Around the Bloc: Armenia’s Relations With Breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh Close, But Not Transparent
Yeravan’s assistance to Stepanakert an ‘open secret’ say Western experts.
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Yeravan’s assistance to Stepanakert an ‘open secret’ say Western experts.
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The essay tries to highlight the circumstances that undermined the successful signing of a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary in 1514. It examines the system of the relationships for both sides. The Kingdom of Hungary wanted to maintain the diplomatic practice that had developed previously, in which a peace treaty signed with the Sultan would include other Christian European states as well, such as Venice, Ragusa, Moldova, Wallachia and Poland, as well as in this case the Holy Roman Emperor. On the other hand Sultan Selim I wanted each Christian state to petition him separately for the peace. For Venice it was of crucial importance that the Holy Roman Emperor would not sign a peace treaty with the Sultan, because that would have precluded Selim I from providing mercenaries for Venice in exchange for money in their fight against the Holy Roman Empire. After the Ottoman Sultan’s successful negotiations with two of Hungary’s neighbors, in October 1513 the Peace of Venice was signed, and between the 16th and 27th of May the treaty was ratified by the Polish ambassador in the Anatolian town of Akşehir. On the other hand the Sultan refused to sign the treaty with the Hungarians, and imprisoned the Hungarian legation in Konya. Due to the long distance, the Hungarian leaders did not found out, but felt that the Ottoman Empire had developed peaceful relations with their neighbors, while the negotiations with them had become prolonged. As a result, the voivode of Transylvania, János Szapolyai ( John Zápolya) crossed the Lower Danube between May 12th and June 3rd 1514 and broke into the Bulgarian territories, but, because under the leading of György Dózsa the peasants gathered for the anti-Ottoman crusade turned against the nobility, the campaign ended quickly and Szapolyai had to withdrew his forces. Based on the circumstances presented, the study concludes that Selim I was not afraid of the Kingdom of Hungary, which was left on its own, and despite of the possibility of an eventual Hungarian assault, he attacked Iran and defeated the Persian Shah Ismail. While the peasant uprising of Dózsa had stopped the attack of the Hungarian armies against the Turks in 1514, Szapolyai took advantage of the Sultan’s absence and attacked again in the spring of 1515, besieging the Turkish fortress of Avala (Havale/Zsarnó) across Belgrade. From the report of Süleyman (later Sultan Süleyman I), the heir to the throne, who was guarding the western frontier, we know the precise chronological order of the Hungarian attack and the story of its successful Turkish relief. The two Turkish documents, both in their original language and in Hungarian translation, are included in the appendices of the study.
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The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 challenged not only the military capabilities, but also the overall economic and financial potential of the Bulgarian state. Maintaining a significant army (numbering over 600 thousand) and participation in extensive and exhausting military campaigns cost the treasury enormous expenses (over 650 million gold francs). The financial situation was further complicated in the months following the end of the conflict when its direct consequences had to be met: mainly, the settlement of the huge mass of refugees who found rescue in Bulgaria.But despite the colossal costs, due to the adequate policy of financial institutions on the whole and to the comparatively well-functioning economy the government finances remained stable.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political speeches of the Croatia’s first President Franjo Tudjman in the light of Anthony D. Smith’s tripartite typology of ethnic, civic and plural concepts of nationhood. Its goal is to determine which one of these models President Tudjman had been advocating and whether his views on this matter had been stable or if they had varied through time. The underlying premise is that Tudjman - as the leader of the Croatia’s (armed) struggle for independence and as an authoritative figure in the Croatia’s semi-presidential system of the 1990’s - played a pivotal role in modelling the Croatian national self-concept in the first decade of its statehood. The qualitative content analysis showed that Tudjman’s first speeches in the year 1990 had had an almost ideal-typical civic structure with their emphasis on civil rights and duties of all citizens of the Republic, regardless of their ethnic background. However, already in 1991 his rhetoric changed drastically due to the outbreak of the Serb rebellion in Croatia and the following Serbian military aggression. Henceforth, Tudjman’s discourse had been laden by often vitriolic remarks against the Serb minority, culminating in the hate-speech in Knin after the Croatia’s decisive military victory against the rebels in the summer military operation “the Storm” of 1995. Nonetheless, even in the belligerent period between 1991 and 1995, the rhetoric of the first President of Croatia always included a civic component, as well as hints to a possible pluri-national solution of the conflict epitomized in his repeated references to the Serb “national rights” within Croatia. Tudjman’s post-war speeches continued to move to and fro between ethnic and civic ideal types, revealing the President’s deep-rooted internal conflict amid the two paradigms. It can be concluded that Tudjman’s hybrid concept of the Croatian nation corresponds to the dualistic process of Croatian nation-building from the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, which, due to specific circumstances, followed parallel routes termed by Smith as “nation-to-state” and “state-to-nation”. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that it will continue to influence debates on the Croatian national self-understanding in the future.
