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It is asserted that, at the beginning of the National Liberation War, the Communist Party in Styria was the most powerful party organization within the Slovene regions. In April 1941 it comprised some 530 members distributed among about 80 cells but, as a consequence of extreme terrorism of occupation forces and other factors there was, commencing as early as 1941, a sharp decrease in membership of the party, which remained weak till 1944.
More...Magyar munkaszolgálatos alakulatok a Vörös Hadseregnél
The Red Army occupying the territory of Hungary created from the Hungarian prisoners of war so-called engineering (in fact, labour service) units in January-February 1945. The Soviets promised better care and transfer to the new Hungarian Government for those who applied for these units. However, contrary to the promises, they were not given over to the new Hungarian government, but they were put to hard physical work for Red Army 10 to 13 hours a day under Soviet armed guards, in minus 10 to 20ºC winter cold, often accommodated in ruined buildings with no windows, with extremely poor food rations, in tattered clothing, in many cases barefoot. The extremely harsh POW-like accommodation conditions, poor nutrition and severe overworking resulted in an average loss of 33% of these labour service units, but one of the “Divisions” it exceeded 39%. These loss rates are nearly identical to those of the Horthy era labour service units (27.5 to 34.4%).
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The paper studies the trends in discussion of social problems of the time, by Slovene Communists, especially the link between the national and social moment in the documents of 22 regional conferences of Slovene Communists in the years 1920—1941.
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This article focuses the role of the IV State Duma in the decisive days of the February revolution in Russia (February 27 – March 3, 1917).
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Communism is a necessary starting point for any political or theoretical discussion of anti-communism. Exorcised for nearly two centuries, communism today is not just occluded by the prohibition of thinking or practicing it, but also expelled by a complete ban on desiring it. Not only does mention of communism bring disgust on the Right, fully aware that the once-horrifying spectre is just its pale shadow today; communism is also an uncomfortable relative for the Left. At best a troublesome legacy of the past – at worst, a foe actively fought against. The desire for communism – as a goal, as an experience of everyday life, as co-existence, co-production and co-abolition of constraints that stand in the way of truly democratic governance – lay at the heart of designing a better future. Therefore, only a mediation in the desire for communism can make the considerations of anti-communism something more than a mere contribution to the emergence of yet another form of “anti” politics.
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The essay discusses four theses on contemporary anti-communism: 1) anti-communism is general and international; 2) anti-communism is an operator within capitalist ideology; 3) anti-communism is a politics of fear; 4) anti-communism is a lure that communists should reject. It proposes new theoretical framework to understand and contest many-faced manifestations of anti-communism.
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Review of: AGATA ZYSIAK - Historical Memory of Central and East European Communism (eds. Agnieszka Mrozik and Stanislav Holubec, Routledge 2018).
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The primary area of exclusion that anti-communism generates is located in social education. It is the actively anti-communist upbringing offered by the contemporary education system that translates into later anti-communist hegemony – first cultural, then political.
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Czy Stanisław Stomma był bardziej marzycielem czy realistą? Radosław Ptaszyński przekonuje, że raczej realistą. Kusi jednak nieco inna, paradoksalna interpretacja. W marzeniu Stommy o realistycznej polskiej polityce też można dopatrzeć się śladu szaleństwa.
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The article is devoted to functioning and pragmatic load of the slogans in the Soviet Ukrainian press. The most widespread groups of slogans for their illocutive purpose are constatives, directives, commisives. The author proposed a new kind of slogans — glorivicatives, the purpose of which was the expression of favour of the authorities and glorification. It has been defined that a very large spectrum of the multidirected slogans addressed to different groups of recipients enhanced the role of the slogans as manifestations of the language of power.
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The review of: Peta zemaljska konferencija Komunističke partije Jugoslavije. Zbornik radova. Izd. Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske i Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1972, strani 373
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There is no single definition of socialist realism, nor is there a single name - either in Europe or in the world, for the entire propaganda and artistic movement. Technically speaking, the name of socialist realism is not widely used in Russia itself, but it is difficult to overestimate its role in the birth of a new myth, a new transcultural code that emerged nearly 10 years after the October Revolution as a result of rejecting constructivist accomplishments by the political establishment. The article strives to search not only for the definition but also for the roots of socialist realism, by mapping out new paths of its cognition. The role of propaganda in the recent history of Russia, is generally underestimated.
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En 1934 et 1935, le parti communiste de Yougoslavie procéda à un raffermissement assez marqué de son organisation; cependant, son développement restait au-dessous de ce qu’il aurati pu être, compte tenu des possibilités objectives qui lui étaient offertes. C’ est en 1937 qu’ on fit un grand pas dans ce sens, car le manifeste de janvier du Comité central du Parti communiste de Yougoslavie représentait déjà un important document de programme actif: il orientait en effet les membres du parti vers une activité parmi les masses populaires. C’ est de là qu’ il faut partir pour expliquer 1’ attitude du Parti communiste de Yougslavie à l’égard du fascisme et du danger de guerre en Europe et particulièrement dans les Balkans, à l’égard de la politique intérieure et de la politique extérieure du Royaume de Yougoslavie, comme à l’égard de l’opposition unie, dans le pays même. Ce manifeste pose en effet la base d’une coopération du Parti communiste de Yugoslavie et des partis démocratiques de l'opposition, de même qu’il précise le rôle du Front populaire, etc.
