DPC BOSNIA DAILY: The Republika Srpska: Form or Function?
Bosnia Daily: September 1, 2015 – The Republika Srpska: Form or Function?
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Bosnia Daily: September 1, 2015 – The Republika Srpska: Form or Function?
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Bosnia Daily: July 1, 2015 – To Count or Not to Count? That Is the Question
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Bosnia Daily: December 22, 2015 – Virtual Electoral Units = Virtual Accountability
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Bosnia Daily: July 8, 2015 – What Chancellor Merkel Should Tell Bosnia's Politicians and People (I)
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Bosnia Daily: July 9, 2015 – What Chancellor Merkel Should Tell Bosnia's Politicians and People (II)
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Bosnia Daily: October 21, 2015 – What to Expect - and What Not To
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Bosnia Daily: June 16, 2016 – Why My Prescriptions on BiH Are Frequently Misunderstood
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Bosnia Daily: November 6, 2014 – Why the International Rush for Government Formation?
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The purpose of this report is to review the European Union’s (EU) evolving approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in assessing fulfillment of EU membership conditions. In particular, this report is concerned with the following questions: • How have EU requirements for BiH changed over time, if at all?, and; • Have priorities evolved, and, if so, how? The European Commission “has drawn detailed conclusions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina… based on the technical analysis contained in… the annual EU Progress Reports for accession-bound countries.” These Progress Reports are technical in nature, but are nonetheless collective assessments generated by a committee of diagnostic evaluators. Apart from the political and economic situation, the Progress Reports “review Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity to implement European standards, that is, to gradually make legislation in key policy areas more compatible with European legislation and standards”. As such, they are a useful barometer of progress made not only in reform, but also expectations and requirements. They provide a useful annual baseline to consider both the status of the country in question in its reform and accession preparations, as well as the EU’s expectations for the country in question. In an effort to answer the above questions, the author has analyzed the annual EU Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 – 2012. These reports break down EU requirements by topic and sector. They are published with a nearly identical structure year after year, which facilitates comparison. The following five areas are examined: Agriculture, the Constitution, the Judicial System, Education and Minority Rights and Protection. These sections were chosen for their link to constitutional reform issues—specifically those identified as crucial for EU accession (justice, agriculture, constitution)—as well as broader human rights issues related to BiH as a post-war, transition state (education, minority rights). Several preliminary conclusions may be drawn from this exercise. First, there has been a significant shift in the agriculture sector, as the frequency of use of imperative language has plummeted, despite the absence of systematic agricultural reform. Second, though there was a slight rebound in 2012, there was a notable drop in the use of imperative language in 2010 and 2011 on the issue of judicial system reform and constitutional reform in spite of the fact that there has been no systematic reform in these two critical aspects of the rule of law. This is particularly interesting considering that 2010, the year after the failed Butmir peace process, is a down year in general. Third, when compared with the reports issued during Slovakia’s accession process (1998 – 2003), the BiH reports are quite stagnant in terms of their content and the tone of criticism. While this may quite fairly reflect the lack of reform in BiH, the lack of firmer and more frequent imperative language to unequivocally demonstrate the need for reform is evident, particularly since 2010. Additionally, while a thorough analytical overlay of the political situation from 2005 – 2012 on the content and tone of reports is beyond the scope of this exercise, a few signposts provide useful context. The reports are issued in the autumn of each year. Key events to bear in mind when reviewing the reports include: the failure of the “April package” in spring 2006; the domestic “Prud process” from November 2008 – January 2009; the Butmir constitutional reform exercise in late 2009; and the visit of EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton to BiH in May 2011. Finally, regardless of the extent of imperative language used, the progress reports take an increasingly critical tone when discussing most policy areas. This is helpful in identifying the remaining reform obstacles and problems areas. The reduction of imperative language, however, is less easy to explain. In the absence of implemented reform, one would expect the use of imperative language to remain stable at a minimum, if not increase, as the reform environment stagnates or worsens, and as criticism continues or increases. However, the EU has drawn few firm lines in BiH, and local officials with an interest in whittling down EU expectations have, not surprisingly, come to see conditionality as something negotiable.
