All configurations of the EU-Russia-US triangle merit examination, in the evolving relationships between the three parties. Beyond the three bilateral relationships and a cooperative trilateral there can be three special bilateral alliances, whose subject of interest would be the third party
More...
Regardless of the merits of Ukrainian criticisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy, its reception in Ukraine indicates that the EU has already missed one opportunity to foster the reforms in Ukraine that the EU ultimately seeks. Yet the presidential election in Ukraine on 31 October represents another opportunity for change, as the country will decide between a pro-reform candidate and a pro-government, authoritarian one. As Ukraine prepares to vote, the EU needs to ensure that it sends the appropriate signals concerning the conduct of the elections. If the elections are not free and fair and the government uses the administration machinery inappropriately to guarantee the victory of pro-government candidate, this should have clear and immediate consequences for relations between the new Ukrainian president and the EU. If on the other hand the elections are free and are followed by steps towards pro-European reform, the EU should reciprocate, above all by making sure that the Action Plan between the EU and Ukraine moves the bilateral relationship significantly and noticeably beyond the current state of affairs. Date of PÜublishing: 1 October 2004
More...
The outcome of the disputed presidential elections in Ukraine in November 2004 is still highly uncertain. It is however clear that it will have profound consequences for the EU’s relationship with Ukraine. The authors suggest the development of a three-pronged EU approach. First, the EU needs to develop strategies to support the democratic transmission of power from President Leonid Kuchma to his successor. In the event of violence being instigated by the authorities, it is suggested that the EU immediately suspend all contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. If the Supreme Court finds that the result cannot be said to reflect the will of the Ukrainian people, new elections run by the OSCE should be considered. Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal with the consequences of a victory for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. It would be imperative that the EU resists the temptation to disengage with Ukraine. The EU would nevertheless need to radically change its policy, for instance by re-targeting economic aid and minimising political dialogue. Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the event that Viktor Yushchenko wins the presidency. In this case, the EU and Ukraine should in the short-term renegotiate the Action Plan to strengthen bilateral relations. Faced with a pro-European, credible reformist like Mr Yushchenko, with broad domestic support, the EU would in the longer term find it difficult to continue to avoid the question of Ukraine as a potential member of the EU. Date of Publishing: 1 December 2004
More...
The ongoing conflict in and around Chechnya is helping to feed the wider international jihadi movement, and is endangering the West as well as Russia. The next “soft target” of North Caucasian terrorism could be a Western one. Mutual recriminations over the conflict have badly damaged relations between Russia and the West. While most of the blame for this lies with Russian policies, the Western approach to the issue has often been unhelpful and irresponsible. Denunciations of Russian behaviour have not been matched by a real understanding of the Chechen conflict or a real commitment to help. In their own interest, Western countries need urgently to address the crisis in the North Caucasus. This requires them to recognize the seriousness of the threat, to open a real dialogue on cooperation with Russia rather than simply making criticisms, and to make a serious economic contribution to the region. Date of Publishing: April 1, 2005
More...
On the 10th of May the EU and Russia signed four ‘roadmap’ documents at summit level in Moscow, on the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. This was the culmination of two year’s work since the May 2003 summit that decided in principle to create the four spaces as a long-term project. It was intended also to give new momentum to the relationship, after seeing that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 had not become a motor for anything very substantial, while the subsequent phase (in 1999) of swapping common strategy documents also led nowhere in particular. Does this new attempt to give structure and momentum to the relationship do something more substantial? Does it mark a new era in the relationship? Does it bear any relationship to the massive symbolism on display in Moscow the day before, as world leaders joined in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II? Date of Publishing: May 1, 2005
More...
