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The basic aim of this study is to reveal and demonstrate how the analysis of the topic of contradiction can outline directions for overcoming transcendentalism, i.e., outline ontological-dialectical approaches to logic through the prism of Kant and Hegel, and based on this, present the result of paraconsistent logic with regard to the formalization of dialectical logic.
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Around the year 1802, when he was reading his famous Lectures on the Method of Academic Study, Schelling, merely 27 years old at the time, had already parted definitely with Fichte’s philosophy and elaborated his own identity philosophy. These lectures contain no didactic guidance for teachers but address students, showing them how, in studying the sciences, not to remain at the level of empirical knowledge but to rise to the height of true philosophical thinking, such as he saw displayed in his own philosophy. That is why he proceeds (in his first lecture) from the absolute concept of science but immediately passes (in the second) to the scientific and moral significance of the higher academic institutions as centers for the education of society. Throughout the discussion on the separate sciences, the prevailing idea advanced was of their identity and of the freedom of science; this idea became a basis of the university reform undertaken in Germany by Wilhelm von Humboldt.
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This article summarizes the author’s theses presented in his larger monograph devoted to the works of Ivan Vazov (the absolute national classic) written in the 1880s. The poetic cycle Epic of the Forgotten (1881–84), the novella Uncles (1885) and the epic novel Under the Yoke (1888) not only constitute the absolute core of the national literary canon, but have also been seen as a complete model of the national philosophy of history, of the Bulgarian collective being in History. The article examines two important points. The first is related to how these major works (the Epic, Uncles and Under the Yoke) construct Vazov’s national-ideological and national-philosophical model in terms of the Hegelian dialectic of thesis–antithesis–synthesis. The second point is related to how this Vazovian model is significantly placed in the framework of two figures – the national hero Vasil Levski (in Epic) and the idiot Muncho (in Under the Yoke) – that are both contrasting and functionally identical. The article analyzes their “high” historical-philosophical representative features.
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In his system of the logical functions of understanding Kant includes modality as the fourth class together with quantity, quality and relation. Kant defines modality briefly, though with the clear indication that modality has to put the judgment in the “relation to the thinking in general”. The present paper will argue that Kant has reached a new definition of modality. However, this can be demonstrated in the logical reconstruction of the system of judgments with the consistent course through the four logical types of judgments included. The specific functions of these judgments are formed on the bases of the logical possibilities of subject, predicate and logical relation. These components are gradually intensified with their inner subdivision and are formed on all other objects in the field of thinking. These general judgmental areas of subject, predicate and relation subdivision constitute the modality in its class. The modality acts through separating and producing the most certain and hardest connection between the judgmental components on the base of modal ground for the object and on the calculation of the whole field of judgment. Modality is realized as the most complex and covered construction of judgment in its own judgmental area. Exactly this general schema of modality is the base for transition to the second analytic in Critique of Pure Reason – the transition as an immediate and inner connection between the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles. The schema of modality is generalized and assembled in a new logical formation – the pure transcendental schema with its logical structure and principles. This search has to give the answer to “the most important task” of transcendental logic: how can we build the object of the pure understanding through the logical form of the synthetic judgments a priori.
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The origin of the idea of inner sense in the early Schelling’s philosophy represents a specific cognitive way which has the aim to make the concept of clear philosophical cognition. In the frame of German classical philosophy, the idea of inner sense
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Review of: Damir Barbarić (ur.), Sloboda i zlo, Schellingov »Spis o slobodi«, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb 2017.
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The author deals with Hegel’s reception of political economy in the Philosophy of Right, showing that reception to be decisive for the development of Hegel’s legal and political philosophy and its mature form, but also for his understanding of the modern natural law tradition and the theory of social contract. Relying on the findings of Dag Strpić, the author argues that Hegel considered “civil society” to be the place of realization of the contractual idea of the state. The “laws” immanent to modern market economy, which were “discovered” by political economy, make in Hegel’s view contractual constitution of the state superfluous and provide at the same time the internal measure for the critique of the contractual theory. This, however, does not mean that Hegel accepts the social model of classical political economy, nor its understanding of the relation between the state and society. He questions its central assumption on the self-regulatory capacity of the market, for which reason he finds necessary the regulation of the market by the state. In the final analysis, as it is shown, the “universality” of civil society is grounded in the “universality” of the political state, which is a higher level of actualization of human freedom than civil society.
