We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.
The fifth chapter of the First Book of Maccabees recounts a whole range of wars waged by Judas Maccabeus against Judaea’s neighbours, who are depicted as threatening the lives of the Jews living in their midst. The account of these punitive expeditions contains the only explicit reference found in the book to an anathema (ḥerem) against a foreign people, a reference which has led some scholars to see Judas as re-enacting the biblical prescription of the ḥerem against the Canaanites. In contrast with this interpretation, the present article argues that the description in 1 Maccabees 5 is highly literary and rhetorical, and that it is part of a strategy which aims at presenting Judas as the heir of the first kings of Israel. In particular, a careful literary analysis shows that nearly all the differences between the accounts in 1 and 2 Maccabees can be explained by taking into consideration the project of the author to present Judas’s military expeditions in the light of Saul’s campaigns, following 1 Samuel 10–15 (especially 14:47–48). Given the indebtedness of 1 Maccabees 5 toward such biblical traditions, the historicity of Judas’s wars against Judaea’s neighbours should be re-assessed.
More...
The success of Roman expansion in the Republican period and the durability of the empire, which survived the fall of the Republic and continued to function for the next few hundred years under the rule of emperors, drew the attention of both scholars and rulers in subsequent eras. The Imperium Romanum became a model for other states that attempted to build their own empires in later times. What captures our attention in discussions on Roman imperialism is mainly one, so far unresolved, dilemma: was Roman expansion a result of the material and psychological benefits that individual social groups enjoyed as a result of the aggressive policy, or a product of the Roman society’s atavistic tendencies for using violence? This seems to be a very difficult question to answer. If we also consider other elements that cause aggression, such as fright, fear (metus Gallicus, Punicus, Etruscus, etc.) of something or someone and a desire to win fame or glory over an enemy, then solving the problem seems impossible indeed. Finding the right answer is not made any easier by the historical sources. On the one hand, they are very biased, as they hide the actual reasons under a thick layer of propaganda and apologetic slogans; so thick, in fact, that in many cases the Romans’ true motives seem incomprehensible. The majority of available accounts present the Romans as the defenders of the weak and their allies. This is the result of a strong propaganda rhetoric used by the Romans in order to justify themselves in contemporary eyes and in posterity too.We should also note one more element that could have had an influence on the development of an imperial mentality in Rome, i.e. the broadly defined civilisation and cultural milieu in which Rome came to be – Italy. A cursory comparison of various Roman war rites with the rituals of other inhabitants of Italy indicates that war was very much a part of the mentality of Italic communities. The presence of war rites in Italic tribes suggests that in Italy, war was an important element of existence. Rome was an integral part of this world, which meant that the presence of a strong military component and aggressiveness in the life of the Roman community was natural.
More...
Publicly displayed statues constituted an important element of Rome’s presence in the life of a province. Until quite recently this form of communication has hardly been attested in the province of Iudaea/Syria Palaestina giving the impression that it was not practiced. However, large scale excavations in various regions in Israel and the intensive “hunt” for inscriptions and their systematic collection carried out by the CIIP yielded a corrective: there is no doubt left that this form of public communication was widely practiced here as well.
More...
Vespasian and his sons were forced to create their own style of politics, and, in search of auctoritas and maiestas, they could not neglect the realm of religion. We should bear in mind that in the Roman world, religion was an integral and indispensable component of social and political life. For these reasons, these representatives of the Roman Imperial Dynasty, just like their predecessors and successors, successfully used different forms of activity surpassing the narrow interpretation of the domain of religio, including massive building programmes, monetary policy or even poetry, to express devotion and respect for mores maiorum as well as to confirm the legality of their power by presenting the divine approval of their political strength.It seems legitimate to acknowledge that the Flavian era did not bring revolutionary changes in traditional religion. This clearly shows that the new dynasty was perfectly aware that one of the aspects of a well-functioning Rome was preservation of the ancestors’ customs and a belief in divine protection which could ensure safety, strength and belief in the unity of the Empire.
More...
