KNOWLEDGE-HOW, ABILITY, AND COUNTERFACTUAL SUCCESS. A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION Cover Image

KNOWLEDGE-HOW, ABILITY, AND COUNTERFACTUAL SUCCESS. A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION
KNOWLEDGE-HOW, ABILITY, AND COUNTERFACTUAL SUCCESS. A STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

Author(s): Adrian Ludușan
Subject(s): Logic, Contemporary Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Methodology and research technology
Published by: Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai
Keywords: know-how; ability; counterfactual success; intellectualism; anti-intellectualism; null hypothesis significance testing; effect size;

Summary/Abstract: The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to overcome these arguments, followed by an analysis of Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument to Hawley’s counterfactual success thesis [CST]. We will conclude that Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument misses its target, so that, as far as we are concerned, Katherine Hawley’s proposal, namely CST, is safe. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a statistical interpretation of one of Hawley’s more specific proposals, counterfactual success with occasional failure [CSTF], and assess a couple of philosophically challenging consequences that follow from such an interpretation.

  • Issue Year: 65/2020
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 51-66
  • Page Count: 16
  • Language: English