The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.
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Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states.A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy
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1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.
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The history of the special services and the ideas which organise them in the symbolic sphere are an important part of the reflection on their contemporary role and position. Over the centuries, the secret services defined Russia's relations with the outside world, shaped its domestic situation, and influenced the fate of the societies and nations that were part of the Russian and Soviet empires. Many generations of their subjects and citizens have been raised in the cult of state security: in this way, the services' negative image (as a powerful machine of repression) was washed away in the public awareness, and their successes and contributions in the fields of modernising and building the power of the country were emphasised. This served, and still serves, to legitimise them, and also to legitimise the ruling elite in Russia.
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1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU.2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy.3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU.4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.
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After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.
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Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations.The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.
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W porównaniu z latami ubiegłymi sytuacja na Kaukazie Północnym uległa stabilizacji, głównie w wymiarze działalności islamskiego podziemia zbrojnego. Przyczyną tego zjawiska są zmiany ideologiczne w obozie bojowników, które doprowadziły do rozmycia walki zbrojnej na Kaukazie w globalnym dżihadzie i jej marginalizacji wobec priorytetowego frontu bliskowschodniego. Stabilizacji sprzyja kryzys organizacyjny Emiratu Kaukaskiego i odpływ bojowników na Bliski Wschód, jak również skuteczność stosowanej przez Moskwę polityki „kija i marchewki”. Uspokojenie sytuacji na Kaukazie jest jednak nietrwałe, ma bowiem charakter sytuacyjny, a nie systemowy. Nie jest efektem rozwiązania nabrzmiałych problemów regionu, generujących chroniczną niestabilność i sprzyjających cywilizacyjnemu oddalaniu się Kaukazu od Rosji. W warunkach kryzysu gospodarczego bądź politycznego w Rosji grozi to odmrożeniem kaukaskich konfliktów, w tym reaktywacją czeczeńskiego separatyzmu i wpisanej w globalny dżihad idei Emiratu Kaukaskiego.
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Aby zniesienie wiz w relacjach pomiędzy UE a krajami Europy Wschodniej stało się realne, należy tę kwestię „odczarować”. Przy obecnym poziomie mobilności i kontaktów międzyludzkich, biznesowych, politycznych, taki krok będzie naturalną konsekwencją trwających od lat procesów liberalizacyjnych.Ponadto abolicja wizowa nie powinna znacząco wpłynąć na zwiększenie presji migracyjnej z krajów Europy Wschodniej, a może przyczynić się do zmniejszenia kosztów obsługi rozbudowanej sieci konsularnej krajów Schengen. Zniesienie wiz przez UE może mieć ograniczony i czasowy charakter oraz pozwolić na faktyczne wprowadzenie w życie zasady warunkowości w relacjach z sąsiadami. W sensie politycznym nadanie przez UE kwestii ruchu bezwizowego kluczowego charakteru zasadniczo zmieniłoby podejście sąsiadów do Partnerstwa Wschodniego oraz stanowiłoby pomost z Partnerstwem dla Modernizacji skierowanym do Rosji.
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Nord Stream increases Gazprom’s flexibility as far its export routes are concerned; it enables them to be changed with regard to the market or political situation. Nevertheless, this expensive pipeline may contribute to a further drop in the price competitiveness of Russian gas. Accordingly, increasing the attractiveness of Russian fuel and ensuring profitable sales is steadily becoming the main challenge for Gazprom in the EU against a backdrop of increasing competitiveness on the market.
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The Kremlin’s support for Vladimir Putin’s cronies
The Western sanctions have proved painful for the Russian elite not only in terms of finance, but also of image and prestige. However, thanks to the EU's much softer sanctions policy compared to the US, the Russian oligarchs have still been able to conduct their business in Europe, either directly or through intermediaries. Since March 2014, the Kremlin has tried to compensate selected businessmen for at least some of the losses they have suffered. The activities of the Russian state apparatus are a coordinated policy aimed at supporting oligarchs in the immediate vicinity of the president, the costs of which have been borne by Russian society. The flow of assets among individual persons belonging to the Russian elite (both among private businessmen and state-owned companies) which has occurred as a result of the sanctions and the attempts to minimise losses, has revealed the close symbiosis and the blurring of boundaries between private and state capital in Russia.