CEPS Senior Research Fellow Michael Emerson asserts that the aftershocks of the EU’s failed referenda on the European Constitution will be most sharply felt – in an external sense – in the Black Sea region. He describes how Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were the first hit by the tremors. But he traces its effects further than that, up the Danube basin to Belgrade, across the Caucasus to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and last but certainly not least up to Russia. For all the states that have been espousing long-term EU membership aspirations – including all of the above, except Russia –the author recommends they take time out for a reality check. For Russia, which had not anticipated this upset in the EU, it may be interpreted not so much a time for a rethink, as an encouragement not to have a rethink. For these states (in different degrees), there is a new question of strategic importance and the name of the game has changed. Emerson is keen to explore whether the EU’s hugely successful political conditionality machine and gravitational powers of attraction, as evidenced in its recent enlargement, can continue to operate with some variant model of virtual, functional membership? Or, if not, he asks whether the prospects for the deepening and consolidation of democracy in these regions are going to be seriously prejudiced? Date of Publishing: July 1, 2005
More...
As typified by Ukraine and Egypt, most of the semi- or non-democratic countries in the EU’s neighbourhood pretend to offer a degree of political pluralism. The standard is for a plurality of parties to run in national elections and participate in parliamentary sessions. In contrast to fully fledged democracies, however, these electoral rituals have little bearing on the composition of government and its policy output, which remains entirely dominated by the executive institutions and parties of power. This paper argues that the trademarks of these types of parties are a serious stumbling block for the development of a multi-party system based on competing ideological currents. For democracy to take hold in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhood of the EU, it is crucial that the logic of parties of power be replaced by one structured around autonomous and ideologically cohesive parties. Thus, both ideological and organisational party-building should be an integral part of the EU’s policy agenda to promote the spread of democracy in these regions. Date of Publishing: August 1, 2005
More...
Pending clarification of further enlargement prospects for the whole of the Western Balkans, Michael Emerson argues in this paper that there is every reason to consolidate the positive recent developments with further initiatives of strategic importance to the region. He explores two outstanding candidates for this purpose: 1) enlargement of the existing Customs Union of the EU and Turkey to include the whole of the Western Balkans, and 2) a South-East European Schengen Agreement for the free movement of people. Date Published: 1 November 2005
More...
Russia’s tough stance towards Ukraine on natural gas prices was viewed by many in Europe and the United States as raising new issues concerning Russia’s foreign economic policies and growing European and US dependency on energy imports. For many new EU member states and for countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, however, this is an old problem. Central European attempts to flag the issue in Western capitals have until now been brushed aside. The rapid approval by the EU Commission of the Russian-German undersea gas pipeline project was a mistake. The concerns of the Central Europeans should have been examined in more detail. Western governments would also be wise to analyse more closely the political and security implications of Russia’s energy policies.
More...
In August 2005, President Saakashvili of Georgia and President Yushchenko of Ukraine met at Borjomi, Georgia, and decided to launch an initiative to promote democracy among a community of like-minded states of Central and Eastern Europe. This led to a meeting in Kyiv on 2 December 2005, of a wider group of countries of the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region, which adopted a declaration announcing the creation of a Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) as a governmental and non-governmental forum to promote the strengthening of democracy, human rights and civil society. The next meeting of the CDC will take place as a Baltic and Black Sea Summit in Vilnius in May 2006.
More...
On the day before the European Commission’s decision on the fitness of Bulgaria and Romania to become EU members on 1 January 2007 (due to be delivered 16 May 2006), it is becoming increasingly evident that the EU has fallen into its own ‘rhetorical trap’ from which there is no easy way out. Most EU officials and politicians would agree that the governance standards in the two Balkan candidates are not up to EU level yet, but everyone knows that there is not much the EU can do about it at this point.
More...