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Following a delay of several years and much heated debate, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) conducted a long-overdue census between 1 - 15 October 2013, the first in 22 years. This census is of crucial importance to both BiH and the international community, as many of the Dayton-era power-sharing arrangements between the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) are based on the 1991 census. The new census results will reflect the significant demographic changes caused by wartime ethnic cleansing and displacement. Given the continuing downward spiral of BiH’s current political dynamic, there should be little doubt that census results will be extremely controversial. On 3 February 2012, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Parliamentary Assembly adopted a law for a census to be conducted in April 2013. The delay in adopting the law meant that BiH did not hold a census in 2011, the year that all European Union (EU) member states (as well as other former Yugoslav countries) held theirs. Additional political haggling delayed the census from April to October 2013. Even though the process of knocking on doors has finished and many are already exhausted from the politicization of the process, the issue is far from over. The aggregation, analysis, and most importantly, the use of the data will remain open questions during 2014 – a general election year. This brief provides an overview of the key issues surrounding the census in BiH and identifies a number of potential policy and political implications that will continue to both shape and reflect the politics of numbers.
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The European Stability Initiative recently published a troubling report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) called “Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth - Why the Sejdić-Finci case should not block an EU application.”1 ESI argues that “non-implementation of the Sejdić-Finci decision cannot justify blocking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership,” noting that the reforms the EU expects from Bosnia have not been required of other EU applicants, much less its own member states.2 ESI argues that a ground-breaking legal ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)3 should not impede Bosnia’s integration into the EU, but instead the EU should quickly give BiH candidate status and expect the constitutional revisions demanded by the ECHR to take place while BiH negotiates with the EU about membership. The paper justifies this with the claim that other countries (including EU member states) include de facto discriminatory provisions in their constitutions and are not sanctioned by the EU or the Council of Europe. // As will be shown in this text, that argument is not only highly flawed, but also demonstrates a troublingly lack of understanding of the fundamentals of BiH politics, as well as constitutional power-sharing arrangements in the member states of the EU. As such, the paper appears to be an effort to provide an ideological framework for the EU to move beyond its continuing failures in BiH that have enabled local politicians to undo many of the highly-touted reforms put in place prior to 2006, when the EU assumed policy leadership. If Brussels uses the ESI paper as ideological justification for dropping conditionality, it would enable the Brussels bureaucracy to move ahead with its “one size fits all” cookie-cutter enlargement policy and pretend that “progress” is occurring, when at best a standstill can be observed, and at worst, previous achievements are slowly being reversed by local party elites.
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The purpose of this updated report is to review the European Union’s (EU) evolving approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in assessing fulfillment of EU membership conditions. In particular, this report is concerned with the following questions: How have EU requirements for BiH changed over time, if at all?, and; Have priorities evolved, and, if so, how? The European Commission “has drawn detailed conclusions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina… based on the technical analysis contained in… the annual EU Progress Reports for accession-bound countries.” These Progress Reports are technical in nature, but are nonetheless collective assessments generated by a committee of diagnostic evaluators. Apart from the political and economic situation, the Progress Reports “review Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity to implement European standards, that is, to gradually make legislation in key policy areas more compatible with European legislation and standards.” As such, they are a useful barometer of progress made not only in reform, but also expectations and requirements.3 They provide a useful annual baseline to consider both the status of the country in question in its reform and accession preparations, as well as the EU’s expectations for the country in question. In an effort to answer the above questions, the author has analyzed the annual EU Progress Reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 – 2013. These reports break down EU requirements by topic and sector. They are published with a nearly identical structure year after year, which facilitates comparison. The following five areas are examined: Agriculture, the Constitution, the Judicial System, Education, and Minority Rights and Protection. These sections were chosen for their link to constitutional reform issues—specifically those identified as crucial for EU accession (justice, agriculture, constitution)—as well as broader human rights issues related to BiH as a post-war, transition state (education, minority rights).
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“Compared with today's events in Kyiv, the Orange Revolution seems a children's party” – a foreign media outlet wrote when violent clashes on Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv erupted between protesters and police and when the first blood was shed. And it's hard to disagree ... While the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a kind of joyful “festival of democracy” with songs, dances, humor, and blossoming of folk art, the "Revolution of Dignity" of 2013-2014, as it is now called, included tragic events of the kind that had never happened in the independent Ukraine. These two impressive popular revolutions in Ukraine do have a number of elements in common. They both started on November 21 (nine years apart), on the day of the Archangel Michael, the official patron saint of Kyiv and the head of the “heavenly army.” People often spoke about the mystical underpinnings of the protests, asserting that heavenly forces led by the Archangel Michael inspired people to fight against the regime. It is not surprising that the more than one hundred activists killed on the Maidan were promptly dubbed the “Heavenly Hundred.”
