus of a substantial amount of discussion, prompted by the upcoming local elections, scheduled for March 13, 2005. Participants put forward a number of specific issues and problems for inclusion on the government policy agenda. Participants also engaged one another in candid discussion of sensitive and contentious issues concerning the integrity of electoral processes in Macedonia. These discussions led participants to consider the adoption of a “code of conduct” to guide parties in the upcoming and future elections.
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Six years after Kosovo was placed under the interim administration of the United Nations, 2005 has been called a decisive year for the province. The first indication that this is indeed the case came in March, when the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Envoy to conduct a comprehensive review of the so-called democratic “standards” mandated for Kosovo. Following this review, and depending on its outcome, in the fall of 2005, a formal process for resolving Kosovo’s status will be launched by the UN. In early 2005, while the international community appeared to be moving forward on the Kosovo issue, authorities in Belgrade and Pristina showed some signs of breaking their ongoing stalemate over official communication. Throughout the spring, reports of a potential meeting between Serbian President Boris Tadic and Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova appeared in the media, but an actual encounter failed to materialize. With Kosovo Serbs continuing to boycott provisional institutions of selfgovernment in Pristina, the positions of Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo appeared as entrenched as ever. ###While realizing that the large question of Kosovo’s status will only be resolved through a process established by the United Nations, the Project on Ethnic Relations nonetheless judged that an informal and off-the-record dialogue among Albanians, Serbs, leaders of neighboring countries, and representatives of international organizations could be of value at this time. In July 2005, in cooperation with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, PER convened a roundtable discussion under the title “Kosovo and the Region Prepare for Change: Relations, Responsible Governance, and Regional Security.” The agenda for the discussion included three broad topics: the regional implications of Kosovo’s future status, possibilities for high-level dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, and relations between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb communities.
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The endurance of anti-Semitism as a cultural theme in Central and Eastern Europe is particularly striking considering the near-destruction of Jewish populations during the Second World War. While there is a vast literature on anti-Semitism past and present, less has been said concerning anti-Semitism as a deliberately deployed political weapon, and less still about its use in the post-Communist states. A number of questions can be posed on the political uses of anti-Semitism in the region: Why do anti-Semitic political practices continue to resonate with the public? How did they survive the transitions to post-communist, democratic politics? What enables political actors to employ anti-Semitism as a weapon, and what are their methods? Is there any defense? To explore these issues and seek practical responses to political anti-Semitism in the region and in Romania, on September 16, 2005, the Project on Ethnic Relations Regional Center for Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe organized a roundtable discussion in Bucharest for senior political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists. These participants took on topics ranging from the historical roots of anti-Semitism, to the role of civil society and of the state in combating anti-Semitism, to the controversial issue of Romania's Emergency Decree 31, which outlaws forms of anti-Semitic discourse, including Holocaust denial. This report documents the discussions at the Bucharest roundtable. Following PER's usual practice, participants are not identified by name in the text. Konstanty Gebert, a journalist at Gazeta Wyborcza in Poland, is the author of this report, which has not been reviewed by other participants, and for which PER takes full responsibility. The text was edited by PER staff.
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In June 2006, PER held roundtable discussions with senior leaders of the two major political groupings of the Kosovo Serbs: the Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija of the Kosovo Assembly (SLKM), and the Serb National Council (SNV). In consultation with PER’s offices in Belgrade and Pristina, the following questions for the meetings’ agenda were drafted: What are the top issues of concern for the daily existence of the Kosovo Serb community? What are the causes of these problems? What are the Serb community’s expectations for the immediate future (prior to the status resolution)? Are there problems that could and should be resolved while the status talks are going on? How should these problems be resolved? Who should be responsible for resolving such issues? Due to severe political disagreements among Kosovo Serb leaders, PER was forced to hold two separate meetings in Mitrovica: one for the SNV group, and the other for the SLKM group. Both rounds of discussions were chaired by PER Executive Director, Alex Grigor’ev (then the PER Director for the Western Balkans).