The 10th anniversary of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia,which falls on 1 December 2007, is already prompting thoughts on whether and how to replace it. This raises basic issues about the form, purpose and content of bilateral treaties in the context of an integrating Europe. The following scenarios are discussed: 1. Retire the PCA without replacement 2. Extend the status quo 3. Extend the status quo, adding a Political Declaration on Strategic Partnership 4. Replace the PCA with a short Treaty on Strategic Partnership 5. Replace the PCA with a comprehensive Treaty on Strategic Partnership 6. Negotiate a Treaty of Strategic Union We argue that the model of the comprehensive multi-sectoral treaty, well known to the EU and its neighbours that aspire to membership, is not suited to the case of Russia, which is not an applicant for membership. Attempts to produce weaker derivatives of this model result in long-winded and pretentious texts that are thin or devoid of legally-binding substance. The treaty form also involves extremely long and risky ratification procedures on the side of the EU and its member states, and is extremely inflexible, even possibly becoming outdated before entry into force. For the foreseeable future, it would be best to focus efforts on concrete, sector-specific agreements. We advocate a three-stage concept, starting with an extended status quo in the short-run (scenario 2), trying to give useful effect to the four Common Spaces agreed in May 2005 and various sector-specific agreements. This could lead on in the medium-term to a Political Declaration on Strategic Partnership (scenario 3) to revise and update priorities after Russia’s WTO accession and more experience with the four Common Spaces. In the long term, we would like to see a Treaty of Strategic Union (scenario 6), as and when there is a greater convergence and mutual trust on matters of political values.
More...
Guidelines for an EU Initiative
This study advocates that the EU support a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder initiative to achieve synergy from regional cooperation in the wider Black Sea area. The background for this initiative is first provided through an overview of the challenges, recent developments and EU interests in this region. Different models of regionalism have been promoted by the EU in the European periphery, and these are schematised with a focus on their respective advantages and disadvantages. Finally guidelines for an EU initiative are set out under: 1) objectives and sector-specific actions, 2) its scope in terms of variable geographic geometries of desirable cooperation in the region and 3) a Framework of institutional and financial arrangements to support the process. An overarching mechanism is required to give political cohesion, ownership, visibility and strategic purpose to the process, and this could well be based on an annual, high-level meeting, drawing on the model of the Black Sea Forum Summit in Bucharest on 5 June 2006.
More...
The international community has been increasingly concerned with the secessionist conflicts that have marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conflicts in the Transnistrian region of Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan are no longer ‘internal affairs’ of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The EU and NATO enlargements have brought these organisations closer to the conflict areas and have increased their interest in promoting solutions to these conflicts. In the context of the international fight against terrorism, there are fears that the existence of failed states or uncontrolled areas can have repercussions far beyond their respective regions. The relative stabilisation of the Balkans will allow the EU and NATO to pay more attention to conflicts that are further away from their neighbourhood.
More...
It is urgent that the EU should follow up on UN Resolution 1701 and the deployment of member states’ troops to Lebanon with a strategic diplomatic initiative aimed at the fundamental problem, namely the lack of an agreed resolution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The reasons for this are a mix of old and new; reasons which are rooted in the international, European and Middle Eastern domains.
More...
There is a tendency in some political discourse now to say that, because the Constitution that was meant to prepare for enlargement failed to be ratified, the enlargement process has now hit a roadblock called ‘absorption capacity’. An alternative narrative is that the Constitution proposed some useful but marginal systemic changes, but its ratification was badly mismanaged by some political leaders. In the meantime, the EU has not experienced gridlock, and its current major political issues have nothing to do with enlargement. The case for a pause after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements is undeniable. EU27 will have to settle down, and sort out the constitutional imbroglio. However the plausible time horizon for any next major enlargement is many years ahead, maybe 2015, with various transitional arrangements pushing the real date in important respects beyond 2020 (e.g. for the labour market). The vague idea of ‘absorption capacity’ is better deconstructed into more precise and objective components such as the capacity of the EU’s internal market, labour market, budget, eurozone and institutional system to absorb new member states, society’s capacity to absorb immigration and the EU’s capacity for assuring its strategic security. All these issues can be discussed, but they are not static matters. Changes in public opinion may be expected to follow from new realities. The dynamics of enhancing capacities for change deserve priority attention. The ‘final frontiers’ proposition (presumably to the exclusion of both Turkey and Ukraine at the least) is a thoroughly bad idea, since there are well-established outer limits in any case to the map of Europe (e.g. Council of Europe membership) and to EU membership as in the Treaty of Rome. It would be a strategic blunder for the EU now to invent a new irreversible dividing line within this map between ‘real Europe’ and an imagined ‘other’ (uncivilised?) Europe beyond. The term ‘absorption capacity’ should be dropped from use in official texts, unless deconstructed into objective elements. Otherwise it is giving the impression of some pseudo-scientific and static reality, and plays into the hands of populist political rhetoric.