After the Croatian military operations “the Flash“ and “the Storm“ and the creation of the new geopolitical relationships, Serbian leadership became aware that the areas of Western Slavonia, Baranja and Eastern Syrmia would not remain under Serbian occupation. Following the defeat of the Serbian forces in Croatia and the joint military operations of the Croatian armed forces and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which practically destroyed the Serbian armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the road towards political negotiations was opened. The matter of reintegration of the occupied areas under the jurisdiction of the UN into the state organization of the Republic of Croatia gained the new importance during the key political negotiations in late 1995. Despite the readiness of the Croatian army and the strong opposition of the Croatian public, displaced persons in particular, to the proposition that the occupied sections of the Eastern Slavonia and Vukovar, a symbol of defence and the suffering of Croatia in the Homeland War, be returned to Croatia using military force, Croatian leadership decided to negotiate with the rebellious Serbs. During the many months of negotiations between the Croatian leadership and the leadership of the rebellious Serbs, attempts were made at finding a way to peacefully resolve the issue of the remaining occupied territory. This made the signing of the Treaty on the peaceful and gradual transition of that area under the Croatian jurisdiction possible. The Croatian government and the Serb leadership signed the Basic Agreement regarding the Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia (the Erdut Agreement) on November the 12th, 1995 in Erdut and in Zagreb. The Agreement allowed for the stability to return to the area which was previously destroyed in military operations, scarred by human suffering, forced migrations and general social and economic decline. It was expected that the peace process, which was started by the signing of the Basic Agreement, would be continued through the UN Security Council’s Resolution, which was supposed to confirm the mandate of the new Peace Corps and to start the enforcement of the Agreement itself. The realization of the peace agreement began with the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1037 from January the 15th, 1996.
More...
The paper, based on the content of the verdict by the International Court of Justice in the Hague on mutual claims of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia for genocide, as well as the notes from the author as a hearing participant before that Court, discusses the points of the verdict, the course of the trial and the data presented in this procedure, as well as the significance of this verdict for the understanding of the events in Croatia during the first half of the 1990-ies.
More...
Vladimir Filipović, Ispod plavih šljemova. Motivi država za sudjelovanjem u misiji UNPROFOR 1992. – 1995. (Zagreb; Sarajevo: Plejada; University PressMagistrat izdanja, 2015), 335 str. Stjepan Milković, Alfe žive vječno! Prilozi za ratni put Specijalne jedinice policije “Alfa” PU zagrebačke u Domovinskom ratu 1991. – 1995. (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata; Udruga veterana specijalne jedinice policije “Alfa”, 2013), 352 str. Julija Barunčić Pletikosić, Petar Mijić, ur., Dokumenti vojne provenijencije “Republike Srpske Krajine” (svibanj- listopad 1995.) (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2015), 504 str. Rasim Muratović, Genocid u Ahmićima 1993. (Sarajevo; Ahmići: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu; Udruženje građana žrtava rata ‘92-’95. “16. april”, 2013), 382 str. Bojan B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslovenska narodna armija 1945-1959 (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2014), 444 str. Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 832 str. William Klinger, Denis Kuljiš, Tito: neispričane priče (Banja Luka, Zagreb: Nezavisne novine; Paragon, 2013), 447 str.
More...
The conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the configuration of the spheres of influence of the two totalitarian great powers, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, followed by the outbreak of war in Europe and the disappearance from the map of Poland in just a few weeks have considerably changed Latvia’s and, obviously, others’ position, in autumn 1939 and the germs of Soviet aggression could already be noticed. Gradually, until June 1940, it became clear that the conclusion of the mutual assistance pacts for Moscow only represented a first step towards their objective to annex the three Baltic States to the Soviet Union.The occupation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in June 1940 was put into practice in a moment when the eyes of all Europe and the world were riveted by the events in the west of the continent. Still, despite these more or less covert attempts, the annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union in 1940 remains an illegal and illegitimate act, because it was imposed by a foreign power, whose armed forces stationed in Latvia in large numbers.Even if, as a result of these actions, Latvia had lost its independence and sovereignty, many states refused to acknowledge the disappearance of the Baltic State as a political entity. The diplomatic representation of Latvia has continued in Washington and London, due to the appointment of the Latvian minister in London, by the government in Riga, as extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative of the country on June 17, 1940.Moreover, repressions in Latvia soon began after the country's occupation by the Red Army on June 17, 1940. If in June 1940 it was just the beginning, only after a month, the arrests and deportations of Latvia’s political elite had began.The estimates on the total population losses during the first Soviet occupation due to all causes – deportations, conscriptions in the Red Army, massacres and disappearances – are converging to an approximate figure of 35,000 people in Latvia, of which about 7,000 women and 4,000 children.We must say that for Latvia July the 1st 1941, when German troops entered Riga, was seen as a day of liberation. It should also be pointed out, in this regard, that the second and third occupations suffered by Latvia in World War II were called by the invaders as "liberations". The German troops had freed the country from the tyranny of the Bolshevist and later, in 1944, the Red Army had liberated the Baltic state from the Nazi oppression. Both assertions contain a degree of truth, but none offered freedom for Latvia and the Latvians.