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Kongres Jugoslovanske socialnodemokratične stranke v Avstriji, ki je zboroval v Ljubljani v Narodnem domu 28. in 29. junija 1914, je sklenil z večino glasov premestiti Izvršni odbor stranke iz Ljubljane v Trst. Do tega sklepa, ki je bil sprejet 29. junija, t. j . dan po sarajevskem atentatu, ni prišlo kar čez noč. Primorski socialni demokratje so že nekaj časa prej razpravljali na sejali svojih političnih odborov o tem, da bi bilo treba prenesti Izvršni odbor iz Ljubljane v Trst. Do te misli so prišli primorski socialisti iz dveh razlogov: temeljni razlog je bil, naj bi se Izvršni odbor prenesel iz tedanje purgerske Ljubljane v Trst, to se pravi, da bi ga premestili v tržaško proletarsko okolje, kjer je bila stranka že močno razvita. Drugi razlog pa je bilo dejstvo, da je bila Dalmacija, ki je spadala v okvir Jugoslovanske socialnodemokratične stranke v Avstriji, le predaleč od Ljubljane in je zategadelj preveč trpelo socialistično gibanje v Dalmaciji in deloma tudi v Istri. [...]
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Abreakthrough in the unleashing of mass terror in the USSR was the February– March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) (1937), which initiated the activities of the NKVD to liquidate “counter-revolutionary elements”. Parallel to these activities, from July 1937 to November 1938, operations were carried out against “hostile nationalities” – a potential “fifth column”, “insurgent base” in case of war. They included all layers of the population. More than 335,000 people were convicted at that time, almost 74% of whom were shot. The main goal was to destroy the remains of “nationalist elements” – a base for foreign intelligence services. On the example of this operation in Kyrgyzstan were presented its stages (preparation, arrest, investigation, sentence) and “technology” of repression. Referring to the “Polish operation” of the NKVD, more detailed archival information about Ludwik Krynicki’s case was provided. An analysis of the national origin of 137 victims was carried out, the remains of which were excavated in Czon-Tasz, as well as the national composition of almost 21 thousand people repressed in Kyrgyzstan in 1918–1953 (including 180 Poles).
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In this article we will critically look back on the some of theses of political science professor Jovan Mirić (1934 — 2015), which are published in the book called Everything Changes, the Crisis Remains (Sve se mijenja, kriza ostaje). This book is the collection of articles, essays and interviews which professor Mirić wrote and published in the period between 1983 and 2011 in various newspapers and journals. The themes which professor Mirić covered in his lengthy body of work include the crisis of the Yugoslav self-managing socialism, the problem of the war between Serbs and Croats and the status of Serbs in Croatia as a national minority. By following Mirić’s long-lasting intellectual development and approach to changed circumstances, we can critically approach to following moments: 1.) Since late 80s Mirić ´s moving to the position of liberal democracy is permeated with the contradictory relationship to his earlier devotion to the self-managing socialism; 2.) Some of articles and essays are marked with the thesis of “the two totalitarianisms” (communist and nationalist one) and Mirić thus mitigates modernist and emancipatory achievements of socialism; 3.) Mirić’s stance towards the conflict between Serbs and Croats is carried out from consistently anti-nationalistic positions, but the position regarding civic or ethnic principle remains unclear. Finally, the conclusion goes in the direction that, despite noticeable changes in circumstances and approaches to those circumstances, Jovan Mirić kept the continuity of his own critical position – although that continuity had its own crises – everything changes, but crisis and critique remain.
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An analysis of previously inaccessible Soviet archives and the archives of former socialist East European countries reveals the history of preparations preceding the founding of the Cominform, whose primary aim was to strengthen the Soviet-dominated "socialist camp" recently established. Although Stalin had’ since the spring of 1946, occasionally considered the idea of forming the Information Bureau (Cominform) with the leaders of some countries from the "socialist camp", he did not allow any initiative on their part. In June 1947 the leader of the Polish communists Gromulka received instructions from the Kremlin to begin making preparations for a conference of the nine communist parties. Neither he nor any of the other participants, however, were told that the meeting would be used as a founding session for the Cominform. This was disclosed to them only when the meeting was already under way. The study of Soviet archives has revealed the Soviet plans preceding the conference and their strategy in carrying them out, and provides insight into the relations between Moscow and the communist parties of the countries belonging to the Soviet bloc, as well as the reaction of the latter to the conference and to the formation of the Cominform.
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The process of normalizing Soviet-Yugoslav relations after the break in 1948 included the particularly delicate question of renewing ties between the countries’ communist parties, which was additionally hampered by the considerable ideological and political differences dividing them. The normalization of relations between the countries in 1955, as well as the abolishment of the personality cult and the intended destalinization of the USSR and other communist countries proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, created favorable conditions for mending the relations between the two parties. The most important event in connection to this took place in June 1956 when, on the occasion of the visit of a Yugoslav party and government delegation led by J. B. Tito, the Moscow Declaration was signed, guaranteeing equality between parties and the right of each communist party to apply its own model of socialism. This document signified the triumph of Tito’s policy, and marked the highest point in Soviet-Yugoslav relations and of the process of destalinization in the communist camp. Immediately after this agreement, however, heavy social unrest began in Poland, leading to bloodshed in Poznan and pointing to a similar course of events in Hungary. Faced with the risk that the new process of democratization might bring to the cohesion of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet leadership hastily reverted to the old centralistic control over the satellite countries and their parties. This decision required that the uncommon position of the Yugoslav party, country and leadership be made to look less appealing to the other communist countries. The relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, noticeably cooler at the end of the summer, rapidly deteriorated during and after the revolutionary events in Hungary in the autumn. By the end of the year the relations between the communist parties of the two countries had declined to the point at which they had been before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The regression in relations reflected, on the one hand, Yugoslavia’s defense of its independent position between the two blocs, which Tito had already achieved, and, on the other, the inability of the Soviet leaders to find a different way, other than that of insisting on ideological uniformity, of keeping the socialist camp together and of maintaining their own dominant position in it.
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