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Current paper is a historiography overview. According to the aim of the present study, here are presented the most relevant opinions regarding the Hungarian conquest and the structure of the Hungarian society in the 10th century. Instead the presentation in range of the different scholarly ideas about the Hungarian conquest, the present paper focuses on the numerical percentage of the conquerors and the structure of the early Hungarian society. Leafing through the historical and archaeological secondary literature, and recalling the different opinions, three categories of scholars can be distinguished. The majority of the academics (e.g. Gyula Pauler or Gyula Kristó) assert the Hungarian conquerors as warrior elite of a superior social layer. In their opinion the early Hungarian society is a nomadic one, in which the members of the community collect a part of their food supplies and other goods by robbery. At the end of the 19"1 century appeared a second major opinion regarding the 10th century Hungarian society. The representative scholars of this research trend, e.g. Ármin Vámbéry and Géza Nagy resemble the community of the Hungarian conquerors to a mosaic. They imagine a hierarchical society composed by different ethnic groups. Géza Nagy is the first scholar who believes that the Hungarian conquest took place in two steps. His opinion laid the foundation for another hypothesis, developed by Gyula László in the second half of the 20th century.Between the First and The Second World War a group of philologists (e.g. Zoltán Gombocz, István Kniezsa) elaborated a third major opinion regarding the Hungarian conquest. They depicted a more realistic picture of the early Hungarian society. Starting from the 1960s, the aforementioned hypothesis was embraced by Béla Szőke and by several other archaeologists, too. The present paper describes also the theory developed by István Zichy and Bálint Hóman, which is built from the second and third opinion mentioned above. According to his goal, the author of the present study does not try to offer conclusive arguments for the Hungarian conquest issue. He analysed equidistantly each theory linked to this issue. In spite of his ambition of being objective, the article contain the author's critical notes regarding some of the presented theories.
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Situated on the watershed between the River Mureş and Arieş, Rimetea and Colţeşti are two Hungarian villages with specific ethnographical tradition in a region populated mostly by Romanians. Since the 13th century both villages were in the possession of the Torockai family, which gradually extended its estates in this area. The family built its first castle after the Mongol invasion of Hungary (1241 —42) in the neighbourhood of Torockó, on a high rock later called Székelykő. This was a fortification specific for that period, suitable especially to shelter people as it was built and maintained together with the neighbouring population. Later on the family showed no interest in that castle used basically by the surrounding communities. At the beginning of the 14th century the family got a higher social rank: Ehellős Torockai was appointed vice voivode of Transylvania. During the confused period of history of Hungarian Kingdom he took possession of the Szádkő castle, that was in the property of the Transylvanian Chapter. Situated at the edge of his private land properties, the castle was intended to be the new residence of the family. However, when Charles of Anjou solved the interior conflicts of the country, Ehellős Torockai was compelled to give back the castle to its legitimate owner. For the following time the family remained in the background and only after the change of the Hungarian ruler could obtaining new privileges. In 1366, when King Louis the Great stayed for a longer period in Transylvania, the Torockais got the ius gladii and probably that was the moment when they were authorized to build a new castle. Late written sources mention even the builder of the castle: Elek Torockai. It was built north to Torockószentgyörgy, and became the centre of the family's land properties. At the beginning it was a donjon like fortification consisting of a solid tower, a ditch, and probably some other architectural components. Probably still in the 14th century it was extended with a new tower, and the two towers were linked by a curtain wall. Basically this is the first significant building phase of the castle. The castle was brought up to date in the mid-15th century when on the southern side a new palace wing was erected. In a document dated in 1470 this was called novum edificium. The family could not enjoy for a long time the new residence because some of its members were engaged in a rebellion against King Matthias in 1467. After that the Torockais lost their castle, and some of their lands, which entered first in the property of the Transylvanian voivode, Miklós Csupor, and later under the possession of János Kis, Péter Derzsi, voivode János Pongrác and his son, Mátyás, János Corvin and others. The family achieved to get back the lost properties only in 1516 when the king of Hungary issued a new diploma for the Torockais, granting ownership of the estate and the castle. During the period when the castle was owned by different families it was many times improved, which resulted the lower and the upper castle. The lower one was consisted of the donjon and some new apartments on the southern part. The upper castle was extended with a bastion and a large courtyard. The two castles were unified when the Thorockai family regained them in 1516. This was already the century when the these type of castles were gradually given up and new types of residences were built. The castle was partially used until the beginning of the 18"1 century when it was completely destroyed by the Habsburg army.