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Russia’s Cossacks evoke extreme opinions among observers: some see them as a marginal social phenomenon, a kind of political folklore; others as a morally and physically healthy part of the nation, a pillar of the modern paramilitary formations which defend the national and cultural borders of the Russian Federation. This text is an attempt to interpret this issue in terms of a socio-political process, which has resulted in the transformation of a spontaneous, bottom-up movement into one monitored and directed from the top down. Regardless of this fundamental change, the Cossacks (or more specifically, the ‘neo-Cossacks’) still define themselves as a cultural and historical community, with the aid of such characteristics as a defensive, pro-state mentality, a militarised lifestyle and service to the state, the Orthodox religion, and their distinct traditions and customs. The first part of this analysis examines the official narrative of neo-Cossackdom through the prism of key concepts. These (the Cossack state, the Cossack register, registered Cossacks, the Cossack state service) carry a large dose of misinformation, because they have been torn out of their historical context and placed in today’s Russian realities. The second part is devoted to Russia’s strategic policy objectives regarding the neo-Cossacks, and the organisational system set up to implement this policy. The text closes with a list of the functions assigned to the Cossacks, i.e. the long-term interests of the Kremlin linked to them.
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1. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been Georgia's main security problem since the beginning of the 1990s, and, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have made up the main security problems in the South Caucasus.2. In the 1990s, the conflicts in the South Caucasus remained in abeyance. This situation sprung from the apparent self-determination (albeit gained through military means) of the self-declared republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (whose emergence and existence would not have been possible without Russia's support) and the appearance of a peace process dictated by Russia. That status reflected the realities of the period and the potential of the parties involved (in particular, the weakness of Georgia in its desire to regain control of the breakaway provinces) and the geopolitical circumstances which made Russia the dominant political and military force in both the conflicts and in the region as a whole. Thus it was possible to preserve a minimum level of stability around the conflicts, i.e. to keep military operations suspended, for about a decade.3. At the turn of the century it became increasingly apparent that the suspended status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was both anachronistic and impractical. It was also clear that the peace process and the republics' self-determination were illusory. All this became obvious after the major geopolitical changes in 2001 and 2003 which included NATO's eastward enlargement, the rise of interest in security issues, the promotion of democracy and new sources of energy resources after 11 September 2001. As a result, the West (mainly the United States) became interested in Georgia and the entire South Caucasus, and thus an alternative player to Russia emerged in the region.However, it was the transformations in Georgia triggered by the Rose Revolution (2003) and the resulting change of leadership and reforms undertaken to build an efficient, Western-oriented state that had the most direct and crucial impact on the situation over the conflicts. Georgia gained a potential which enabled it to question the illusory order surrounding the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts.4. Restoring the country's territorial integrity became one of the priorities for Georgia under president Mikheil Saakashvili. This objective was to be achieved through a comprehensive strategy involving, pressure on the separatists, including military pressure through modernisation of the army, as well as measures to undermine the internal legitimacy of the separatists leaderships by creating alternative centres of power. Other elements of the strategy included reducing the role of Russia, seen as a de facto player in the conflict, pursuing and internationalising the peace process itself (making the West involved in conflict resolution was crucial in this respect). Finally, the strategy also envisaged a readiness to grant Abkhazia and South Ossetia broad autonomy within Georgia. Georgia exposed the weakness of the peace process and the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were mere pawns in the Georgian-Russian conflict. Currently Georgia faces an alternative between a rapid change to the conflict resolution format (Georgia has presented the fullest formula, adjusted by the OSCE and others), or a resumption of military operations (all players involved in the conflict in practice take this possibility into account). The manner in which the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be solved will also be one of the most important factors in determining the future of Georgia, i.e. its stability, reforms and pro-Western orientation.5. In recent years, the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have ceased to be only local: they are no longer an internal Georgian conflict, not even a conflict between Georgia and Russia - they have become an element in the game between Russia and the West. The restoration of Russian dominance in Georgia and in the South Caucasus, and the sustainability and future development of political and economic investments made in the region by the West over the last two years, largely hinge on the outcome of the conflicts. Current clashes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been used as bargaining tools in the dispute between Russia and the West concerning the future of Kosovo and the Balkans. In the end, by getting involved in the South Caucasus and supporting transformations in Georgia, in a barely noticeable way and supposedly against its intentions, the West has become partly responsible for the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.6. 2008 may prove to be a turning point for the conflicts in Georgia as a consequence of the resolution of the question of Kosovo, which is perceived as a precedent or catalyst for solutions in the Caucasus, and the unexpected political crisis in Georgia which started in autumn 2007. The Georgian crisis has shown that the transformation of the state is not yet complete, and its reliability in the West may be undermined. Georgia has proved sufficiently determined and strong to question the pathologies that arose in connection with the conflicts and propose an alternative, but too weak to safely tackle them on its own.
