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The complexity and uncertainty in the application of the European system of financial supervision is due to the fact that its particular concepts were implemented at different times. First, it was the system of European financial supervisors (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA), which was primarily aimed at coordination of national activities. Then, the European Banking Union was established, comprised of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), as well as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which must also be seen in the context of assistance to troubled banks. Difficulties of interpretation are further compounded by a lack of consistency in approach to the institutions subject to examination. Should they include only the euro zone, or the whole EU, only the banks or other institutions as well? If you take into account the SSM, SRM or ESM, it is often not very clear who and when should act what tools should be applied, For example, when the ECB may, and should, correct decisions of national supervisors and what, in the context of increasing involvement of the ECB in the banking union, is the role of the ESRB; whether and when banks can possibly challenge decisions eg. on establishing a capital buffer or inclusion on the SIFI list, etc. Also unclear is the role of the EBA and ESMA in the context of the creation of a banking union, SSM, SRM and ESM and delegation of regulatory powers of ECB and the Commission to regulatory agencies (Meroni doctrine) or creation of regulatory agencies beyond the Treaty (Pringle doctrine).
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There are taking place fundamental changes in the architecture of financial market supervision (ESFS, EUB, CMU) in the European Union. These changes are associated with respect for prudential rules. Such situation in fact is a return to the era of once criticized interventionism and the maximum state regulation. The most frequently cited nowadays objectives of the rules related to the single EU financial market (e.g. financial stability, consumer protection and the prevention of market abuse) come down to establish uniform rules of conduct for all with consideration of general welfare (according to principle: the single market = unified supervision = uniform regulations).However the only problem is that the strong integration of the legal systems of EU member states may restrict competition (their economies), inhibit innovation and increase systemic risk that constitutes a denial implemented since 2000 the idea of European financial market integration. The process of Europeanisation of regulation and supervision of the EU financial market is inevitable, nevertheless it requires a constant search for equilibrium point between efficiency and wider security and not from the point of view of euro zone, but a common European system.
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The proposed bill provides for the amendment of Article 141 of the above-mentioned Act which specifies the limits of enforcement deductions from pension benefits. In the author’s opinion, the entry into force of the rules providing for the lack of opportunities for enforcement of deductions from pension benefits in the lowest amount may lead to adverse consequences for that group of beneficiaries in relation to access to financial services. These institutions may treat such pensioners as people with a low level of solvency, since it is not possible to carry out enforcement deduction directly from periodic benefits they receive. Moreover, a 14-day period of vacatio legis specified in the bill seems too short in the context of the substance of the proposed amendment.
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