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Pri proučevanju slovenskega družbenega in političnega razvoja v prvem povojnem desetletju se mi vedno znova potrjuje prepričanje, kako koristno bi bilo, če bi za povojni čas imeli pri nas podobne edicije virov, kot jih imamo za obdobje NOV. Nalogo izdajanja virov smo si znanstveni delavci zastavili že pred desetimi leti v dolgoročnem načrtu »Zgodovina Slovencev 1945—1976«. Vendar do njene uresničitve iz različnih razlogov do danes še ni prišlo. Izjema bodo nova Zbrana dela Borisa Kidriča, kjer bo nekoliko bolj osvetljeno prvo povojno leto v Sloveniji, ko je bil Kidrič še na vodilnih položajih v Ljubljani. Načrtovana zbrana dela Edvarda Kardelja in Josipa Broza-Tita bodo v dosti manjši meri zajela slovensko arhivsko gradivo. Pri izdajanju zbranih del posameznikov, pa čeprav so to vodilni politični delavci, obstaja še dodatna, metodološka pomanjkljivost, da ne morejo zajeti in predstaviti širših dogajanj, temveč predstavljajo politično, gospodarsko, skratka teoretično misel posameznika in v najboljšem primeru njegovo delovanje, v dosti manjši meri pa delovanje organov, organizacij, da o razmerah na terenu ne govorimo. [...]
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Eine der Spezialitäten der Funktion der staatlichen Sicherheitsorgane im politischen System von János Kádár war, daß die staatlichen Sicherheitsorgane die gesamte Gesellschaft unter Kontrolle nehmen wollten. Diese Feststellung bezog sich nicht nur auf Landesebene, auf die für bedeutsam gemeinte Organisationen, sondern auch auf die lokale Ebene. In einer Diktatur sowjetischen Typs auf der wirklichen Laune der Gesellschaft, auf die wirkliche Meinung über die Macht und ihre Maßnahmen, konnten sich hauptsächlich die Macht aus Sowjetischen Willen gnadende Partei- und Staatsführers aus dem Informations-Aufklärungsnetz benachrichtigen. Mit diesem Netz konnten sie auch die öffentliche Stimmung beeinflussen und einzigartige Fälle für die Macht entsprechend lösen. Einer der Gründe war – neben dem Mangel von Parteien mit verschiedenen Programmen und verschiedener gesellschaftlicher Basis und wirklich freiwilligen gesellschaftlichen Organisationen, die in einer Demokratie fähig sind, einige Gruppen der Gesellschaft zu verstärken – zweifellos die Furcht vor einem wesentlichen Instrument das Ausüben der sozialistischen Macht, die Furcht vor dem Terror. Während der Revolution wurde das Informations-Aufklärungsnetz der Macht trotz aller bewusst verteilten Propaganda, die auf die Haftung des Staatsorgans und Soldaten schallenden und trotz der Propaganda, die nicht einmal auch in die Konzeptionsprozesse oder Konstruktiv-Verfahren eingewebt wurde, praktisch zusammengebrochen, beziehungsweise es wurde wegen Dekonspiration unbrauchbar. Die staatlichen Sicherheitsorgane sollten sich natürlich, einigermaßen, mit der lokalen Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, die sie unter Kontrolle nehmen wollten, kennenlernen. Einige ökonomische und gesellschaftliche Eigenschaften von Várpalota beeinträchtigten ernsthaft die Arbeit der staatlichen Sicherheitsorgane im politischen System von János Kádár, so lohnt es sich diese kurz bekannt zu machen.
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The review of: Roter Anstoss. Podnaslov: Der »Osterreichische Weg«. Sozialistische Beitrage. Izdala Josef Hindels in Anton Pelinka. Wien-Miinchen 1980, 363 strani.
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The review of: Referati VIII. zborovanja arhivskih delavcev Slovenije v Kočevju od 20. do 22. oktobra 1977), Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, Ljubljana 1978, 144 strani
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The review of: Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma. 1974 — 9. zvezek; strani 581.
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This article attempts to explicate the 10 years of the Guatemalan Revolution (1944–1954) from the viewpoint of the world system theory, from the fall of Ubico’s dictatorship until the military coup. It lays emphasis upon Guatemala’s structural economic dependency on the United States, the effects of this on the internal social structure of the country and on the political and social struggle during this period. The article is divided into six parts: the first one shows the historical antecedents; the second one the dictatorship, its fall, and the Revolutionary Junta (1930–1945); the third one the presidency of Arévalo (1945–1951); the fourth one the presidency of Arbenz (1951–1954); the fifth one the military coup (1954). While each part contains a short resume, the sixth and last section gives a general review and interpretation of the whole revolutionary process, about its causes, its progress and its consequences.