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W ostatnich latach Turcja szybko przemienia się z sojusznika Zachodu w coraz bardziej problematycznego partnera. Dla tureckich władz sojusz z Unią Europejską oraz w ramach NATO nie ma już charakteru wspólnoty wartości, ale traktowanej wybiórczo, chwiejnej wspólnoty interesów. Pogłębia się też polityczna alienacja Turcji na Bliskim Wschodzie. W następstwie arabskiej wiosny i procesów przez nią uruchomionych Ankara utraciła wpływy, które w poprzednich latach intensywnie budowała w tym regionie. Narastające osamotnienie Turcji na arenie międzynarodowej wynika z coraz pełniejszego podporządkowywania tureckiej polityki zagranicznej ideologii partii rządzącej, AKP. Wizja świata oferowana przez tę ideologię rozmija się z diagnozami partnerów, a cele, jakie stawia tureckiej polityce zagranicznej, są sprzeczne z ich oczekiwaniami. Dodatkowo oparcie polityki zagranicznej na ideologii odbiera jej elastyczność i dopasowywanie do bieżącej dynamiki międzynarodowej.
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The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.
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The New Silk Road is China’s main foreign policy project, devised under Xi Jinping. Beijng is striving to build up durable influence in the states in its neighbourhood. At the same time, China’s view of the international order is characterised by a non-confrontational understanding of influence. China does not intend to build its own closed regional bloc, but is rather trying to push through its own vision of globalisation for Asia, Europe and Africa. China is trying to merge its traditional way of thinking about the external world (Sinocentrism, and a preference for bilateral relations with weaker states) with Western formats for multilateral cooperation such as development banks and international organisations. While trying to purse China’s ambitions resulting from its rise as a global power, the Chinese elites nevertheless fear taking over leadership in the region and assuming responsibility for the same.
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Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.
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Important changes have occurred in recent years in the attitude of a majority of the German elite towards the history of the 20th century and the political identity built on collective memory. Until recently, the sense of guilt for the crimes of the Third Reich and the obligation to remember were prevalent.While these two elements of Germany's memory of World War II are still important, currently the focus increasingly shifts to the German resistance against Nazism and the fate of the Germans who suffered in the war. Positive references to Germany's post-war history also occupy more and more space in the German memory. In 2009, i.e. the year of the 60th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 20th anniversary of the fall of Communism, the efforts of German public institutions concentrate on promoting a new canon of history built around the successful democratisation and Germany's post-war economic success. The purpose behind these measures is to build a common historical memory that could be shared by the eastern and western parts of Germany and appeal to Germany's immigrants, who account for a growing proportion of the society.
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The Republic of Turkey has been undergoing a thorough transformation since 2002 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On the ideological level this transformation entered a decisive stage after the coup of 15 July 2016 which was thwarted by the government’s supporters. The coup is treated as a modern political myth that has been employed by the government to build a comprehensive story of a Turkey it governs, and to define the fundamental values and identity of the state. Turkey is becoming an even more difficult partner for the West after the failed coup. Inherent in its founding myth is a strong anti-Western and anti-liberal trend based on a political system strongly relying on one leader. However, this does not mean that a Turkey with a government model of this kind will automatically become a close ally of other anti-Western countries (such as Russia and Iran) and build a camp with them that would be in competition with the West. In this context, Turkey above all emphasises its own sovereignty. Furthermore, it is not looking for points of reference in other countries because it is a model for itself.
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1. Clear qualitative changes have taken place in relations between the European Union and its Eastern neighbours over the past year. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been playing a significant part in the context of these changes. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, which are the countries interested in enhancing co-operation with the EU, the ENP has provided a formula that allows taking steps to implement this objective. The ENP has also contributed to "outlining an alternative" to Belarus' current self-isolation. However, the ENP has first of all given a clear message to Russia by specifying the EU's interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe. The ENP has clearly stated that the EU wants to build democracy and a free market in those countries, and has signalled that the European Union intends to discuss the issues concerning the countries directly with them, and not through Moscow's offices.2. The main shortcoming of the ENP appears to be the disproportion between the number of commitments and tasks that the neighbours must make and carry out and the benefits promised by the EU. Currently, the ENP does not offer membership prospects, and other concessions made by the European Union have not been clearly defined (neither in terms of the scope nor the terms and conditions of implementation). This lack of balance between the European Union's great aspirations to influence its neighbours and the limited offer it addresses to those neighbours seems to be a problem of such magnitude that, unless the situation changes, it may paralyse further implementation of the ENP. 3. The mechanisms and objectives of the ENP have been determined in rather general terms, which gives the EU great freedom of action in its policy towards the Eastern partners. On the one hand, the ENP allows for a very reserved approach or even the simulation of real actions; yet on the other, it does not exclude the possibility of very active engagement by the EU (including holding out the prospect of membership for the European neighbours). This shows that the ENP does not definitely determine the nature of the EU engagement. A great deal depends on the political will on the part of both the European Union's structures and its individual member states. The ENP's flexibility seems to be a particularly valuable feature; it gives an opportunity for an evolutional change to this formula which may be inspired by both new experiences and the changing reality.
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