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Even though I am still a child, I am taking the liberty of telllng you grown-ups a'bourt myself. You adults surely think: these eleven-year- old kids have nothing more important in their head.sthan the thought of a football. Well now, my classamate Gabre, who sits on ,the same bench with me, has many odd desires and his parents, being well-to do, fulfill his every wish. To tell you the truth, I would like to have my very own football anid kilck it so long anid so hard that I wouldn't even want to see it for a week. What I wouldn't gitve for skils!
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TA FAÇON DE M'AIMER SÉPARATION TU ES VENU ET TU ES PASSÉ LE CALME N'EST PAS SILENCE LE SOURCE DE LA NUIT LES JUSTES LE SON LE CERISIER LA PLUIE A TON ODEUR O SILENCE ...
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THE DEPARTURE OF EURYDICE (1 of 2) THE DEPARTURE OF EURYDICE (2 of 2) LET'S GET THE COACHMAN DRUNK (1 of 2) LET'S GET THE COACHMAN DRUNK (2 of 2) WINDOWS MEMORY OF THE PURPLE COLOR RUSTLE OF WINGS AND WATER WINDOW IN A LOST TOWN FOR ALL THINGS OUR CHILDHOODS ARE TO BLAME THE RIVER IVANYA BALLAD OF THE DECEIVED FLOWERS (1 of 2) BALLAD OF THE DECEIVED FLOWERS (2 of 2) OPEN DOOR (1 of 2) OPEN DOOR (2 of 2) VIRGINITY CAVE WITH A WELL AND FLOWER (1 of 2) CAVE WITH A WELL AND FLOWER (2 of 2) SLEEPING YOUTH YOU WHOSE HANDS ARE MORE INNOCENT (1 of 2) YOU WHOSE HANDS ARE MORE INNOCENT (2 of 2)
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The article describes the basic elements of U.S. policy in Colombia during George W. Bush ’ s presidency. It points out several issues for which the U.S. government has been continuously criticized, but focuses on two main aspects of the policy: the two-pronged war against illegal armed groups and the aerial eradication of illicit crops. I argue that although broader U.S. objectives such as strengthening of Colombian democracy have been fulfilled, the aerial eradication has not only proven ineffective in the long run, but is inherently flawed and continues to cause massive ecological destruction.
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This article focuses on the relationship between the United States and Thailand under Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram between the years 1948 and 1957. It first seeks to show how Phibun, who had collaborated with the Japanese during World War II and had at one time faced prosecution as a war criminal, was able to overthrow the post-war liberal government and gain acceptance in the United States. Next, it will present and analyze the basic tenets and principles of the Thai-American relationship in the context of the Cold War and the bipolar rivalry in Asia. Finally, it will explain the issue of Phibun ’ s changing image in the United States and his attempts to make his government more “democratic” as part of his struggle to retain power and to quell the growing internal discontent with his regime.
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Hermeneutic phenomenology of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the theory (as elements in a theoretical “language”), and in relation to the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as “fulfilled” in laboratory situations that “produce” worldly objects. The question then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied when the mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev’s proposal to avoid this involves the concept of “inscription.” This paper proposes another approach, covariant realism, which draws from Heidegger’s notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored.
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The paper argues that there is no logic of scientific discovery, but there is an inference-like pattern that we can model as a “logic,” retrospectively, once a discovery has been successfully made. While accepting a kind of epistemological pluralism and opportunism, the claim will be advocated that a convergent and reasonably wide-ranging normative “logic” might be constructed, one that might even work reasonably well in selected applications and might (therefore) also lead us to make congruent judgments of irrationality or illogicality wherever it seems not to yield the “normatively appropriate” outcomes in otherwise comparable specimen cases.
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Drawing from the example of critical psychology, this paper examines how dissatisfaction with an existing scientific paradigm can stimulate interest in philosophy and social theory. The emergence of a social constructionist understanding of scientific knowledge in prominent dialects of critical psychology is related to a combination of scientific and political concerns, and briefly set in the context of three important strands of twentieth century philosophy: existential hermeneutics, ordinary language philosophy and poststructuralism. These strands agree on at least two issues: the rejection of metaphysics and the ontological foregrounding of the notion of discourse or language-in-use. These philosophies have influenced the development of discursive methods and constructionist epistemologies in special sciences such as psychology and sociology. It is suggested, however, that both the commitment against metaphysics and the prioritising of discourse are problematic, and that a process metaphysics based on the three pillars of possibility, mediation and actuality (or pattern, matrix and activity) might be articulated in order to overcome the bifurcation of nature tacitly accepted by the commitment to a discursive ontology.