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Scientific historiography did not manage to crucially influence the creation of historical conscience as far as the processing of themes on past in the second edition of Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia are concerned. Reality of Yugoslavia was contradictory and full of conflicts of various types in which even historians participated, each in their own way, sometimes even without being aware of it. The governing establishment feared the revealing of the past because it could spoil previous historical picture, especially the one that had nothing to do with the Second World War and state-political organization of SFRY. In addition to this, partisan generation was still very present in the public scene. Thus for them every reexamination of history was the conviction of their gained rights and casting of an unjust shadow on their own past. While Serbian historiography showed a great level of disunity, disharmony and hiding behind the principles of non-interference in political and ideological clashes in Yugoslavia of that time, by which it did support one concept, Croatian Marxist historiography was consistently defending the views of its Establishment, slowly preparing the field for overcoming the rigid national approach. The clashes between Serbia and Croatia in historiography showed two completely different concepts in the interpretation of the common past, two separate currents, as if these were two different histories.
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A particularly important element in forming Yugoslavia’s new course in foreign policy and the political platform on which it was based was Tito’s trip to India and Burma, the Asian countries which had already applied in practice the policy founded on the principles of coexistence and long supported the establishment of international premises which would later become the essence of the nonalignment policy. Personal contacts with Indian and Burmese politicians and the meeting with the Egyptian president Nasser on their return to Yugoslavia, broadened the Yugoslav leaders’ views of the world beyond Europe and America, which had previously remained outside the scope of Yugoslavia’s foreign affairs. This experience helped to give a new incentive and to strengthen the basis of a new idea gradually maturing in leading Yugoslav political circles. The realization of this idea would place Yugoslavia at the forefront of a large group of countries with impressive voting leverage in the United Nations, in addition to allowing access to an entirely new and big market abroad.
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The available information pertaining to the period above shows that the reorganization of state security in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was thorough in its legal, personnel, organizational, and archival aspects. State security was carried over to republican level, while in the years immediately following the Brioni Plenum the entire Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs was marginalized and subjected to a drastic cut-down. Cadres were assigned to official duties and positions according to criteria depending on republican and national affiliation, a new policy whose various controversial aspects would become evident in the period to come. The entire department of Internal Affairs experienced a process of swift additional training and education of personnel, whose members were now selected according to their professional qualifications. The complex conditions in the sphere of security required increased engagement of police and state security forces, and the need was felt to establish special police units for various crisis situations in the country. This idea was, however, not put in effect before the seventies, after several terrorist acts had taken place. Revision of the department’s activities and the destruction of its records led state security to restrict its activities aimed at the general supervision of citizens. The remaining information and the specific political tendency of those who ordered this revision in policy leaves room for doubt in regard to the content of the important (historical) material that was destroyed, and to the true intentions of the people in charge of this campaign, which may have served the additional purpose of eliminating documents and records compromising to them and of clearing the way for their future political activity.
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In this article we will critically look back on the some of theses of political science professor Jovan Mirić (1934 — 2015), which are published in the book called Everything Changes, the Crisis Remains (Sve se mijenja, kriza ostaje). This book is the collection of articles, essays and interviews which professor Mirić wrote and published in the period between 1983 and 2011 in various newspapers and journals. The themes which professor Mirić covered in his lengthy body of work include the crisis of the Yugoslav self-managing socialism, the problem of the war between Serbs and Croats and the status of Serbs in Croatia as a national minority. By following Mirić’s long-lasting intellectual development and approach to changed circumstances, we can critically approach to following moments: 1.) Since late 80s Mirić ´s moving to the position of liberal democracy is permeated with the contradictory relationship to his earlier devotion to the self-managing socialism; 2.) Some of articles and essays are marked with the thesis of “the two totalitarianisms” (communist and nationalist one) and Mirić thus mitigates modernist and emancipatory achievements of socialism; 3.) Mirić’s stance towards the conflict between Serbs and Croats is carried out from consistently anti-nationalistic positions, but the position regarding civic or ethnic principle remains unclear. Finally, the conclusion goes in the direction that, despite noticeable changes in circumstances and approaches to those circumstances, Jovan Mirić kept the continuity of his own critical position – although that continuity had its own crises – everything changes, but crisis and critique remain.
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This paper starts from the findings of the latest study of social structure in Serbia (2012), which show a significant reduction of vertical social mobility, especially for further inter-stratum distance. In light of these data, the author considers that we have to re-examine earlier, very biting evaluation of some Serbian sociologists concerning “closeness” for mobility of the society in socialist Serbia. The author analyzes and re-evaluated findings of earlier research (Janićijević, 1970; Flere and Đurđev, 1982/3; Bogdanovic, 1986; 1988; Vukovic, 1989). He concludes that very brisk evaluation of mobility in the Serbian society during socialism is a consequence of schematic interpretation of these findings with Yasuda’s index.