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It is worth noting that after Kosovo’s proclamation of independence and the protests and violence which resulted in Serbia, South Serbia is the only area which has so far remained quiet and calm. By not organizing protests or celebrations, both local Albanian and Serb leaders exercised the caution needed to keep their communities from imploding or exacerbating the already high tensions of this momentous occasion. In fact, this caution shows that the local leaders have begun to realize the importance of peaceful coexistence, restraint, and a moderate approach to politics. That said, an insufficient political will in Belgrade for resolving many of these outstanding issues continues to frustrate local leaders. As you will read in the following text, promises are often made but follow through is less common. To be fair, results from these commitments are slowly coming to fruition, but their speed and efficacy remains deficient. Frustration is felt not only by the Albanians, Serbs, and Roma in South Serbia but by the international community as well. Since much of the progress in South Serbia has been a direct result of interest and pressure by the international community, this weariness is a troubling development. For the foreseeable future, the dynamics between Belgrade and Pristina will dominate headlines and international policy, which is why it is more important than ever for civil society and non-government agencies to remain engaged on other interethnic and intra-ethnic issues affecting Serbia. As is often the case in the Balkans, interethnic relations are far more complex than they seem, and tensions in one locality often have a way of spilling over into another. Without addressing many of these problems, majority-minority relations will remain faulty, and interethnic tension will persist. By engaging instead of ignoring these issues, PER will continue to work for a better and peaceful future for Southeastern Europe.
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Montenegro remained deficient in its minority policy legislation. The country’s first Minority Law remained stagnant in draft form despite the comments and encouragement of outside reviewers such as the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The problem was a lack of political consensus on several contentious points, and an inability to break the political stalemate and move forward. To address the specific issue of the political stalemate over the Minority Law as well as Montenegro’s general deficiency in minority policy legislation, in July 2005, with funding from the Global Opportunities Fund of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, PER launched a three-year initiative devoted to helping Montenegro develop and strengthen its state policies toward ethnic minorities, and in the process galvanize the authorities to show more political will in helping minorities in the country. Success was achieved early on in the project. In May 2006, Montenegro finally adopted the Minority Law and opened a new chapter in the history of majority-minority relations in Montenegro. But the Montenegrin path to minority accommodation was not without its setbacks. In July 2006, two key provisions of the Minority Law were declared unconstitutional by the Montenegrin Constitutional Court. The rejection of these provisions, which guaranteed seats in parliament and local assemblies for representatives of ethnic minorities, was perceived as a let-down by many minority leaders and continues to be an increasing source of tension between them and the majority. Mutually beneficial majority-minority relations have been the core of Montenegro’s successful model of interethnic accord. Damage to these relations will be the destabilizing factor in this multi-ethnic country.
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The activities carried out by PER in Kosovo between the summer of 2009 and the fall of 2010 were concentrated on helping to resolve specific, practical issues that the Serbian community encounters in everyday life in Kosovo with the purpose of improving the life of this community as well as improving interethnic relations in Kosovo. Issues such as how to deal with budgets and employment and how to bring more investments to a community, united Serbs and Albanians around the table preparing them to cope with the real challenges that need to be overcome. Another topic of importance in our work this past year was the effort to start a dialogue between Albanians and Serbs to help overcome and heal wounds that have been festering for many generations. Although it will take a considerable amount of time before there will be understanding and acceptance between the two communities, PER through its Forum for Dialogue has created one such venue for dialogue. The discussions have been very open and sincere on both sides. The open TV debates that followed some of the discussions with key representatives of the Albanian and Serb communities showed very clearly that interethnic dialogue can take place across the table even on some of the most sensitive topics. We judge that significant progress has been made in Kosovo south of the Ibar River in improving the living conditions of minority communities and advancing their political integration into Kosovo’s mainstream society. The local elections that took place in November 2009 resulted in expanded participation by the Serbs. The start of the process of decentralization which marked a significant change in access to power and influence at the community level, that is reflected in a more relaxed atmosphere in Kosovo and is visible in the interaction of Albanian and Serb politicians at all levels. With a number of municipalities now under the control of pragmatic mayors, mostly from the Serbian community, more decisions are made at the local level and this empowerment of the communities has helped to improve the situation in Kosovo.
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Two referenda organized in Moldova’s autonomous region of Gagauzia on 2 February provoked heated debate in Moldovan society. At least two elements explain the attention of politicians and political commentators. First, the political elite from Gagauzia insisted, as a political affront to central authorities, on organizing these referendums even if the Court from Comrat declared them illegal. Secondly, the referendums aftermath delivered a severe blow to the Republic of Moldova’s image of the foreign policy course. These actions highlighted that there are contesters of the European integration idea. In this context, politicians and political commentators in Chisinau should answer two major questions: Who is guilty? And then, What has to be done? In this brief analysis we will try to identify the genuine reasons that politicians from the autonomous region held referendums and propose a range of recommendations to mitigate the implications of these events.
