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The article is a confrontation with Robert Brandom’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, his attempt to systematically “renormalize” Hegel, i.e., to reduce his extravagant formulations to the criteria of common sense. The article analyses a number of Brandom’s “domestications” of Hegel’s speculative concepts: self-relating, determinate negation, mediation, In-itself, action, knowledge, Spirit, reconciliation, history. On the basis of the examples from Marx, Freud, structuralism, Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Lacan, Adorno, the text defends Hegel’s “madness”, the irreducible speculative, non-interpretable core of his philosophy. Hegel’s statements have to shock us, and this excess cannot be explained away through interpretation since the truth they deliver hinges on that.
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Through an original and extraordinarily fruitful reading of the Hegelian conception of negativity, Catherine Malabou developed the concept of plasticity which she keeps working on as one of her cardinal concepts even to this day. Engaging in the problematic of unity in Hegel, the paper takes on the task of trying to answer the question whether plasticity is one or are there several plasticities. The author argues that one must be careful not to reduce the inherent multiple of plasticity to a single plasticity which becomes plasticity par excellence: the plasticity of plastic explosion, of an abrupt and absolute break, to be distinguished from a creative or productive plasticity of habit. Malabou claimed that Hegel was – contrary to what Deleuz read in him – a philosopher of conceptual multitude as a multitude which cannot be reduced to only one image, the image of unity. If this is true, then the concept of plasticity itself with which she grasped the essence of Hegel’s dialectics, should be understood at least as a “unity in conflict”, if not as an inorganic, inhomogeneous, composed unity – and perhaps even as a unity of the pack.
More...On Hegel’s Presentation of Self-Consciousness
The paper provides a modest reading of Hegel’s treatment of selfconsciousness in his Phenomenology of Spirit and tries to present it as an integral part of the overall project of the experience of consciousness leading from understanding to reason. Its immediate objective is, it is argued, to think the independence and dependence, that is the pure and empirical I within the same unity of self-consciousness. This implies a double movement of finding a proper existence for the pure I and at the same time a breaking down of the empirical I’s attachment to particularity. It is argued that the Hegelian struggle for recognition intends to show how the access to reason demands the subject’s renunciation of its attachment to particularity, that is to sacrifice not only its bare life but every thing indeed, including its particular identity, and yet, to go on living.
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The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, “being” and “nothing” are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of “being” is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the “thetical judgement”. And the article’s first thesis claims that Hegel couldn’t have placed “being” at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between “being” and “nothing”, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the “transcendental inter-subjectivity” in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel’s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that “being” and “nothing” are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of “public” whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.
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The paper takes as its starting point the figure of the owl as the emblem of philosophy, it looks at its history and takes up its most significant philosophical use, the notorious passage where Hegel uses the owl as the indic ation of philosophy’s necessary belatedness. This is the passage which is usually taken as the point of indictment of Hegel’s position and the role he ascribed to philosophy. Hegel’s adage ‘What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational’ is scrutinized in its various aspects, particularly in view of its other version, ‘what is rational must happen’. The tension between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ is perhaps the clue to understanding this adage, where Hegel doesn’t opt for the one or the other, but aims at the paradoxical intersection of the two. Hegel’s adage is put in contrast with Marx’s Thesis Eleven. The paper considers the concepts of the rational, the actual, the belatedness/retroaction, the grayness and finally the owl (and the part that bestiary plays in philosophy), thus trying to circumscribe the task that should be assigned to philosophy.
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Kant argues about the concept of history trough three issues: the issue of perception, the issue of morality and the issue of politics. He wants to present the human journey from the wilderness to the civilization to culture and from culture to morality. The universality of Kant indicates to the human orgin is connected to the mutual destiny of the mankind could be developed. According to this, history is showing us many antagonisms of the nature and the intellect as parts from which are the human gifts for morality developed. The progress the development of the civilization is a product from the conflict as a part of nature, and the last aim of this development is the establishment of the world’s civilization. With the establishment of the world’s civilization is not only the freedom of mankind in their relationship guaranteed but also in the relationship of countries. The purpose of this work is not only to present the theological background of Kant’s concept of history, but also to put the accent on the issues about the (im)possibility of the realisation of the historical aim, and these issues are engendered in Kant’s philosophy.
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The review of: Nietzsche és a Parsifal. Prolegomena egy személyiségetikához (Nietzsche and Parsifal. Prolegomena to an Ethics of Personality) by Ágnes Heller; Translated by Magdolna Módos, Horror Mataphysicae series, Budapest: Századvég Kiadó—Gond, 1994, 154 pp.
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Prije nego što krenem sa svojim izlaganjem, želio bih precizirati u kakvom je ono odnosu prema generalnoj temi: "Moral i demokracija". Ustvari, naslov mog izlaganja može navesti na pomisao da sam ja želio reartikulirati odnos kantovske moralne teorije prema demokraciji čija bi moderna forma omogućila rješenje sumnji (aporija) Kantove političke misli. Tu bi se radilo, naprimjer, o tome da se prevladaju protuslovlja između monologističkog morala i nužno pluralnog političkog društva, počevši od dostignuća komunikacionalne ili diskursivne teorije; ili, pak konkretnije, ja bih poduzeo ponovno iščitavanje teza o "kosmopolitskoj historiji" i o "vječitom miru" u svijetlu našeg XX stoljeća koje se bliži kraju, preuzimajući, naprimjer, Kantov očito dvosmisleni stav prema Francuskoj revoluciji ili pak, njegova razmatranja o projektu prosvjetiteljstva.