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Two comments are often (and increasingly) heard about politics, elections and citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): 1. “If citizens want political change, they should vote for political change”1 2. “BiH needs more political accountability from its elected leaders at all levels, (but without difficult, substantial, politically impossible changes to the constitutional structure or election system).” Few would doubt the apparent truth behind these statements. A core element of a functioning, accountable democracy is the regular possibility for the alternation of power, as citizens vote out, and vote in, different leaders and parties that offer different platforms for the future. Voters should be able to use the election system to force politicians to deliver and to be accountable. Nothing is standing in the way of BiH’s path to a more prosperous, reform-oriented, Euro-Atlantic future other than citizens voting for new leaders who can bring this vision to reality. However, based on the experience of the past 18 years, is this a realistic approach to politics in a post-Dayton, pre-EU BiH? This paper considers whether there are incentives in the BiH electoral and political system that promote a relationship based on accountability between the electorate and the elected, and whether it is likely that a country that purports to be hungry for reform and progress, and tired of the same old faces in politics, can or will demonstrate this interest through their choices in the general elections in October. Why does it seem like every election in BiH is meant to be “pivotal,” while in reality little seems to change?
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The past two years in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were punctuated by episodes of unprecedented popular activism. Major flooding in central and northern BiH demonstrated government lack of preparedness and incompetence at all levels. These events coincided with the failure of efforts to obtain one particular constitutional change: implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) ruling in the Sejdić-Finci case. The positions of BiH political leaders on structural questions have been clear – and entrenched. Yet little attention has been paid, both by local political actors and the international community, to what citizens of the country actually think as to how outstanding structural impediments to accountability and functionality, manifest in BiH’s constitutional order, can be addressed. This paper analyzes results of seven recent polls, undertaken mostly in the past two years, to identify areas of popular agreement on discrete elements which should be addressed in BiH’s constitutional structure. This analysis allows for an overall view on trends over time and across themes. It also reduces the risk of selective data and manipulated answers being touted as expressions of citizens’ interests. The aggregate results demonstrate far more popular appetite for confronting outstanding problems through the constitutional structure than is evident at either the local or international political level – 88% in the aggregate in 2013, including nearly 80% of RS respondents, for example. Citizens understand that this would allow them to live as in a “normal country” with functioning governance, facilitate confidence-building and reconciliation, and be a prerequisite to integration into the EU. Numerous responses on sectoral priorities defy conventional wisdom – and current policies. Corruption consistently topped the list of identified popular concerns, with it being explicitly linked to the economic situation in most of the polls assessed. Justice is seen as among the most corrupted elements of governance, this corruption also being manifest in political influence. Nearly 8 in 10 citizens – including more than 6 in 10 Serbs – surveyed believe corruption needed to be investigated and adjudicated at the state-level. An overwhelming majority of BiH citizens of all stripes agree that agriculture should be among the elements of constitutional reform – with more than 60% (including a plurality of RS Serbs) believing this should be a state competence. Furthermore, nearly 80% of respondents stated that EU laws should trump domestic law, giving the EU potential leverage in its reform efforts, should it mobilize a popular constituency. The analysis of the surveys shows that the differences among respondent groups are narrow and are decreasing over time, as all citizens grow more dissatisfied with politics and politicians. There are few differences across entities and ethnicities when it comes to burning issues such as corruption, the economic crisis, political representation and justice.
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This policy note argues that while educational policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) do not explicitly encourage radical or extremist thinking, they do decidedly facilitate the emergence of narrow-minded, ethnically exclusive groups of young citizens unequipped to operate in a heterogeneous, complex world. Insufficient measures exist to promote critical thinking, media literacy, multiperspectivity and inclusive civic-mindedness. At best, the present educational approach bodes poorly for the socio-economic prospects of BiH’s youth in an increasingly competitive global market; at worst, few preventive measures exist that would dissuade vulnerable individuals from gravitating towards extremist worldviews. BiH’s ethnically fragmented and exclusivist approaches to education are anathema to the development of critical thinking and analytical skills necessary to open young minds, reduce intolerance and question the ethnic status quo narrative. While global fears of Islamist extremism dominate discussions on radicalism and terrorism, other forms of extremism (radical nationalist; white supremacy; neo-Nazi; anti-immigrant; etc.) benefit from young minds unable to effectively digest and question messages of hate and intolerance. Young people from the Balkans have gone not only to Syria and Iraq, but also to Ukraine, as part of a perceived ideological, cultural struggle.