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At a conference in Wilton Park on 1 February 2004, ESI presented its analysis of Mitrovica’s economic and social predicament to Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb leaders, together with a proposal for a way forward in 2004.1 To balance the fears and concerns on both sides, ESI’s Wilton Park proposal consists of a package of measures, to be implemented in parallel during the course of 2004. The Wilton Park event revealed broad agreement among local representatives as to the severe social and economic challenges facing Mitrovica, and on the need for immediate action to reverse the cycle of decline. There was a genuine willingness to search for solutions that would ensure a future for the town, and to explore the potential for a locally-negotiated package agreement along the lines outlined here.This paper argues that there is scope for a compromise solution acceptable on both sides of the river Ibar, in order to pre-empt the economic and social death of the Mitrovica region. Such a solution would need to come soon, however, while Mitrovica is still able to attract the international attention and resources required for a serious development strategy.
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Germany matters and so does Turkey, which turns this national debate into one of European importance. The quality of this debate and, most importantly, the policy responses it generates, will leave a defining mark on German domestic politics and the future shape of Europe. || In 2004 a paperback appeared in German with the title „Turkey and Europe – the positions“. The book described the German debate on Turkish accession to the European Union. In the introduction, Claus Leggewie, the book's editor, outlined three big issues at the centre of this debate: the state of Turkish democracy; the relative backwardness of the Turkish economy; and geopolitics, including the question whether the EU would want to share a border with Iraq. || This Great Debate derives its energy from fears and hopes; from the real sense that Germany (like other European societies) is changing rapidly and that Turkish EU accession would change it further; from the real challenge of an aging society faced with a youthful migrant population; from the need to integrate a new religion into a largely secularised society; from an avalanche of serious new research; and from an enormous reservoir of old prejudices.
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One area where the EU has discriminated against Turkey has been in the field of visa-free travel. This suggests an obvious way to show that EU conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey remains “strict but fair”: to offer Ankara a visa roadmap similar to that which has been given to Western Balkan countries. Once the roadmap requirements are met, Turkish citizens should be able to travel to the EU without a visa. Visa-free travel to the EU is a right enjoyed by Central Europeans (since the early 1990s) and by most people living in the Western Balkans (since 2009). The EU already promised it to Turkey under the 1963 Association Agreement. A credible visa liberalisation process would provide tangible evidence to ordinary citizens that the EU remains committed to a future integration perspective. It would also be a useful tool to advance the implementation of non-discrimination policies and promote further improvements in Turkey‟s human rights record, bringing down still high rates of asylum requests granted to Turkish citizens in EU member states. Such a reform process would be a win-win proposition for the EU and Turkey and a big shot in the arm for the accession process.
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Visa liberalisation has been a crucial element in the EU’s relations with Romania, Serbia and Albania. Yet until recently it had not even appeared on the agenda of talks between Brussels and Ankara. Then on 21 June 2012, the Council invited the Commission to establish a dialogue with Turkey aimed at visa liberalisation. Almost a year has passed since these Council conclusions. The dialogue on visa liberalisation has yet to begin. || There has never before been an EU candidate country that had been negotiating accession for years and whose citizens were unable to travel without a visa. As Turkey and the EU move towards the fiftieth anniversary of their strategic relationship, which started with the 1963 Association Agreement, the time to overcome this particular legacy of the 1980 coup is now. It is time to cut this Gordian visa knot. || Cutting a Gordian knot: Solving an intractable problem through thinking outside the box. Based on legendary event in the ancient city of Gordiyon, 70 kilometers south-west of Ankara.
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The Agreement on the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities marks the cornerstone of discord of the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The General Principles for the establishment of the Association/Community, agreed in August 2015, brought more controversy and caused an unprecedented crisis in Kosovo. Proponents championed it as a tool to integrate northern Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo jurisdiction and advance normalisation of relations between the two states. Yet, the Association has become a complicated matter in practice. Many segments of Kosovo society reject an Association of this kind, the Constitutional Court ruled it to be in violation of the spirit of the Constitution and the government is largely reluctant to implement it until Serbia presents clear plans for withdrawal of the parallel institutions it funds around Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs view an Association from a very practical point of view: a reward instrument for painful integration into Kosovo and a replacement for departing Serbian-funded institutions. Serbs fear the Albanian reactions seen over the last 24 months, feel unwanted in Kosovo and worry that Belgrade will abandon them soon. The Serb community - the party most affected by the dialogue and least included in it - wants the dialogue on normalisation to continue, want the coalition agreement to be adhered to and want a smooth transition from the Serbian to Kosovar system.
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