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Uvoluminoznom delu, Kritici čistog uma (1781), zahtevajući radikalno novo utemeljenje za celokupnu oblast teorijskog, Kant se dokazao kao istaknut mislilac. Svoju slavu da bude i politički autor, veliki filozof a ujedno i značajan politički pisac on zahvaljuje jednom tekstu koji obuhvata otprilike deset procenata prve Kritike, raspravi Večni mir, objavljenoj na Miholjdanski vašar (29. septembra 1795). Neznatan obim ne govori protiv filozofske težine. Naprotiv, u jezgrovitoj kratkoći na videlo izlazi visoka virtuoznost.
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Za početak bismo mogli jednostavno reći da je prijevod Habermasovog Ogleda o ustavu Evrope izvan svake sumnje važan prilog pravnoj, politološkoj, sociološkoj i filozofskoj literaturi na našem jeziku. I premda je ova uobičajena (vanjska i uglavnom plakativna) kvalifikacija važnosti nekog spisa česta u javnoj upotrebi, u slučaju ovog autora i ovog prijevoda ta kvalifikacija je doista tačna. Jer, značaj ovog spisa i prijevoda ne leži naprosto u općepoznatom autoritetu Jürgena Habermasa koji, kao što znamo, u svom teorijskom i javnom angažmanu posljednjih decenija na svjetskoj sceni uživa status jedne od vodećih filozofskih figura, nego i u činjenici da se – između ostalog, na pretpostavkama njegovog filozofskog koncepta komunikacijskog djelovanja, komunikacijskog uma i diskursne etike (koji je izgrađen na kapitalu filozofske moderne, a koji u suštini predstavlja apologiju “umnog sadržaja moderne”), Habermas najneposrednije bavi živim i kompleksnim problemima pravno-političkog ustrojstva i aporijama Evrope u uvjetima neo-liberalnog kapitalizma i ujedno ispituje i promišlja uvjete i mogućnosti transformacije evropskog svijeta u smislu (nedovršenog i problemima bremenitog) nacrta evropskog ujedinjenja i njegove pravno-političke i ustavne institucionalizacije. Ta njegova nastojanja u ovoj knjizi između ostalog sažeto izražava i formulacija u kojoj se kaže da se – na pozadini “krize Evropske unije u svjetlu konstitucionalizacije međunarodnog prava”, odnosno na pozadini pitanja: “Zbog čega je Evropa tek danas ustavni projekt“ – ovdje radi o tome da “priča o civilizacijskoj snazi demokratskog uobličavanja prava izvan nacionalnih granica dobija svoj poticaj iz paralizirane konstelacije svjetske politike koja se danas ogleda, prije svega, u izrastanju finansijskih tržišta koja ostaju izvan dometa čak i najmoćnijih nacionalnih država. U aktuelnoj krizi, čini se da one ne nude primamljivu opciju državnog jamstva javnog blagostanja. U ovakvoj situaciji pokušaj evropskih država da putem nadnacionalnog uobličavanja zajednice povrate dio političke sposobnosti da sama sobom upravljaju, izlazi iz okvira uobičajenog samopotvrđivanja. Otud i naracija koju sam predložio za evropsko ujedinjenje nalazi svoj nastavak u zamisli o politički uobličenoj svjetskoj zajednici”. A ovo “kozmopolitsko uvezivanje građana svijeta” Habermas prospektivno alternira evropskoj političkoj realnosti i odnosno realnosti sadašnje “državne zajednice Evropske unije” koja “dijeli sa današnjim državama partikularizam pomoću kojeg se političke zajednice u socijalnom prostoru razgraničavaju jedna od druge”. Nadilaženja ili transformaciju tog stanja stvari Habermas vidi u “zamjeni perspektiva od klasičnog međunarodnog prava prema političkom ustavu svjetskog društva koji nije više čista misaona konstrukcija”.
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In this work I direct attention to the role and importance of pluriperspectivism in the thought of G. W. F. Hegel. For that purpose, I read (interpret) the allegory about the true as a bacchantic ecstasy, which can be found in his fundamental work Phenomenology of Spirit. Also, in the text I indicate the importance of pluriperspectivism, that is, point out and elaborate its essential characteristics: on the one hand, it allows and encourages the more unexclusive and more embracing approach to the reality while, on the other hand, it allows and encourages the growth and development of perspective, that is, the increase of the truthfulness of truth.