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The most promising contemporary form of epistemic scientific realism is based on the following intuition: Belief should be directed, not toward theories as wholes, but toward particular theoretical constituents that are responsible for, or deployed in, key successes. While the debate on deployment realism is quite fresh, a significant degree of confusion has already entered into it. Here I identify five criteria that have sidetracked that debate. Setting these distractions aside, I endeavor to redirect the attention of both realists and non-realists to the fundamental intuition above. In more detail: I show that Stathis Psillos (1999) has offered an explicit criterion for picking out particular constituents, which, contrary to Kyle Stanford’s (2006) criticisms, neither assumes the truth of theories nor requires hindsight. I contend, however, that, in Psillos’s case studies, Psillos has not successfully applied his explicit criterion. After clarifying the various alternative criteria at work (in those case studies and in a second line of criticism offered by Stanford), I argue that, irrespective of Stanford’s criticisms, the explicit criterion Psillos does offer is not an acceptable one. Nonetheless, the deployment realist’s fundamental intuition withstands all of these challenges. In closing, I point in a direction toward which I’ve elsewhere focused, suggesting that, despite the legitimacy and applicability of the deployment realist’s intuition, the historical threat that prompted it remains.
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One of the “characteristic parameters” dividing up analytical and Continental philosophizing is the interpretation of the concepts of “reality” and “the world”. The paper offers an analysis of this characteristic parameter with regard to the relations between epistemologically centred and hermeneutically oriented doctrines of realism.
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Lifeworld realism and quantum-physical realism are taken as experience-dependent conceptions of the world that become objects of explicit reflection when confronted with context-external discourses. After a brief sketch of the two contexts of experience—lifeworld and quantum physics—and their realist interpretations, I will discuss the quantum world from the perspective of lifeworld realism. From this perspective, the quantum world—roughly speaking—has to be either unreal or else constitute a different reality. Then, I invert the perspective and examine the lifeworld from the standpoint of quantumphysical realism. This conception of the lifeworld has gained momentum from new research results in recent decades. Despite its experiential basis, quantum-physical realism bears an ambiguity akin to that of lifeworld realism. While the perspectival inversion serves to highlight the problem, it also contributes to an improved understanding of lifeworld-realism.
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I explore the interaction between theory-based interpretations of scientific evidence and constraints on theories provided by that evidence. Interpretation is often viewed as a source of error and a reason for scepticism about scientific results. But, I argue, while interpretation does generate epistemic risk, it also points to new sources of evidence that can constrain our theories. This is especially clear in the development of instrumentation that increases the range of our interactions with nature. While the design of such instruments and the interpretation of their outputs are deeply dependent on theory-based interpretations, these outputs can still challenge those very theories. At the same time, theory-guided instrumentation provides us access to aspects of nature that we cannot study with our unaided senses. This access allows us to extend the range of evidence that we collect, and thus increases the constraints on our theories. As a result, theory-guided evidence collection has a positive impact on the prospects of scientific realism since these increasing constraints on our theories provide our only reason for thinking that we may be approaching the development of true theories.
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The compatibility of Darwinism with religious beliefs has been the subject of vigorous debate from 1859 to the present day. Darwin himself did not think that there was any incompatibility between his theory of natural selection and the existence of God. However, he did not think that appeals to the direct or indirect activity of a Creator substantially increased our understanding of any natural phenomenon. In effect, Darwin endorsed what we would today label as “methodological naturalism,’ roughly the view that the only legitimate elements of the explanation of natural phenomena must appeal only to natural processes, natural laws and natural regularities. In section 2, Darwin’s commitment to methodological Darwinism is documented. Section 3 addresses the question of whether methodological naturalism does or does not rule out belief in a divine Creator. Section 4 raises the question of whether methodological naturalists are also metaphysical naturalists. Finally, section 5 assesses the warrant for expanding the scope of ‘science’ to include non-naturalistic factors.
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An intense discussion about the issue of historical narrative arose during the time when the naïve realism of classical historiography was being critiqued and led to a dispute, in the last century, between constructionism and critical or scientific realism. We can distinguish between constructionism and noetic constructivism. According to ontological constructionism all facts are human constructions; according to noetic constructivism, our notions and theories are constructs with objective meaning (sense and reference); they refer to objective reality. Scientific realism recognizes the existence of noetic construction but does not regard facts as our constructions, as pure fictions. The point of contention is the question over whether historical narrative is merely a discursive construction or whether it is also a scientific reconstruction of the past. Resolving the dispute over whether historical narrative can be objectively true, or whether it is subject to empirical control or not, is dependent on finding the answer to this question.
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