More...
After a long period in which it had enjoyed the protection of Germany and its allies, Romania refused to honour its obligation of entering the war. Romania’s neutrality was always seen as a temporary state, as nobody doubted that, sooner or later, the country would enter the battlefield wherever its interests would weigh the heaviest. The German diplomats experienced the evolution of Romanian neutrality in a negative manner. They have always viewed it as being ill-willed, unfriendly, hostile even. This almost evil perception of it was the result of an endless row of skirmishes, incidents and press campaigns that had eroded for good any trust in the real intentions of the Brătianu cabinet and brought into the discussion King Ferdinand’s worrying passiveness. The German diplomacy received a stern reply. It faced two major crises in the management of Romanian neutrality. The first occurred in September 1914, when, capitalising on the successes had by the Russian army of the Galician front, Romania was showing signs of willingness to cooperate from a military point of view. Cooperate, but with whom? With the Triple Entente or with the Central Powers? The second important crisis concerning Romanian neutrality was experienced by Germany in the run-up to Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente and immediately afterwards. Again, the component factors pertain to the impression created among the public opinion. Italy’s intervention in the war could not have gone unnoticed. It encouraged the pressures made by the politicians who were pointing to the spectre of war against Austria-Hungary. The Romanian government would have found it increasingly hard to resist the pressures without the concessions and the courtesy acts of Germany and its allies. Before Romanian entered the war (1916), neutrality proved to be more valuable than military cooperation. The German diplomats assessed correctly all crisis situations, but the more important initiatives were always taken in a risk zone. Their mission was a difficult one: to turn Romania towards the Central Powers. The success would have brought closer the victory on the Eastern front and would have concentrated all resources on the Western front. This endeavour was not a success, but the explanation for the failure remains debatable. One must analyse in an honest manner the hypothesis of a failed cooperation with the other allies. The lasting impression is that Austria-Hungary did not support German initiatives enough. But what could it have done, more that it actually did? The proposals negotiated between Berlin and Vienna were never taken seriously in Bucharest. Brătianu knew from day one he would cooperate with Russia. From there onwards, all was just a matter of time. Two years passed until what had been anticipated from the start of the war actually happened. Romania would not stay neutral forever. Instead, it would intervene in a war for its national ideal. Italy had done the same thing it its moment of crisis. Also, the hypothesis of competencies must be analysed thoroughly. Were the German diplomats prepared enough in order to understand and to manage the politics of the Romanian neutrality? Despite the high turnover of plenipotentiaries, the German diplomacy assessed flawlessly the route the Romanian government would take. No-one doubted for a moment Brătianu’s duplicity. The information was timely and of good quality. Most of the time official diplomacy wasn’t the only method being used. The circuit of diplomatic mail also reveals ramifications of dynastic diplomacy various other emissaries get involved, there were less visible characters at play – spies, secret agents etc. Apart from the thoroughly documented reports sent by plenipotentiary Bussche, the military attaché also sent letters to Berlin. The latter had his own sources of documentation, which he analysed carefully and interpreted accurately. Undoubtedly, Germany tried hard and proved patient. Everyone understood what the stakes were. The battle was, however, lost on another front. This was a direction of conduct that did not pertain to the times of war. Trusting King Carol’s iron hand, the German diplomacy did not attempt early to prepare Romania for the hypothesis of a definitive neutrality. It was always believed, despite all the warnings, that, irrespective of political colour, the Bucharest government would cooperate. This was an error that nobody was able to correct afterwards. When Berlin realised where Romanian was truly going, the game was already over.