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Below we present a former Soviet spy captured in Romania in the 1930s, and his political transmogrification within the structures of the popular democratic regime. It is the case of Ukrainian born Ion Anton Vidraşcu, an unqualified worker with a poor education who deserted the Romanian Army in the USSR after a quarrel with an officer (1929). "In the motherland of workers and peasants", Vidraşcu will be recruited by the secret services and sent to Romania on some spying missions. He was caught by the Siguranţa few years later, trialed and sentenced to 10 years of prison for espionage. During detention he meets with the future communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a biographical episode that will bring a major change to his political and professional career after August 23, 1944.
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This is a review of Mihai Taşcățs book Operaţiunea Română” din R.A.S.S. Moldovenească în Marea Teroare stalinistă, 1937-1938, Editurile Serebia şi Cartea Juridică, Chişinău, 2014.
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Ceausescu’s regime did not allow the existence of a “political opposition” in the Socialist Republic of Romania. The absence of a reforming political opposition was regarded by the Kremlin’s analysts as a key factor for keeping Nicolae Ceausescu in power. Col. (r) Filip Teodorescu; the former Chief assistant of DSS’ Third Direction; mentioned in his memories that unlike other socialist states; in Romania there wasn’t an organized dissident movement. Therefore the aim of the Ceausescu’s regime adversaries was exactly the one to create an opposing group meant to surface at the right moment with the purpose of promoting the overturning of power. The statements of Chief assistant of The III-rd Direction; Counter - intelligence of DSS rises a lot of questions with regards to so called „team of tomorrow” and to the lack of a real opposition inside R.C.P. blocked silently by DSS officers. The existing connections between some prominent members of the power groups could not sustain the idea of an organized plot; a coup d’état; be it classical or not. In December 1989; political; military and intelligence elite of the Socialist Republic of Romania not only failed to reform the system but it failed at creating even the premises for such a reformation.
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Born in a Hungarian jewish family from Nagyvarad/Oradea Mare; in 1913; Valter Roman was a typical professional revolutionary. He joined the banned communist movement from interwar Romania in 1928; first as a follower. In 1931; when he was studying at Brno Polytechnic University; he became also a party member. After his return to Romania; he was imprisoned in 1934 for his political activity. When the Military Court sentenced him to 8 years; Valter Roman had already left Romania; for France. He fought in Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939. He spent the Second World War in the Soviet Union; where he worked mostly for the Third International. He returned in Romania in 1945; joined the Romanian Communist Party and held some middle-level positions within Party and State hierarchy. Until his pass-away; in 1983; he stood up for the communist idea; being a so-called „truly believer“.