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Later this month, the European Commission is scheduled to publish its 2015 Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a document that purports to be the EU’s annual manifesto of priorities for the country. Like its predecessors of the last five years, however, the report will come up short. Its content will continue to be driven by inertia, though attempts by the Commission to inflate any signs of progress are a common feature that can be expected as well. There is some indication that turnover within the Commission following the 2014 European elections may open up some institutional space for a more frank reckoning with the lack of progress in the country, which has been mired in political stagnation for nearly a decade. However, there is also a risk that institutional commitment to the still vague “Reform Agenda” will limit this slender opportunity. The interaction of these forces is complex. Here is what to expect from this year’s report.
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When a new Croatian government was formed at the end of 2011 under SDP leadership, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Vesna Pusić, took office and shortly thereafter announced their intention to make good relations with neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) a top priority of their policy of strong regional engagement. This decision to re-engage in BiH came after years of inactivity due to official Zagreb’s all-consuming focus on its preparations for EU membership and at a time when the on-going structural political crisis in BiH had reached new heights. There were growing demands for action on the crisis from individual EU member states despite the EU itself being not willing to seriously re-engage and take action. The new government’s BiH policy was to be a “principled policy” – one that would follow the state policy defined by former President Stipe Mesić in 2000 and accepted by all subsequent governments which was based on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and making it clear to BiH Croats that their capital is Sarajevo, not Zagreb. There was real hope in Zagreb that this was a new beginning. New opposition HDZ leader Tomislav Karamarko had generated further hope in a stronger, constructive BiH policy, on account of his political biography. But it soon became evident that there was no developed thinking or cohesive plan behind the basic declarations. Three years on, and hopes for change have been dashed. Croatia’s policy toward BiH has had little or no positive impact on relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Milanović’s efforts got mired in the conflictual relations among the key political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like former President Ivo Josipović’s earlier BiH policy initiative, it demonstrates that Croatia’s leverage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly over BiH Croat politics, has substantially diminished since the 1990s. Foreign and European Affairs Minister Pusić attempted to make an impact working within the framework of the EU after Croatia became its 28th member, but her BiH plan received little support among member states, despite the fact that its main elements were almost identical to those of the later German-British initiative – now the EU’s new and much-touted BiH policy. Pusić could do little more than insist that she thought of it first. The Pusić plan had presented a dramatic policy U-turn that left the BiH experts within her ministry largely marginalized. Now, toward the end of Pusić’s term in office, those in her ministry in charge of BiH and the wider region appear to be skeptical of the prospects for the EU’s new BiH initiative to succeed. The BiH policy of all the top political players in today’s Croatia – the Prime Minister, the Foreign and European Affairs Minister, the President, the opposition leader – seems to be schizophrenic. They seem to possess closely-held views that are both moderate and reality-based. They reject the idea of a third entity, repudiate the HDZ BiH’s cooperation with the government in the Republika Srpska, and see the BiH Croat political leadership, along with the country’s entire political elite, as corrupt and part of the problem - not a part of the solution. Yet these views hardly ever translate into public performance or policy. Instead, the government, president, and opposition repeatedly allow themselves to get drawn into paying public tribute to Croatia’s 1990s policy legacy on BiH, which views the country solely through the lens of ethno-politics. While this conduct is considerably less invasive than it was under Croatian BiH policy in the 1990s, it nevertheless prevents Croatia from completely breaking with the past and setting aside the war legacy – which could now be done at a very low political price due to the current general disinterest of Croatian citizens regarding BiH. As a consequence, Croatia’s already limited potential impact as an honest broker on Bosnia and Herzegovina both in its direct relations with BiH and within the EU framework is further reduced. In Brussels, for example, Croatia’s MEPs are more vocal, but they are less respected than those of other new member states. Another policy remnant of the recent past is the constitutional right granted to BiH Croats with dual citizenship to vote in Croatian elections. The practice of this right undermines the sovereignty and democratic development of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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On the road towards EU enlargement, potential member states need to comply with the EU acquis communautaire. Chapter 18 of the acquis foresees the conduct of a population census by enlargement countries. This has proven to be more challenging in the post-war environment of the former Yugoslavia than in other countries. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the attributes of ethnicity and territory increased in importance as they were used to set or consolidate new borders and distribute rights and power according to population numbers and concentration. The sensitive aspects of ethnicity, language and religion, and the simple definition of the census category of ‘place of usual residence’ complicate the collection of census data in the region. This complication is rooted in the potential for an increase or decrease of ‘ethnic’ population numbers that can lead to the loss of rights or political influence. The significance of these aspects has been underestimated by the EU, which approaches the collection of population data as a rather technical exercise. This policy note reviews the recent census experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to identify similarities in problems, process and politics, and to offer lessons learned for the future.
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