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Carnap famously argued that metaphysics unavoidably involves a confusion between science and poetry. Unlike the lyric poet, who does not attempt to make an argument, the metaphysician attempts to make an argument while simultaneously lacking in musical talent. Carnap’s objection that metaphysics unavoidably involves a blend of philosophy and poetry is not a 20th century insight. Plato, in his beautifully crafted Phaedo, presents us with the imprisoned Socrates, who having been condemned to death for practicing philosophy in the Apology, has a dream in which he realizes that he ought to make music. In this dialogue, however, Plato indicates no hint of the scorn that Carnap has for metaphysics— rather Socrates’ friends find him setting Aesop’s fables to verse. In the modern era, Nietzsche re-introduced the ‘music making Socrates’ in his Birth of Tragedy. But Nietzsche is not the first to revive the concept in modern philosophy. Before Nietzsche’s call for a new music-making Socrates, the early German Romantics, in particular Schlegel, explicitly called for the identification of poetry and science in the concept of Poesie. As Schlegel writes: ‘Alle Kunst soll Wissenschaft werden, und alle Wissenschaft Kunst werden; Poesie und Philosophie sollen vereinigt sein.’ On the one hand, in Ion Socrates is not wrong to critique Ion for not knowing the significance of his own work. On the other hand, Socrates himself recognizes in Phaedo that he is guilty of failing to heed the call to make music. Long misunderstood, the Romantic concept of Poesie is not mere irrationalism, for it offers an aesthetic metaphysics of the Absolute. Romanticism is indeed a philosophy of the Absolute, but one which cannot conceive of any solution to the profound impasses that confront philosophical knowing except by learning to make music.
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Many different strategies of distinction between ethics and politics exist in the history of philosophy. Though Immanuel Kant created a new critical method of this differentiation in his late works – in which the moral was derived from the fact of reason and categorical imperative, but the politics was derived from the human nature and the maxim of publicity –, this distinction could not be affirmed by young transcendental philosophers, e.g. Friedrich Schlegel. In this paper I reconstruct the “debate” between Kant and Schlegel on the possibility of political ‘a priori’ following their arguments about the notion of republic. According to the complexity of the question I analyse only a sub-question, the moral and political dilemma of tyrannicide (or revolution), which represents the difference between the standpoints of the two philosophers.
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There is a strong tendency in post-Hegelian philosophy to return to the starting point of Fichte’s philosophy, such as the primacy of practice, the privilege of the subject, and an “antithetical dialectic” as opposed to absolute dialectics. Kierkeggard is no exception. However, this aspect, which is related to Fichte, can be really grasped in the ethical stage of existence, in which Kierkegaard places Fichte’s question of the relationship between the I and the non-I in the existential context of the Self and society.
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While the traditional logic reflected the structure of proposition assuming separation and persistence of concepts of subject and predicate, Hegel, by his conception of a speculative proposition, has allowed philosophy to grasp a dialectical nature of the relation of those concepts. The author considers the radical change that happens in the logical reflection of the essence of the proposition in the light of the crucial requirement of the whole Hegel’s philosophy to think and express the Absolute as the subject. After the introductory comments on the groundbreaking epochs in the history of philosophical thinking due to which the logical problem of proposition became one of the central ontological issues, the birthplace of Hegel’s theory of speculative proposition is found within his early critique of philosophies of the first principle such as Fichte’s. In the central part of the text, the theory of the speculative proposition is thematized considering Hegel’s insight into the difference between a philosophical proposition and propositions and knowledge that originate from the other spheres of spirituality. After that, the proposition that expresses the Absolute as the subject from the Preface of Phenomenology of Spirit is interpreted as the manifestation of the speculative nature of the philosophical proposition, because, from the other side, the speculative proposition could be interpreted as the expression and the way the Absolute exists, too. As the speculative proposition, however, the proposition “the Absolute is subject” reveals reasons why the philosophical system, not the isolated proposition, has to be understood as the true element of existence of truth in Hegel’s thought.
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Kantian ethics and concept concerning “radical evil” represent one of the most interesting facets of moral reflection of German philosopher. Using anthropological and philosophical approach based on well-known critical method, I. Kant tried to find a comprise between “natural” behavior (i.e. not regulated by synthetic a priori judgments) but based only on sensation of pleasant unpleasant and “rational” behavior when humans tried to exit the realm of appearance and personal egoism for entering a new ethical dimension based on right (not pathological, if using I. Kant’s word) maxims being able to make human beings better than they are. In the paper it is underscored that main goal of Kantian ethics is the creation of a community where religion is a fact of reason and not of faith and reason, having as main actors men reaching an high level of self-consciousness and virtue that I. Kant granted as the greatest happiness one can have. The author tried to highlight the passage from “human being” as individuum (representative of a species) to ethically autonomous member of social consortium using as sources different Kantian works where this problem has been studied deeply and gave great emphasis to story of Job, representing in the best way the passage the Author wrote of. At the same time, he set for himself the goal of exploring progressive character of Kantian ethics aimed at making human beings better than they are, but not the best, considering noumenic nature of ethics hidden in the “Realm of goals”. Given such assumptions, the Author leads a debate with scholars distorting Kantian ethical thought by interpretation from Lacanian standpoints so that those scholars made I. Kant original source of totalitarianisms, where, in scholars’ opinion, humans do their duty both for saving their lives and express their sadistic tendencies and makes clear that Kantian ethics, throughout contradictory and complicated, is oriented to correction and education of human behavior for saving humans being from their own passions.