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina changed both by the 1992–1995 war and the Dayton peace which was imposed from outside and which officialised the nationality- -based division of the country, the contrasts that exploded during the conflict are still unsolved. The political forces still base their electoral consent upon nationalistic themes, while the population has lost faith when it comes to a prospective of an economically better future. A good example of this situation is the town of Srebrenica and its surroundings, where Europe’s biggest genocide since WW2 took place. There rest thousands of Muslims killed in July 1995 under the eyes of the UN military forces. The cemetery, a tangible symbol of the horrors which happened at the end of the XX century – not so different from the Nazi concentration camps that were left standing for the whole world to see and for the generations to come to keep as a warning – should inspire absolute respect in anyone. But it does not. This area is inhabited mainly by a Serbian population, and is exposed to insults and abuse from people driving by. Twenty years from the genocide – which is considered as such by Muslims only and not by Serbs – true peace is still far away, and the nationalities – ex enemies but still rivals – think that only their own dead are to be remembered, while those others are only result of media publicity. Yet if all that can happen in the Third millennia Europe, it means that there is still something wrong in the continent.
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One of the most frequently used sources by the researchers about the crusades of Władysław Varnenchik and Yanosh Hunyadi of 1443–1444 are the “Notes of the janissary”, written by Konstantin Mihailovich. This source has been already reviewed by H. Kolarov. It also has been used by B. Cvetkova, K. Gagova and others. Till now, the only translation made in the Bulgarian historiography was of chapter XXVIII, revealing the government of the Ottoman Empire. There has been none known translation of the chapters describing the anti-ottoman campaigns from the middle of XV century. In the following paper will be translated chapters XXI, XXII and XXIII, dedicated to those campaigns. Chapter XXI describes the “Long campaign”. In chapter XXII are followed the abdication of sultan Murad II to his son Mehmed II and his later return to the throne. Chapter XXIII is dedicated to the Battle of Varna that took place on 10.XI.1444. The part from the “Notes of the janissary”, concerning the crusades of Władysław Varnenchik and Yanosh Hunyadi of 1443–1444 in its integrity could be accepted as a reliable source. Despite the existence of some inaccuracy in it, the comparison to the other historical data, lead us to the conclusion that this written source could be used by the researchers of this topic.
More...Az erdélyi kora avar kori soros temetők kutatásának kérdéseiről
One of the most important archaeological phenomena in Transylvania during the Early Avar Period is represented by the late group of the so-called row-grave cemeteries, named conventionally in the archaeological literature “Band-Vereşmort group”. The scientific research of these cemeteries started at the beginning of the 20th century with the excavations carried out at Band by István Kovács. Since then several other necropolises belonging to the same group have been identified and partially unearthed which led to a relatively intense scientific debate regarding mainly to the chronological and ethnical aspects. Based on literary sources as well as on the archaeological evidence, the early scholars (István Kovács, Márton Roska) ascribed the discussed sites to the Gepidic population, while the graves containing horse bones, situated on the edges of the cemetery at Band, were connected to the Avars. Due to the excavations carried out at Moreşti in the 1950s which resulted in the discovery of a cemetery dated in the Gepidic Period, Kurt Horedt succeeded to elaborate the chronology of the Transylvanian row-grave cemeteries. According to him, the graveyards belonging to the Gepidic Period (group III/Moreşti group) can be sharply separated from the ones dated in the Early Avar Period (group IV/Band-Vereşmort group) both from chronological and ethnic point of view. In his opinion the former belonged mainly to the Gepids and could be placed roughly in the first half of the 6th century, while the latter was assigned to “late Germanic” communities, showing also “nomadic” influence, and dated exclusively in the 7th century. He excluded the existence of any direct link between the two horizons. Horedt’s theory was severely criticized by István Bóna who, unlike Horedt, developed his opinion based on the similarities between the two mentioned groups. The polemics between the two scholars dominated the research on the topic in the 1970s and 1980s. In Bóna’s view, the beginnings of the Band-Vereşmort group could be traced back to the second half of the 6th century, or even earlier, and therefore the existence of continuity between the row-grave cemeteries from the Gepidic and the Early Avar Period was out of question. He ascribed the latter group to the Gepidic communities which survived the Avar conquest in 568 and lived continuously in Transylvania under Avar rule. On the other hand, he connected the burials containing horse bones to the Avars. Later this assumption was generally accepted in the Hungarian archaeological literature. Further arguments for the late Gepidic interpretation of the Band-Vereşmort group were brought by Radu Harhoiu who published the cemeteries from Bratei 3 and Galaţii Bistriţei excavated in the 1970s. He dated the whole group in the second half of the 6th century – first half of the 7th century and considered that these cemeteries were used exclusively by the late Gepids living under Avar rule. The burials with horse bones were interpreted as a result of acculturation of the Gepids which adopted Avar burial customs and artefacts. In the course of approximately 100 years which passed since the publication of the cemetery at Band, the scholars focused on two