More...
The chief purpose of this article is to present and analyze the shift within the transatlantic portrayals of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. This analysis will indicate the shift from a hesitant and ambivalent attitude with respect to the war in Bosnia towards a rather pro-active, military response to the war in Kosovo, built on the criteria of a just war and on the need to use force in order to pursue humanitarian outcomes. A second pivotal goal is to identify factors which shaped the shift in the transatlantic perceptions on the wars in Former Yugoslavia and examine them as developments within the transatlantic discursive constructions. The examination of such developments will focus on: from war occurring in an age-old ethnic conflict trapped territory (Bosnia) towards a war and humanitarian catastrophe at the “heart of Europe” (Clinton’s term); from the equivalence of guilt (as explained by Tom Gallagher), in the case of Bosnia, towards the imperative of identifying and targeting aggressors, in the case of Kosovo; from deployment of ground troops and neutral peace-keeping towards air-strikes and peace enforcement.
More...
After years-long research, Indian scientists carried out a successful nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 in the Rajastan desert. Although Indian officials immediately stated that it was a „peaceful nuclear explosion“, and that they did not intend to make a nuclear weapon, India had become the 6th nuclear power and the first non-aligned country to come into „the nuclear club“. This lead to a strong criticism on the international stage, especially by Pakistan, as well as by great powers and some non-aligned countries. As a member of the Non-aligned Movement, closely alligned with India, Yugoslavia carefully tracked statements and explanations given by Indian officials, systematically noted and analyzed responses of individual countries, and calmly created its own view toward the Indian nuclear test. Yugoslav diplomacy promptly congratulated India its huge technological success, defending the right of all countries, including India, to develop research in the field of nuclear energy, thereby granting full trust to Indian official statements that they did not intend to use their achievements in military purposes. Further, the Indian nuclear explosion resurected the previous nuclear ambitions of Yugoslav state leadership, primarily of Josip Broz Tito. The Yugoslav nuclear program was relaunched, including the examination of possibilities for exploiting nuclear energy for military purposes. Yugoslav leaders expected great help from India in this matter, so they undertook efforts to intensify cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear energy, and to spread that cooperation to other nonaligned countries. However, Indian assistance, being much less than expected, did not contribute to the Yugoslav nuclear program, which, owing to many weaknesses, produced modest results in civilian research, and did not achieve any success in the military field.
More...
Riga police say over 1,000 people joined veterans who fought Soviets to mark key 1944 battle.
More...Várad visszavételének történetéhez
The battle between 1688 and 1692 for the occupation of Várad is an unprecedented event of the reconquer because it has never happened before that the blockade turned into siege on two occasions. During the period of the occupying war (1683-1699) both the members of the war council of the Court and the commanders in chief in power from Hungary were fully aware of the prominent strategical importance of Várad because without having the fortress in Partium the Habsburg rule in the upper part of Hungary and Transylvania was uncertain. Although the siege proposed by Carol of Lotharingia in 1686 didn’t take place, occupying Eszék and Eger made possible the establishment of the blockade round the fortress, which almost lead to a result as the guard considered any further resistance hopeless without a relief army and a proper reinforcement. In 1691 the Imperial and Royal Army started the siege of the fortress. But the documents in Kriegsarchiv from Vienna clearly prove that Ludovic, marquis of Baden wanted to weaken the bastions and the guard by attacking them and also to decrease the stocks so that the besieged should surrender. Though his action was an unpredicted success, the defenders resisted, and the army sustaining the blockades could make the stubborn resisting fighters fall to their knees by another proper siege under the leadership of cavalry general Donat Johann von Heitersheim.
More...