More...
The European Union thinks of itself as a ‘soft power’, which is defined by Joseph Nye as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” and which can “be cultivated through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges.” Few would think that Russia has ‘soft power’ ambitions, but the truth is that Russia has started to invest in the infrastructure of a soft power.
More...
This paper argues that the January 2006 gas cut off in the Ukraine encouraged EU policymakers and the media to focus on the wrong Russian gas issue. The core issue for the EU is not the threat of a politically motivated gas cut off. Rather it is the prospect of Russia, through lack of investment, not being able to produce enough gas to cover Russian and EU demands. The paper considers the extent of the likely gas deficit and determines that if no action is taken by 2010 the EU may be facing a deficit close to or even beyond its current Russian gas import level. The damaging consequences of such a deficit are then outlined for Russia, the Central and Eastern European member states and the older Western EU member states. The paper goes on to argue that an over-arching liberalised market structure needs to be built in both Russia and the EU, underpinned by the strong investor protection provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty. The paper concludes by examining the short- and longerterm measures that can be deployed to close the deficit.
More...
Presevo Valley gained international attention mostly due to the insurgency of local Albanians in 2000, which was also a key factor destabilising Macedonia in 2001. Situated in southern Serbia and bordering on Macedonia and Kosovo, Presevo Valley is home to Serbia’s Albanian minority. Although the Valley has been calm in the last few years and the resurgence of armed conflict is unlikely at the moment, the situation is still fragile and continues to pose a potential security threat for the wider region. As the solution to Kosovo’s status is approaching, the problems of Albanians in Presevo Valley deserve serious attention. There are two main sources of security threats: one is the potential influx of Serbian refugees, the other is Kosovo’s (hypothetical) partition. The latter could potentially lead to the outbreak of violence, as Albanians of the Valley recently declared their intention to be united with Kosovo if the Serbian villages in the North of Kosovo would join Serbia. This Policy Brief argues, however, that the Serbian government could reduce the chances of conflict by addressing some everyday problems faced by the Albanian minority, which could take the wind out of the sails of potential irredentists. Albanian grievances centre on issues such as their weak presence in the public sector, high unemployment, limited implementation of their language rights and the lack of economic development. Some of these problems could be effectively addressed through strengthening local autonomy, which could be part of the solution. It is argued here that continuation with the Covic plan, which combines decentralisation and demilitarisation, could bring about the desired stability for the region, which needs continued attention and assistance from international bodies, among them the European Union.
More...
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s statement to Spain’s El País that the idea of a ‘gas-OPEC’ should not a priori be excluded, adds to a series of twists, among which was Vladimir Putin’s confirmation on 1 February that the idea of a gas cartel was an ‘interesting one’ worth considering further. Hitherto, this gas saga featured Russia, Algeria, the EU, NATO and Iran. The story revolves around Russian-Algerian mingling on gas matters, spurring European and Transatlantic concerns over the prospects of a ‘gas OPEC’. At a time of increasing European dependence on foreign energy supplies, these developments have been interpreted as being part of a wider effort, led by Russia, to use energy as a lever to undermine European diplomacy. These allegations have been dismissed by Algeria and Russia, whose leaders insist that their cooperation is intended to optimise their benefits and those of their customers alike. This paper examines the underpinnings of these developments by assessing the likelihood of their culmination in a gas cartel and offers an insight into the potential policy choices behind them.
More...