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The author explores the place, role, and significance of the transcendental ‘I’ in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, from a theoretical standpoint. It will be analysed through the ideas of an absolute, unconditioned principle, aresidue of abstraction and a product of a real (existing) activity, as well as through ideas of the ideel ray in the structure of consciousness, as a transcendental aspect in psychological consciousness, while the absolute ‘I’ will be interpreted as an activity of the spontaneity of mind, with the ‘I’ in reflection concluded. It will be shown to be, , on the one hand, pure, transcendental, and logicaland, on the other, as concrete and individual. Thanks to this dual nature, it enables self-consciousness as sui generis mode of consciousness, different from the objectifying consciousness, but, at the same time,, acting freelyas an agent. In the analysis of consciousness as consciousness, Fichte shows that unitary psychological (real) consciousness has structural elements that are necessary and objective; a transcendental structure. Only through those transcendental moments ‘I’, as a condition of possibility, a concrete psychological subject, comes into being. By differentiating between psychological consciousness and transcendental moments, Fichte also distinguishes between First and Third-person point of view. Unified, the kernel of psychological consciousness, the ‘I’, is transcendental. This interpretation of Fichte’s ideas aims to make them independent of German Idealism, and more accessible for analysis in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind and notions of consciousness. Thus, the result of the first section, ‘I’ as an unconditioned principle, can be interpreted epistemologically; a residue of abstraction has phenomenological connotations, while the ‘I’ as a real activity, contrary to factual knowledge, is an explicit distinction between consciousness and knowledge. The imperative indicates that psychological consciousness possesses its necessary form, which psychology alone cannot explicate; while the ideel ray represents an attempt to solve the problem of self-consciousness through form and structure alone. Furthermore,, in this respect, the absolute ‘I’ is not interpreted metaphysically or with connotations to idealism, but as a pre-differentiated activity and spontaneity of mind. In addition,, anotherconsequence is that consciousness should not be conceptualised only as a ‘state’ or ‘property’, but as a structure with unique form. The Heidelberg School of Self-Consciousness’ insistence on the fallibility of the reflection model puts Fichte’s potential solutions to this problem at the forefront of contemporary concepts of self-consciousness, as they are conceptualised either on reflection or objectifying consciousness, thus putting consciousness in the place of an object. Further explications of the importance of these ideas for the problems of egological and non-egological consciousness will be elaborated elsewhere.
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Contrary to Hegel who, starting with the first sentences of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, limits Kant’s philosophy to the predicates of critical skepticism and egological psychologism, Fichte tries to find philosophical arguments that would free Kant’s transcendental system from such limitations. Hegel wants to demonstrate an immanent critique of Kant’s criticism. Although Kant’s philosophy arises from the need for a clear and final definition of the foundations and limits of the use of pure theoretical mind - from disagreement with the dogmatism and relativism of traditional metaphysical endeavors – his transcendental criticism, in its essentially dualistic intentions, hides one fundamental - Hegel would say reckless - dogmatic and skeptical nature. Hegel states that the absolute identity of subject and object, lying hidden within Kant’s transcendental idealism, has been transformed into a formal, external, identity, so that transcendental idealism has passed into formal and, in fact, psychological, idealism. Hegel claims that Kant did the same mistakes that he had found in Hume’s philosophy. One of the basic aporias of Kant’s philosophy, the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori, was limited to subjective and external/formal meaning, where the possibility of mindful understanding turned out to be impossible. Kant’s idea of productive transcendental imagination, which should be understood as ‘the mind itself’, had been presented almost in the ordinary form of psychological, but a priori, powers.Fichte’s effort to understand and demonstrate Kant’s critique in a way that is free from skeptical and psychological remnants is one of the faces of his understanding of the spirit, and not the letter of Kant’s philosophy, and one of the most important features of such an approach lies in the peculiarities of Fichte’s understanding of nature and the role of transcendental apperception. In Fichte’s transcendental system, the transcendental self is expressed as a place of possibility of any given content of consciousness, including individual, specific, contents of perception. Dualism is almost completely lost from Fichte’s transcendental conception, all by rejecting the formalistic remnants of Kant’s critical position. In this sense, among other things, Fichte’s transcendentalism, unlike Kant’s criticism, should be understood as transcendental idealism.In this paper, we will compare certain elements of Hegel’s and Fichte’s approach to Kant’s philosophy and point to several important aspects of Fichte’s (non)egological understanding of transcendental apperception, all for the purpose of more accurately measuring the distance between Fichte’s and Hegel’s idealistic position. In particular, we will argue that Fichte’s transcendental idealism is closer to Hegel’s absolute idealism as much as Fichte’s conception of the nature of the transcendental self is distanced from egological conceptions in epistemology.