main topics: chronology and ethnicity. Despite of this debate, in the current state of research both of them are far from being clarified. Taking a closer look, one can observe that the date of the collapse of the Gepidic Kingdom (567) and the Avar conquest in the Carpathian Basin (568) are usually considered a sharp borderline between the ‘Gepidic’ and ‘Avar’ material culture, and therefore between the Moreşti group and the Band-Vereşmort group. In the same time the cemeteries from the Tisza region are placed generally before this date, many times not on archaeological, but on historical grounds. However, several finds seem to belong to the first decades of the Avar Age (e.g. Egerlövő, grave 31 – with a coin of Justin II and Sophia; Tiszagyenda – with a coin of Maurice Tiberius; Kisköre-Pap Tanya, graves 42 and 43; Hódmezővásárhely-Kishomok, graves 1 and 7). In Transylvania the situation is less clear and therefore the question if the Moreşti type cemeteries reached the Avar Period or not remains open. The same problem rises in the case of the date of emergence of the Band-Vereşmort group. Recent results showed that the beginning of the group already in the 6th century is beyond doubt, but still, it is not clear enough to which date it can be traced back. There are a few elements which might indicate a date prior to the Avar conquest, like Noşlac, grave 121 or the stray finds coming from the vicinity of cemetery 3 at Bratei, but there is no evidence that these discoveries belonged to the cemeteries in question. The end date of the Band-Vereşmort type cemeteries is also unclear and is hindered by the fact that most of the graveyards were only partially unearthed. In this regard it seems more expedient to analyze the different cemeteries separately. The latest elements were discovered at Noşlac which reach the 8th century. Concerning the ethnic interpretation a relatively great variety can be observed. However, in this regard the research was seriously marked by the nationalistic approach of the communist era. Beginning with the second half of the 1950s the main task of the Romanian archaeology was to identify the local Daco-Roman population during the Migration Period and Early Middle Ages in order to find a link between the moment of the abandonment of the Roman province Dacia and the Medieval Period. This endeavour led to the emphasizing of the importance of the autochthonous population as well as to the minimizing of the significance of the ‘migratory’ peoples. This approach resulted in the emergence of a set of clichés which, in slighter degree, persists even today. One of the most important problems is related to burials containing horse bones which generally belong to the latest phase of the cemeteries. These were traditionally connected to a ‘nomadic’ community (e.g. Avars, Cutrigurs). Recently, Radu Harhoiu assigned them to the acculturated Gepids. In this regard the moment of the appearance of the Avars in Transylvania is of great significance. Since Kurt Horedt it is a commonplace in the Romanian historiography that the Avars entered in Transylvania for the first time only at the middle of the 7th century, or at the earliest, around 630. In contrast, Bóna believed that the first Avars reached the Transylvanian Basin already in the first decades after they settled down in the Carpathian Basin. Unfortunately, our present knowledge on this topic does not permit the establishment of the moment when the Avars entered in Transylvania, first of all, because of the reduced number of the well documented and published excavations. On the other hand, the fact that the research has not succeeded in identifying the specific burial customs and artefact types which could be connected undoubtedly to the first generation of the Avars in the Carpathian Basin was totally left out of consideration. Recent studies pointed out that the typical ‘Avar’ material culture was not brought by the Avars from the East, but emerged in the Carpathian Basin after 568 comprising several elements with different cultural roots (e.g. eastern, Byzantine, Germanic, Romanized, Slavic etc.). As it was shown above, the central question of the debate regarding the Band-Vereşmort group is related to the continuity or discontinuity of the Gepidic population in Transylvania in the last third of the 6th century – first half of the 7th century. It was observed already in the 1970s that the discussed cemeteries contained several grave-goods whose origins cannot be found in the material culture of the Gepidic Period, instead they have convincing analogies in the Late Merovingian necropolises from Western- and, mainly, Central-Europe. Taking this into account, the question which rises is if these elements arrived in Transylvania together with their owners colonized from the West, or they are the results of a development of the local communities which had strong relations with the Merovingian world. All these unsolved problems led to a lot of confusions and contradictions in the archaeological literature. This can be attributed mainly to the inflexible use of the concept of ethnic identity by most of the scholars, who considered it to be a rigid and permanent entity which can be identified based on the grave-goods or, in general, on the material culture. However, the archaeological evidence shows a much more complex picture where different cultural elements are in permanent interaction. In this respect a good example is the cemetery at Gâmbaş which was considered the most representative necropolis of the Avars from Transylvania by Kurt Horedt on one hand, and was thought to be a late Gepidic graveyard by Radu Harhoiu on the other hand. According to the present state of research it seems that the material culture of the Transylvanian Basin during this period included several elements of different origins. Therefore, the question asked in the title of this paper remains unanswered. On the other hand, the future research should focus not only on chronological and ethnical, but also on social aspects. To achieve such results new, well documented excavations as well as anthropological analysis are needed.