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This article encompasses an analysis of research on the process of the formation and development of Croatian émigré communities in Croatian historiography based on 39 papers devoted to this topic, published from 1969 to 2018. The analysis was conducted on two levels. The general (under)representation of the topic in the context of Croatian historiography as a whole is examined first, followed by the issue of the influence of the dominant narrative on research through three key domains: the selection of topics, the use of characteristic methodology, and the interpretation itself. In this context, two periods have been examined separately – during the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and after the Republic of Croatia achieved independence. Parallel with this part of the analysis, the basic characteristics of papers on the topic of Croatian émigrés have been contextualised in regard to the achievements of foreign historiography and related scientific disciplines from the aspect of applying theoretical and methodological research frameworks. The reasons for the poor representation of this topic include high politicisation in regard to the critical stance of a large part of the émigré population towards the political system in Yugoslavia till 1991 and the difficult accessibility of archival material and relevant literature on immigrant associations. The analysis did not find any direct influence of politics, i.e. ideology, on the researchers, but there was a shift in the focus of research in line with changes in the social context, from the (pro-)Yugoslav émigré communities towards the predominantly anti-Yugoslav ones in works published after 1991. The predominant characteristic of the analysed works in both periods is the lack of an interpretation of the activities of examined individuals, events, and processes in a broader theoretical framework. Accordingly, a narrow focus on sources is predominant in the methodological sense, as is the lack of contextualisation of the development of Croatian émigré communities within the frame of immigrant associations. They are approached as homogenous groups, and their development is primarily interpreted in the context of events in Croatia. Following everything stated above, this paper points to the necessity of applying developed theoretical and methodological models through an interdisciplinary perspective.
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The Institute of Modern History was formed (under its present name) forty years ago, on February 1969, when the Department of History of the Yugoslav Workers Movement, a part of the Institute for the Study of the Workers Movement, fused with the Department of Historical Studies of the Institute of Social Studies. In the second half of 1958, with the arrival of young, educated historians these two departments began an organized and systematic study of the modern history of the Yugoslav people, and it is this year which is taken as the actual beginning of the Institute. The Institute’s present research activity is centered around the macro-project »Yugoslav History of the 20th Century«. The first results of research were published in the Institute’s periodic publications: »The History of the 20th Century«, Collection of Works, »The History of the Workers Movement«, Collection of Works, and »Contributions to the History of Socialism«.
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The process of normalizing Soviet-Yugoslav relations after the break in 1948 included the particularly delicate question of renewing ties between the countries’ communist parties, which was additionally hampered by the considerable ideological and political differences dividing them. The normalization of relations between the countries in 1955, as well as the abolishment of the personality cult and the intended destalinization of the USSR and other communist countries proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, created favorable conditions for mending the relations between the two parties. The most important event in connection to this took place in June 1956 when, on the occasion of the visit of a Yugoslav party and government delegation led by J. B. Tito, the Moscow Declaration was signed, guaranteeing equality between parties and the right of each communist party to apply its own model of socialism. This document signified the triumph of Tito’s policy, and marked the highest point in Soviet-Yugoslav relations and of the process of destalinization in the communist camp. Immediately after this agreement, however, heavy social unrest began in Poland, leading to bloodshed in Poznan and pointing to a similar course of events in Hungary. Faced with the risk that the new process of democratization might bring to the cohesion of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet leadership hastily reverted to the old centralistic control over the satellite countries and their parties. This decision required that the uncommon position of the Yugoslav party, country and leadership be made to look less appealing to the other communist countries. The relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, noticeably cooler at the end of the summer, rapidly deteriorated during and after the revolutionary events in Hungary in the autumn. By the end of the year the relations between the communist parties of the two countries had declined to the point at which they had been before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The regression in relations reflected, on the one hand, Yugoslavia’s defense of its independent position between the two blocs, which Tito had already achieved, and, on the other, the inability of the Soviet leaders to find a different way, other than that of insisting on ideological uniformity, of keeping the socialist camp together and of maintaining their own dominant position in it.
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Miloš Mišović, TAMNA STRANA BRIONSKE ISTINE,»Službeni list SRJ«, Beograd 1997, str. 247.
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The first official visit of the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, to Yugoslavia (17-23 November, 1952) and the return visit, at Winston Churchill’s invitation, of Yugoslav President, Josip Broz Tito, (16-21 March, 1953), had considerable impact on the mutual cooperation and understanding between the two countries’ governments. The meeting attracted the attention of international political circles and provoked various reactions of the public. The talks served to strengthen British confidence in the Yugoslav government’s readiness to resist possible aggression of the Cominform countries. The reason behind this was the agreement, which had recently been signed between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. As part of a global defense plan, this Agreement was taken to guarantee the defense of the west wing in the event of war. British reliance on Yugoslavia’s course of action was also based on explanations given regarding Anglo-American intentions in case of war in the Balkans and on clearly defined Yugoslav views concerning the Ljubljana issue, the role of Italy, the importance of Albania’s preventive isolation and the possibilities of defense maneuvers on Yugoslav territory. In the course of these talks, the British government assured the Yugoslav side for the first time, that it would not be left without support in the event of an assault from the Cominform countries since a confrontation of that sort would mean the beginning of a third world war.
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