The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.
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1989 marked the beginning of a short but intense period of thorough geopolitical changes in the eastern part of Europe. The simultaneous weakening and liberalisation of the communist regime in the USSR led by Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual limitation of Moscow’s economic and political support but also its shrinking control over the countries in the Soviet bloc and domestic political crises inside these countries led to a rapid downfall of the communist governments in Central-Eastern Europe. The military, economic and political structures of the Soviet bloc were dissolved within a timeframe of just two years, and the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist in December 1991, to be replaced with fifteen new independent states. The Russian Federation became the main successor to the USSR as it, albeit seriously weakened, inherited a large section of the Soviet empire’s resources and had to redefine its interests in the new post-Cold War European and global order that was being formed.
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Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states.A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy
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Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states. A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy.
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It is generally believed that one sign that the secret services are doing their job well is that the media says nothing about them. In this respect, Russia is a special case: the services receive an excess of media coverage. This is only partly due to the media’s natural interest in an attractive subject, as well as the services’ own selfpromotion (although that is increasingly true around the world). In fact, it is a symptom of Russia’s information warfare, in which the special services’ public image is just one block in building the appearance of a strong state and a strong government. It also justifies and legitimises the high position which the services and elite members of the institutions of force enjoy in the Russian Federation’s political system. However, this artificial, mythologised image of the services conflicts with their non-public practices. These are revealed when their cover is blown, when journalists investigate criminal scandals involving the services, when controlled and uncontrolled leaks of compromising information take place, and when the opposition publicises cases where the special services violate fundamental rights and civil liberties – something they often do under the pretext of fighting the ‘fifth column’ of the West, international terrorists and foreign spies. This produces two different images of the services: the official one and the common one. The former presents the services as professional, patriotic and a stronghold of traditional values, Russia’s ‘sword and shield’; the latter shows them as pampered by the regime, lawless, corrupt and undisciplined, involved in brutal competition with one another, bureaucratised and criminalised.
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Od marca 2014 roku rosyjska gospodarka zmuszona jest funkcjonować w warunkach sankcji, którymi objęta została przez USA, Unię Europejską i wiele innych państw świata zachodniego w odpowiedzi na agresję na Ukrainę i aneksję Krymu. Sankcje polegały m.in. na wprowadzeniu szeregu ograniczeń współpracy gospodarczej Federacji Rosyjskiej z państwami zachodnimi. Najmniej dotkliwe ekonomicznie, mające jednak znaczenie prestiżowe, były sankcje o charakterze dyplomatycznym, w konsekwencji których Rosja została wykluczona z formatu G8 – grupy najbardziej wpływowych państw świata, zawieszone zostały jej negocjacje akcesyjne z Organizacją Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju, a przywódcy państw zachodnich początkowo powstrzymywali się od oficjalnych kontaktów z rosyjskimi władzami. Nałożone restrykcje ponadto pozbawiły Rosję dostępu do środków organizacji międzynarodowych, m.in. Bank Światowy i wszystkie jego agendy zawiesiły finansowanie nowych projektów w Rosji, podobną decyzję podjął Europejski Bank Odbudowy i Rozwoju. Rosyjska gospodarka objęta została także sankcjami sektorowymi, które m.in. limitowały dostęp do rynków kapitałowych największym bankom państwowym Rosji, a także kilku państwowym spółkom naftowym i zbrojeniowym; wprowadzały również zakaz eksportu do Rosji uzbrojenia i towarów podwójnego zastosowania; ponadto ograniczały dostęp do wybranych technologii i usług wykorzystywanych w sektorze wydobycia ropy naftowej.
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1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.
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Russia’s long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US ’s position in the region. Its short-term goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea. Russia’s support for the reunification of the two Korean states is purely declaratory; in practice the Kremlin is striving to maintain the political status quo on the peninsula. At the same time, Russia wants to maximise its influence by developing economic relations and maintaining political contacts with both Koreas. Moscow does not view the denuclearisation of North Korea as one of its priorities. Its approach to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is instrumental; in Moscow’s eyes, although the program poses certain risks for Russia, it also opens a number of opportunities. The course of the crisis so far has demonstrated that Russia does not have sufficient tools to influence the course of events. As a consequence, it has had to accept a role as China’s ‘junior partner’ in the Korean issue.