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Kant gave two new meanings to the age-old science of metaphysics, creating thus two new disciplines: metaphysics in the theoretical sense and moral metaphysics. However, only the second one, the metaphysics based on practical reason, corresponded to a certain extent to traditional metaphysics. This new acception claimed a type of knowledge based on the concept of freedom, a fundamental concept for human reason. This article shows the role of freedom in the development of Kant’s moral metaphysics.
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G. W. F. Hegel critiques Immanuel Kant for his assertion that philosophical reason cannot know (cognize) the Supra-Sensible (God, the Absolute). In his view, Kant’s idea of God is an empty notion and fails to comprehend either His existence or His Being. Kant considers God a postulate of practical reason (free reason), and for Hegel postulation is a subjective and non-rational act. To deny that philosophy can know God is to declare the death of both philosophy and God, insofar as God is the proper object of philosophy, for Hegel. Kant considers human cognition to be finite (determinate) and reason self-critical. He distinguishes knowledge, faith, and three types of reason and supports the unity of the human cognitive faculties. He sees difference and unity as postu¬lating and including each other. Hegel, however, reduces faith to knowledge and holds reason to be absolute. He converts Kant’s differences into opposites, dualisms, and contradictions, which he then reduces to the same (the identity principle). Hegel sees no ontological difference between God and humanity and places them both on the same ontological level, which ultimately brings them into conflict and causes them to exclude each other. He turns them into idols. Hegel’s merit lies in making philosophy historical, given that absolute reason manifests itself in history. As a result, history is a chronicle of violence governed by the principles of identity and contradiction.
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The aim of this paper is to present the nature, role and place of the Trinity in the philosophical system of G.W.F. Hegel, referring here in particular to his works “Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Lectures on the History of Religion”. In doing so, we try to move through three different starting points. In the first we ask about the spiritual and political climate of Hegel’s time, and how it influenced his conception of the Christian God. In the second we look at some peculiarities of Hegel as a thinker and author. Finally, through the third and most comprehensive starting point, we seek to observe Hegel’s conception of the Trinity in discourse with traditional Christian Trinitarian doctrine. Here again we encounter three different questions: The question of Gnostic and Ne-oplatonic role models in Hegel’s work; with Hegel’s attempt to transcend God as a mystery through speculative thinking, and finally, the relationship between God, the world, and man in Hegel’s work. In all this, G.W.F. Hegel eventually proves to be an unorthodox but also a permanently inspired thinker.
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In this consideration we start from the premise that to understand Hegel’s notion of the absolute in the environment of the end of metaphysics it should be necessary to explain how the techno-genetic construction of artificial life in the logic of technoscientific research appears as a legitimate moment of mediation between absolute beginning and absolute freedom. Such insight is gained in the traces of historical thought in the attempts of Heidegger and Sutlić when it comes to the systematic explication of Hegel’s metaphysics and its path to the identity of subject-substance in the form of absolute science of what is already called experience in the Phenomenology of Mind as a reflection on human freedom. It goes from the immediate certainty of Being through the mediation of consciousness to the overcoming (Aufhebung) of history as the positivity of the exposition of an idea in world history as the science of the absolute itself.
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As a thinker of becoming and not of being Hegel managed to undermine the domination of particular static world-picture and substantiality as some ground of reality which in the widest plurality of its appearances fixates it in an uncontradictory order. In this text author inquires to what extent such Hegel’s approach still keeps one rather important perspective in the understanding of social reality, but also a perspective of social justice open. Social ontological perspective that is opened with Hegel, based on readings of recent authors such as Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard and Axel Honneth, the perspective based on a process, inter-determination and inter-relatedness, on transformation and especially Hegel’s take on ‘social justice’ still contains an important emancipatory potential.
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