The First World War changed the destinies and crushed the careers of many foreign civilians who lived in Britain in 1915.Elek Kiss (1888–1971), the former bishop of the Romanian Unitarian Church, was among those civilians who were interned behind the barbed wire at the Frith Hill P.O.W. and Enemy Alien Internment Camp, at Frimley, in Surrey county.The camp, commonly referred to as Frimley, was a forty-acre outdoor camp housing civilians as well as Austrian and German prisoners of war. It was bisected by a public road, on one side the military prisoners, on the other side were the civilian internees. Elek Kiss, a Hungarian Unitarian student of Manchester New College, Oxford, was a civilian internee at Frimley in May and June of 1915.Among his comrades he mentioned in his journal the names of several German prisoners including many Jews.Kiss’s seventy-page archive contains the letters destined to his fi ancé. It is most probable that he never sent these letters, but kept them and brought them back aft er his release. Th ey then disappeared into oblivion for several decades until, fortunately, an anonymous person sold them to the Archive of theTransylvanian Unitarian Church.Th is paper presents a short introduction to the life of Elek Kiss and publishes his authentic Frimley letters. As far we know this is the sole Hungarian language documentation about the internees’ life at Frimley. The English language diary written by the well known painter George Kenner (1888–1971), who was an internee at Frimley at the same time, coincides in many aspects with Elek Kiss’s letters, both as a confessional and as a descriptive representation.
More...
In a complex system of controversial events, causes and consequences of World War I, scientific and national historical perspective still differ considerably. I can have the same evidence about an event and yet quite different to understand their meaning. The sole responsibility for the war can not be attributed to a single person or country. Take into account the entire context. Space for further scientific analysis remains open. For historians, with the necessary creative dialogue and broader communication to continue to combine multiperspectival methods and numerous facts “like a puzzle” to get as comprehensive picture of events in this worldscale conflict, which has caused far-reaching political, social and civilizational change
More...
It is instructive to compare Hitler and Churchill as boys in school. Churchill at St George’s School, Ascot (1884). Headmaster’s remarks. General conduct: “very – bad – is a constant trouble to everybody and is always in some scrape. He cannot be trusted to behave himself anywhere. He has very great abilities.”
More...
The article concerns the massacre of prisoners that occurred at the Villa Publica few days after the Battle of the Colline Gate. The order to slay the prisoners was issued by Lucius Cornelius Sulla. The view that only Samnites had died in the massacre due to Sulla’s personal hatred of those peoples is deeply embedded in historiography. The author of the article believes that Samnites constituted only a part of the murdered prisoners in the Villa Publica. Also Sulla’s motives were different – he aimed at intimidation of senators who held a meeting at the same time in the nearby Temple of Bellona. The massacre also launched reprisals against political opponents that escalated into the infamous proscriptions.
More...
In the 1920s and 1930s, the USSR dispatched hundreds of agents and couriers to Romania to take pulse of the society, the armed forces, the political Russian emigration to this country, as well as information about the leaders of the main parliamentary political parties. This study examines the case of such a spy (Simion Babenco) who was entrusted by the Soviet secret services to establish an informative residence in Moldova. Babenco was supposed to gather information, via recruited Romanian citizens, about the Romanian units quartered in the garrisons of Buzău and Focşani. Unfortunately for him, Babenco was arrested by the Siguranţă in the summer of 1939, just few weeks after crossing the border illegally. He was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor for attempted espionage. During detention, he meets the future leader of the Romanian Workers' Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, as well as other Soviet spies captured on Romanian ground, most of whom had been around Dej during detention and after communists seized power. The political fate of Babenco after August 23, 1944 was deeply influenced by the proximity to Dej and his entourage.
More...
Emil Bodnăraş was one of the most mysterious characters of the Romanian communist regime. This mystery was kept alive by Emil Bodnăraş’ undisclosed relations with the Soviet intelligence and his own personal features. That often brought Bodnăraş in the midst of events central for the Romanian Communist Party and Romania, such as the overthrow of Antonescu’s regime, on 23 August 1944. This article follows the role played by Emil Bodnăraş during the RCP internal struggle for power, from the banishment of Ştefan Foriş, the secretary general of the party, on 4 April 1944, to the casting out of the „right deviationists” (Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu), in May 1952.
More...