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It seems that Harre's reference to Kant starts from the presupposition that categorical imperative is only a formal principle whose content is separable from it. If one takes the pattern of the natural law as adequate for interpretation of the fundamental pattern of categorical imperative, then it can be equated with Harre's principle of universibility. However, the pattern of autonomy is fundamental for the explication of categorical imperative because it points out the origin of categorical imperative, and the issue of the acquired universality. Also, it can be proved that the fundamental pattern of the categorical imperative is equivalent to the pattern of purposfullness, namely that the formal formulation of the categorical imperative cannot be separated from the content. On the other hand, since Kant took categorical imperative as a cryterion for moral evaluation of maxim of acting, the author reconsiders the possibility of utilitarian interpretation of Kant's test of universalism. If that could be possible then Harre's thesis on the synthesis of utilitarianism and dentic ethic would not be surprising but rather found in Kant's works. However, the categorical imperative cannot be equated with the argument of generalization (what would happen if everyone did that?) nor with the argument of the golden rule, because they examine only the legitimacy of action and Kant's test of universality on the other hand, refers to morality of maximes. Harre's utilitarian strategy, defined by an argument of the golden rule, aims for the general, but this generality is not Kantian,
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Ono što Löwithovo filozofsko mišljenje izražava višestruko je. U filozofiji 20. stoljeća to je, čini nam se, bdio u sjeni drugih, značajnijih filozofskih ili društvenih pitanja. U sjeni je pitanja koje otvara filozofski diskurs modeme, koja liiteramokritički, esejistički, kritičko-estetički, filozofsko»antropološki, slavi samo pobjedu jednog principa, jedne logike. Tu logiku danas vidimo u vladavini principa subjektivnosti koja stiče svoju samosvijest u procesu subjektiviranja, potčinjavanja svega što se može potčiniti.
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Posle Hegelove smrti 1830. godine svet je postao običniji. Ove Burkhartove reći u doslovnom smislu izražavaju i Levitov program. Samo što on isti problem sagledava znatno radikalnije. Za Levita ovaj prelom, koji se posle Hegelove smrti zbio u mišljenju 19. veka, znači »dovršenje nemačke kulture od strane Hegela i Getea.« »Ove studije iistorije duha, veli Levit, ipak nisu prilog istanji duha u uobičajenom smislu reči. Jer temelji istorije duha, koji potiču iz Hegelove metafizike duha, reducirani su otada na trivijalno. Duh kao subjekt istorije više nije fundament nego, u najboljem slučaju problem. Ono što preostaje od duha samo je još duh vremena«. (S. 8)
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Po običaju, treba nešto na ovim našim kolokvijima reći, onako kako to činim svakom prilikom, a ovom prilikom, smatram, i posebno. Djelo izazovnog naslova, enciklopedijsko svojom širinom, ali i prebogato sveopćim-univerzalnim sudovima koji nas dovode, ili nemam pravo reći nas, no mene dovode u teškoće razumijevanja: značenja sadržaja, opsega pojmova, do nedoumica i prijepora.
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Tko danas odabire filozofski rad kao zanimanje, mora od samog početka odustati od iluzije s kojom su nekoć započinjale filozofske razrade: da je moguće snagom mišljenja zahvatiti totalitet stvarnoga. Nikakav opravdavajući razum nije se mogao ponovno pronaći u stvarnosti čiji poredak i oblik pobija svaki zahtjev razuma; tek polemički ona se spoznavatelju pruža kao cijela stvarnost, dok samo u tragovima i krhotinama dopušta nadu da bi se jednom dospjelo do prave i odgovarajuće stvarnosti.
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In his first work entitled “Thoughts Concerning the True Measure of Vital Forces” Kant made an attempt to solve one of the most famous disputes of 17th-century philosophy. Though Kant’s solution is incorrect, it shows the way the philosopher usually solved philosophical problems. In his later works, written during the critical period, Kant came back to the problems he dealt with in his first essay, but the most important continuation of it can be found in the unpublished notes being part of so-called Opus postumum.
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The author examines possible analogies between Kant’s transcendental idealism and de Saussure’s and Levi-Strauss’s structuralism, in order to analyse if the former can be understood as a predecessor for the later. The author shows that both teachings assume a priori formal framework, but they diverge in the ways they describe it, as well as in understanding of its function. Consequently, the author concludes that structuralism can be seen as one possible use of Kant’s idea about the existence of such a frame. Furthermore, the author claims that Ricker’s understanding of structuralism as ‘Kantianism without transcendental subject’ should be rejected, since a teaching which does not assume existence of such subject cannot be understood as Kantian.
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In this article we delineate the concept of subjectivity in Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. In our critical analysis we distinguish three levels of the dynamic concept of subjectivity and focus on problems which refer to the fundamental determination of their absolute subject. Fichte develops his conception of absolute subjectivity from Kant’s conception of the autonomous subject in the practical part of his critical transcendental philosophy. Absolute subjectivity is not reflected, but simply posited as an absolute thesis. Nonetheless, we claim that the structure of absolute subjectivity becomes unintelligible unless we maintain the principles of heteronomy and reflectivity. Following different ways of interpreting the conception of the absolutely autonomous subject, we conclude that the act of absolute positing cannot be proved through or reflected in theoretical investigation. Hence, there is a demand for a “thetic judgment” by which subject posits itself absolutely.
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