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The core of the fortress from Szilágysomlyó (Șimleu Silvaniei, RO) is a 16th century castle protected by towers and a moat. Between 1581 and 1594 Stephen Báthory Jr. (1553–1601) − the nephew of prince Stephen Báthory, who studied in Poland and was captain of Nagyvárad (Oradea, RO) for a while − transformed the castle into a residence and surrounded it by a bastioned enceinte. The plans of the transformations were probably made by Simone Genga (cca. 1530–1602) from Urbino, the military architect of the price. The constructions were seized after a while, thus the outer enceinte, similar to the fortress of Fogaras (Făgăraș, RO) remained unfinished. The inventory of the moveables edited below for the first time in extenso was taken in 1594, after the breaking-off of the constructions.
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The author defends very emotionally but on the basis of documentary material and scientific studies on the subject, the following thesis: “As far as the Balkan War caused a real explosion of incomparable nationwide euphoria of unprecedented and never heard of rapture and enthusiasm, which united all Bulgarians... in the name of the Patriotic cause, we have reason to assign it place of central importance among the wars for national unification, which Bulgaria led after the Liberation.” According to the author the bayonet attacks of the Bulgarian infantry undoubtedly played a central role in the fighting during the war.It is on those bayonet attacks that the research is focused. It traces the historical events and outlines the moral psychological effect of the bravery of the Bulgarian troops on the enemy.
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Author of this survey article tries to indicate multiply legacies of the First World War on the army officers’ mind-set in the interwar years and especially during the Second World War at the Balkan war theatre. The experience of Austro-Hungarian officers on the South and Eastern Front 1914–1918 no doubt influenced the once middle ranked or junior officers at the same theatres of war in the period after 1941. It was not only combat experience and frustration but attitudes stirred up by propaganda as well.
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After the defeat in the war against Poland, the Bolshevik leaders withdrew their support for the previous military policy of the Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP). Soldiers of Polish origin, who in 1920 had been delegated to the I Polish Red Army, were retransferred to the Red Army units, where they had formerly performed military service. After the ratification of the Riga Treaty of 16 April 1921, Polish communists had to limit their activities to psychological warfare and propaganda against their political adversaries at home and intelligence infiltration of the Polish Army structures.
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The article deals with the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC – the first clash between the armies of the Corinthian League and the Persians during the great invasion of Hellas in 480–479 BC led by the Achaemenid ruler Xerxes. The recapitulation of the battle shows that its outcome had been pre-ordained. Leonidas and Spartan ephors knew in advance that the operation at Thermopylae was doomed, but they decided to carry it out and ordered Leonidas to defend the pass to the end, to show the other Hellenes the determination of Sparta to fight. In this context, Leonidas’s behavior was understandable – instead of leaving the position he could no longer safeguard, he ordered the majority of the Hellenic contingents to withdraw, and remained in the pass with the Spartans, Thebans and Thespians only. This deliberate sacrifice of basileus Leonidas and the elite of the Spartan aristocracy showed again Sparta’s readiness and determination to fight the Persians to the end at all costs
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