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Aktywowanie mechanizmu stałej współpracy strukturalnej (tzw. PESCO) w grudniu 2017 roku zwieńczyło debaty i działania z zakresu wzmacniania wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony UE. Wypracowanie kompromisu dotyczącego PESCO pokazało strategiczne rozbieżności pomiędzy Francją, Niemcami a państwami wschodniej flanki UE w zakresie percepcji wyzwań i zagrożeń, wizji rozwoju polityki bezpieczeństwa UE oraz przyszłości relacji transatlantyckich. Zaś zachodnioeuropejskie debaty wokół PESCO unaoczniły stopień oderwania politycznych narracji od wojskowej rzeczywistości.
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In this text, I will examine the main trains of thought in the narrative of the historical memory of the Russian Federation’s special services, which demonstrate the attempts to reconcile the traditions of the Tsarist-era services with those of the Soviet services. I will proceed from the assumption that the history of the special services is part of the history of the state apparatus, and more broadly, of the state’s political systems. In this context, the work of Russian historiographers focuses not only on combining these two, in many respects contradictory identities of Russia – the Tsarist and the totalitarian – but above all on the creation of parallels between the historical and contemporary situations. This is because the historical legitimisation of the services is an important factor that gives legal validity to the current ruling elite, whose roots largely lie in the KGB, and which operates under the conditions of a new system of governance based on state capitalism.
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The history of the special services and the ideas which organise them in the symbolic sphere are an important part of the reflection on their contemporary role and position. Over the centuries, the secret services defined Russia's relations with the outside world, shaped its domestic situation, and influenced the fate of the societies and nations that were part of the Russian and Soviet empires. Many generations of their subjects and citizens have been raised in the cult of state security: in this way, the services' negative image (as a powerful machine of repression) was washed away in the public awareness, and their successes and contributions in the fields of modernising and building the power of the country were emphasised. This served, and still serves, to legitimise them, and also to legitimise the ruling elite in Russia.
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1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU.2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy.3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU.4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.
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Among the key processes which have been taking place in Russia in recent decades, special attention should be paid to social mobilisation, i.e. the developing habits of taking up grassroots activities, the emergence of horizontal social networks, the large number of formal and informal civic initiatives (both political and non-political). This mobilisation should not be analysed separately from the evolution of the model of the state as a whole, which – especially since 2012 – has seen an increase in repression and a decline in economic efficiency. The main question posed by this study concerns the conditions that make social mobilisation and the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the condition of the state only result in short-term and local outbreaks of protest and not into a change in the entire model of governance. In this context, the text considers both the current and personnel-related factors, and the long-term cultural, social and political factors.
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After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.
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Słowackie wybory prezydenckie z marca 2019 roku pokazały wyraźnie linie i skalę podziałów w tamtejszym społeczeństwie. Główną ich osią jest stosunek do najsilniejszej partii koalicji rządzącej Smer-Socjaldemokracja byłego premiera Roberta Ficy, sprawującej władzę na Słowacji od 2006 roku z jedną krótką przerwą (2010–2012). Coraz większą rolę zaczyna jednak odgrywać także podział na zwolenników dalszej integracji Słowacji w strukturach Zachodu oraz przeciwników prozachodnich elit, którzy dążą do tego, aby pod hasłem obrony suwerenności radykalnie przedefiniować politykę zagraniczną państwa. Biorąc to pod uwagę, słowackie społeczeństwo można podzielić na trzy główne grupy: tych, którzy domagają się odejścia skompromitowanych elit i usprawnienia działania państwa, bez reorientacji polityki zagranicznej; tych, którzy chcą przede wszystkim stabilności i obawiają się poważniejszych zmian; a także tych, którzy chcą wymiany elit oraz radykalnej zmiany systemu politycznego i polityki zagranicznej.
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The presidential elections in March 2019 clearly demonstrated the battle lines and the scale of divisions within the Slovak society. The main axis of these divisions is the public’s attitude towards the strongest party in the ruling coalition – Smer – sociálna demokracia [Direction – Social Democracy], led by the former Prime Minister Robert Fico, which with one brief interruption (2010-12) has held power in Slovakia since 2006. However, an increasingly important role is being played by the split between supporters of Slovakia’s further integration into Western structures and opponents of the pro-Western elites who seek to radically redefine the state’s foreign policy under the banner of defending its sovereignty. Taking this into account, Slovak society can be divided into three main groups: those who demand that the discredited elites leave office and that the functioning of the state be improved, though without any major change in foreign policy; those who primarily want stability and are afraid of major changes; and those who want to replace the elites and are demanding radical change to the country’s political system and foreign policy.
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Wśród istotnych procesów toczących się w Rosji w ostatniej dekadzie opisu i analizy wymaga aktywizacja społeczna – kształtujące się nawyki podejmowania oddolnych działań, tworzące się poziome sieci społeczne, duża liczba formalnych i nieformalnych inicjatyw obywatelskich, zarówno politycznych, jak i apolitycznych. Aktywizacja ta nie może jednak być rozpatrywana w oderwaniu od ewolucji całego modelu państwa, który – zwłaszcza po roku 2012 – notuje wzrost represyjności oraz spadek efektywności gospodarczej. Główne pytanie, jakie stawia niniejszy tekst, dotyczy uwarunkowań, które sprawiają, że aktywizacja społeczna i wzrost niezadowolenia obywateli z kondycji państwa skutkują jedynie krótkotrwałymi i lokalnymi wybuchami protestu i nie przekładają się na zmianę całego modelu zarządzania. W tym kontekście rozpatrzone zostały zarówno czynniki bieżące i personalne, jak i długofalowe uwarunkowania kulturowe, społeczne i polityczne.
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Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was an experiment carried out by the Russian ruling elite. Even though the new president has been a loyal member of the ruling camp, this decision involved certain risk that the extensive constitutional powers could eventually encourage the new president to seek emancipation, which could provoke internal conflicts and splits in the elite. This paper analyses Medvedev’s presidency and tries to answer the question why this scenario did not take place and why Medvedev failed to overcome the restrictions imposed on him at the start of his presidential term. The paper also presents the activation of certain social groups during Medvedev’s presidency and their calls for a new social contract with the government.
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Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations.The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.
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Rosyjskie kozactwo budzi wśród obserwatorów skrajne opinie: przez część jest traktowane jako marginalne zjawisko społeczne, folklor polityczny, przez innych – jako moralnie i fizycznie zdrową część narodu, filar nowoczesnych formacji paramilitarnych broniących granic państwowych i kulturowych Rosji. W tekście podjęto próbę interpretacji tego problemu w kategoriach procesu społeczno-politycznego. Doprowadził on do przekształcenia oddolnego, spontanicznego ruchu w ruch sterowany odgórnie, kontrolowany. Niezależnie od tej zasadniczej zmiany, kozactwo (ściślej – neokozactwo) nadal definiuje się jako wspólnotę historyczno-kulturową, za pomocą takich wyróżników, jak: propaństwowa i obronna mentalność, zmilitaryzowany styl życia i służba państwowa, wyznanie prawosławne, odrębne tradycje i obyczaje. W części pierwszej – przez pryzmat kluczowych pojęć – przybliżono oficjalną narrację na ten temat. Omawiane pojęcia (stan kozacki, rejestr kozacki, kozactwo rejestrowe, kozacka służba państwowa) niosą sporą dawkę dezinformacji, co wynika choćby z wyrwania ich z historycznego kontekstu i umieszczenia we współczesnych realiach rosyjskich. Część druga jest poświęcona strategicznym celom polityki Rosji wobec neokozactwa oraz systemowi organizacyjnemu powołanemu do jej realizacji. Tekst zamyka wykaz przypisywanych mu funkcji, tj. wiązanych z tą społecznością długofalowych interesów Kremla.
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